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Of course, employees get sick for many different reasons, not only due to work 
pressures as in the above quote, but also for reasons unrelated to the work(place). 
Regardless of its cause, being absent from work due to sickness has significant 
social and economic consequences for sick-listed employees (e.g., social exclusion, 
loss of income) as well as for organizations (e.g., costs of replacement staff, lost 
productivity) (Van Gestel, Vossen, Oomens & Hollanders, 2013; Whitaker, 2001). 
Given these costs, my dissertation deals with an important question that flows from 
the one raised in the above quote: How do organizations – in my case, hospitals – 
manage the sickness absence of their employees, so that they can return to ‘taking 
care of the sick people’ in the hospitals? In particular, as I often had to clarify 
during my PhD trajectory, my main issue of interest was to understand how the 
sick-listed employees within hospitals (instead of the patients) are taken care of, in 
order for them to return to their work as soon as possible.
This issue has not been addressed in isolation. Rather, I have approached the study 
of sickness absence practices within organizations as the ‘microfoundations’ of the 
(inter)national ‘activation paradigm’ aimed to reduce the burden of sickness absence 
for society. Namely, although not mentioned by the employee in the above quote, 
sickness absence has major implications for the wider society as well (Whitaker, 
2001). These implications include absence-related healthcare costs (around 10 billion 
euros per year in the Netherlands; Steenbeek, Hooftman, Geuskens & Wevers, 2010) 
and the costs of sickness benefits (16.8 billion Danish kroner, around 3.3 billion 
euros in Denmark, in 2013; Statistics Denmark, 2015a). Hence, the aim of my 
dissertation was to study how the activation paradigm is translated into sickness 
absence practices within hospitals in two different countries: the Netherlands and 
Denmark.
In this chapter, I will briefly introduce the concept of the activation paradigm. 
Next, I will elaborate on the theoretical approach of my dissertation, which is rooted 
in institutional theory and – more specifically – in Scandinavian institutionalism 
and the literature on translation. This elaboration also leads to the formulation of 
‘It’s really expensive for a hospital to have people on sick leave. And I think 
that if you don’t take care of the people working for you, they get sick. I think 
my ten-year old daughter said it very well, she said, ‘I don’t understand that 
you go to work and then you get sick, why do you get sick at work?’, I said, 
‘because I have so much to do’, [and then she replied], ‘well, that’s stupid, 
that’s really stupid, because who’s going to take care of the sick?’. She is ten, 
and I think she said it all: Who is going to take care of the sick people?  
[Employee DK2-4]
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the main research question of my dissertation. Subsequently, I will explain my 
choice for studying hospitals in the Netherlands and Denmark as the context of 
my research. Finally, I will give an overview of the research questions that are 
addressed in each of the subsequent chapters of my dissertation.   
1.1 Setting the scene: The activation paradigm
Since the 1990s, many European countries have adopted the ‘activation paradigm’1 
to curb the increasing costs of their welfare states (Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011; Serrano 
Pascual, 2007; Weishaupt, 2011). The activation paradigm marks a normative shift in 
the task of the welfare state, from the traditional ‘passive’ provision of social bene-
fits in case of an inability to work (due to unemployment, sickness or disability), 
to the ‘active’ prevention of benefit dependency through gainful employment and 
conditionality of benefit receipt (see Table 1.1 for an overview of this shift; Cox, 
1998; Eichhorst, Kaufmann, Konle-Seidl & Reinhard, 2008). While the welfare state 
was previously seen as providing a safety net, nowadays it is argued that benefi-
ciaries have become entrapped in this net and have to be propelled back into the 
labor market as soon as possible (Sol, Sichert, Van Lieshout & Koning, 2008). Work, 
or a higher employment level, is thereby considered as the key solution to improve 
the economic self-reliance of individuals on the micro level as well as to ensure the 
long-term viability of the welfare state on the macro level (Bonvin, 2008; Eichhorst 
et al., 2008; Weishaupt, 2011). 
Table 1.1 Changes in the goal, task and underlying principle of the welfare state
‘Passive’: Welfare provision ‘Active’: Provision of activation
Goal Prevention of poverty through benefit provision Prevention of benefit dependency through 
gainful employment
Task Guaranteeing social rights (benefit receipt is seen 
as an entitlement)
Regulating individual’s behavior (benefit 
receipt is conditional on rights and 
obligations)
Principle Collective responsibility to protect individuals 
against social risk
Individual responsibility to be able to adapt 
to the requirements of an ever-changing 
economy
Source: Based on Serrano Pascual (2007, pp. 15-23) 
1 In the literature, the ‘activation paradigm’ (e.g., MacEachen et al., 2007; Serrano Pascual, 2007; Weishaupt, 2011) goes by 
different names, such as the ‘activation logic’ (e.g., Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011) or ‘activation policies’ (e.g., Bonvin, 2008). In my 
dissertation, I use these terms interchangeably. 
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In my dissertation, I focus on the activation paradigm in relation to sickness absence, 
or “absence from work that is attributed to sickness by the employee and accepted as 
such by the employer” (Whitaker, 2001, p. 420). More specifically, I focus on long-
term sickness absence, which I define as absence from work for six weeks or longer 
(Dekkers-Sanchez, Hoving, Sluiter & Frings-Dresen, 2008). In this area, the activation 
paradigm promotes an early and sustainable return to work before employees 
have fully recovered, following a hurt versus harm rationale: “hurt – pain that is 
experienced during recovery – does not necessarily imply harm or an impediment 
to recovery” and hence, “pain [or hurt] is not a reason to stop all activities or to not 
return to work” (MacEachen, Ferrier, Kosny & Chambers, 2007, p. 43). Instead of 
focusing on the disabilities of sick-listed employees, the activation paradigm thus 
stresses uncovering their remaining ability to work, by considering adjustments of 
working hours and/or work tasks (Hetzler, 2009). The focus on workplace actions 
within the activation paradigm, together with the social and economic costs 
associated with sickness absence, have led to a greater involvement of organizations 
in the return-to-work process. Increased employer participation is also advocated by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2010, 2015): 
Employers are key players in the [sickness and] disability benefit system, 
even if they are not always recognized as such. Too often they are outside the 
policy process, being viewed as part of the problem, not part of the solution. 
In particular, sickness absence is a period during which much more could be 
done in most countries to monitor the health status of workers and manage 
their return to work (OECD, 2010, p. 14).
Although by now the activation paradigm is regarded as a politically legitimate and 
appealing discourse (Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011; Eichhorst et al., 2008; Weishaupt, 
2011), so far, relatively little is known of how this paradigm is translated into actual 
sickness absence practices within organizations (e.g., OECD, 2010; Seing, MacEachen, 
Ekberg & Ståhl, 2014; Tjulin, MacEachen & Ekberg, 2010). This is remarkable, since 
the functioning of activation policies not only depends on an appropriate policy 
design, but also – and perhaps even more so – on the acceptance, translation and 
enactment of these policies by workplace actors (Eichhorst et al., 2008; Graziano 
& Winkler, 2012; Van Gestel & Nyberg, 2009). Moreover, effective implementation 
is dependent on the collaboration between multiple actors in sickness absence 
management (Hoefsmit, De Rijk & Houkes, 2013; Seing et al., 2014; Tiedtke et al., 
2012). This is increasingly the case, since the number of workplace stakeholders 
has expanded as a result of the growing attention to sickness absence. Nowadays, 
these stakeholders may include supervisors, Human Resource (HR) managers, union 
representatives and healthcare providers (Franche, Baril, Shaw, Nicholas & Loisel, 
‘
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2005). At the same time, the involvement of a multiplicity of stakeholders with 
various interests has been shown to create frictions (e.g., between line and HR 
managers) as to who is responsible for managing sickness absence (Cunningham, 
James & Dibben, 2004; Seing, Ståhl, Nordenfelt, Bülow & Ekberg, 2012; Van Gestel, 
Nyberg & Vossen, 2015). Conflicts over responsibilities may impair the return-to-
work process when absence problems are left unaddressed or are dealt with (too) 
late or inconsistently. This may lead to a situation of “muddling through” in cases 
of sickness absence (C. Dunn & Wilkinson, 2002, p. 245), instead of an early return 
to work as espoused by the activation paradigm. 
With regard to the link between activation policies and local sickness absence 
practices, the above underscores that “[a]s there is no one-to-one relationship 
between legislation and actual behavior, it is necessary to study the tension 
between policy and practice in its specific context” (Tiedtke et al., 2012, p. 242; 
see also Higgins, O’Halloran, & Porter, 2012). In my dissertation, I respond to this 
call by studying how sickness absence is managed in actual cases and within the 
context of the activation paradigm. Since there are considerable differences in the 
arrangement of the activation policies across countries (Eichhorst et al., 2008; Van 
Berkel, De Graaf & Sirovátka, 2012), I have taken a cross-national perspective in my 
dissertation by comparing the Netherlands and Denmark (more on this follows in 
section 1.3). Doing so enables me to study how activation policies are arranged in 
different welfare states (Daguerre, 2007) and whether these various arrangements 
lead to differences in how sickness absence is managed. My dissertation herewith 
aims to achieve a better understanding of the macro-micro linkages between the 
activation paradigm on the one hand and micro-level perceptions and actions of 
workplace stakeholders in sickness absence management on the other hand.
1.2 A Scandinavian institutionalist perspective on
  microfoundations
1.2.1 Institutional theory and institutional logics
The relationship between national activation policies and local sickness absence 
practices can be understood from the perspective of institutional theory, which 
seeks to explain how institutional demands – or society’s expectations of appropriate 
behavior – affect the actions of organizations and individuals (Dacin, 1997; 
Scott, 2008). Institutional demands refer to the “rules and regulations, normative 
prescriptions and social expectations” exerted on organizations and individuals 
in a given field (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 457). Also part of these demands are 
cultural templates called ‘institutional logics’: “the socially constructed, historical 
18
patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and 
space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 
p. 804). Institutional logics thus provide explicit and implicit rules of appropriate 
(inter)action and interpretation, and in so doing specify means and ends of behavior 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). As I will argue in Chapter 2, 
the activation paradigm can be considered an institutional logic, being a macro-
level belief system regarding the division of responsibilities between the state and 
other stakeholders in social security, and including practices that define legitimate 
answers and solutions to deal with social issues of (in my case) sickness absence.
Nowadays, institutional theorists recognize that actors face multiple, often con- 
flicting institutional logics (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 
2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008), and that this ‘institutional complexity’ is not a 
temporary situation but rather an enduring feature of many organizational fields 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). Furthermore, the broad and general nature of institutional 
logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Voronov, De Clercq & Hinings, 2013) as well as 
the occurrence of institutional complexity are assumed to provide organizations 
and individuals with opportunities for action, since they can use the multi-
interpretability of, and contradictions between, institutional logics to their own 
advantage (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012; Voronov et al., 2013). Accordingly, 
scholars have become interested in understanding the strategies and mechanisms of 
responding to (multiple) institutional logics, either on the level of organizations (e.g., 
Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010) or on the individual level (e.g., Pache & Santos, 
2013a; Reay et al., 2013). Hence, the institutional logics perspective acknowledges 
that micro-processes are “built from translations, analogies, combinations, and 
adaptations of more macro institutional logics” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 4), rather 
than being mere lower-level, non-agentic copies of institutional logics.  
Despite this increasing interest in knowing “how logics work in practice” (Lindberg, 
2014, p. 486), to date, researchers are still catching up on their understanding of 
the so-called ‘microfoundations’ of institutional demands: the intra-organizational 
processes through which “macro-orders are ‘pulled down,’ and become imbricated in 
local or particular cases, situating macro-effects inside organizations and individuals” 
(Powell & Colyvas, 2008, p. 278; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).2 This research gap stems 
from the fact that institutional scholars have traditionally focused on the macro level 
of analysis instead of on the micro level, and paid more attention to the outcomes 
of institutional demands (e.g., homogeneity and stability) rather than to the process 
2 Although I define the microfoundations of institutions as a top-down focus, Powell and Colyvas (2008) also defined a 
bottom-up approach, where micro-level actions aggregate to change or disrupt institutions. This approach is, for example, 
reflected in the concept of ‘institutional work’ (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
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through which organizations and individuals translate and enact these demands 
into practices (Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Suddaby, Elsbach, Greenwood, Meyer & 
Zilber, 2010). In addition, more recent efforts that aim to address this gap have been 
criticized for emphasizing the organizational over the individual level (for critiques 
see, e.g., McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2013a; Reay et al., 2013), with 
researchers “looking for ‘an organization’s’ single response” to institutional demands, 
rather than for the responses of multiple individuals in the different subunits of an 
organization (Binder, 2007, p. 551; italics in original).
As a result, there is a limited understanding of the microfoundations of institu-
tional demands, both in terms of taking a multi-level perspective and in relation to 
studying how (multiple) individuals interpret, translate and enact these demands in 
their local practices (after Felin, Foss & Ployhart, 2015). With this dissertation, I aim 
to contribute to a better insight into the microfoundations of an institutional logic 
(i.e. the activation paradigm), answering the following main research question: 
What are the microfoundations of the activation paradigm in sickness absence 
management, within hospitals in the Netherlands and Denmark? 
I will address this question by applying and further developing a distinctive, 
process-oriented variant of institutional theory: ‘Scandinavian institutionalism’ 
(Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, 2003) and its concept of ‘translation’ in particular 
(Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996).
1.2.2 Scandinavian institutionalism and translation
Although Scandinavian institutionalism consists of different lines of inquiry (i.e. 
‘decoupling’, ‘sensemaking’, and ‘translation’; Boxenbaum & Strandgaard Pedersen, 
2009), I focus on the concept of translation (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin-
Andersson, 1996), since it “offers both a conceptual and methodological way forward 
for researchers interested in moving beyond the totalizing view of institutions and 
institutional outcomes” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 243). Instead of viewing 
institutional demands as diffusing into organizations automatically and ‘as is’, 
the translation approach considers these demands (described in terms of ‘ideas’) 
as spreading and being transformed within organizations through translations by 
actors with specific interests (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; 
based on Latour, 1986). In this way, translation can be defined as “the more or less 
deliberate transformation of practices and/or ideas that happens when various actors 
try to transfer and implement them” (Røvik, 2011, p. 642). The translation approach 
thus assumes that institutional demands are changed as they are translated: “to set 
something in a new place is to construct it anew” (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005, p. 8).
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In describing the translation process as the ‘travels of ideas’, Czarniawska 
and Joerges (1996) built on Latour’s (1986) conceptualization of translation “in an 
attempt to understand a continuous circulation of management ideas and practices” 
(Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005, p. 8). The translation process is said to occur in four 
steps: idea, object, action and institution. In short, before an idea can be transferred 
to a new context, it first needs to be selected and framed as the rational solution to 
local problems, and support for its implementation has to be mobilized by aligning 
actors’ interests. When chosen, the idea is turned into an abstract object that is 
disembedded from its old setting in terms of time and spatial features. Finally, the 
idea is re-embedded in the new context by translating it into practices, which are 
themselves at times materialized into action, and if repeated, may become stabilized 
into an institution (otherwise the idea remains a fashion). The translation process 
then restarts with the selection of a new idea (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin 
& Wedlin, 2008). In my dissertation, I focus on the ‘action’ phase of the translation 
process, where the activation paradigm becomes re-embedded within organizational 
practices.
According to Sahlin-Andersson (1996), the translation process is guided by three 
implicit editing rules that are informed by the institutional environment. These 
rules are not available to actors as explicit “rules to follow”, but only reveal as “rules 
which have been followed” when studying the translation process in hindsight 
(p. 85). In brief, rules of context help to make sense of ideas and re-embed them 
in a new context; rules of formulation enable phrasing an idea in a way that is 
appropriate to the new setting; and rules of logic describe logics of action (see 
also Helin & Sandström, 2010; Morris & Lancaster, 2006). Taken together, although 
the translation approach focuses on intra-organizational processes, as we saw 
in the previous paragraphs, it does so without losing sight of their institutional 
embeddedness (Boxenbaum & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2009; Czarniawska & Sevón, 
2003). It therefore fits particularly well with my aim to study the microfoundations 
of the activation paradigm.
Nevertheless, in my dissertation, I do not only wish to apply the translation 
approach, but also to further develop the scholarly understanding of the translation 
process. To do so, I address two issues that have remained rather underexplored so 
far: (1) the translation work at an organization’s frontline, and (2) the micro-level 
interactions occurring during translation. These issues are briefly explained below.
21
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Translation work at the frontline
The perceived attributes of an idea, the perceived characteristics of a problem 
and the match between them are all created, negotiated or imposed during the 
collective translation process. All three are the results, not the antecedents of 
this process. […] It is therefore the process of translation that should become 
our concern, not the properties of ideas (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 25).
As the above quote shows with regard to the translation approach, a distinguishing 
feature of Scandinavian institutionalism is its interest in intra-organizational 
processes as a response to institutional demands (Boxenbaum & Strandgaard 
Pedersen, 2009). Applied to translation, the focus is thus on the process of translating 
(as a verb) to understand why and how an idea is adopted in practice, rather than 
on the properties of an idea.3 Put differently, the translation approach does not 
aim to study the intrinsic characteristics of an idea, but rather (the success of) its 
presentation during the translation process (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 25).
Yet, until now, translation researchers have often stopped their investigations at 
the organizational level of analysis, studying the adoption of ideas by (top) managers 
but leaving aside how these ideas are subsequently translated at the frontline (Helin 
& Sandström, 2010; Reay et al., 2013; Teulier & Rouleau, 2013). This is remarkable, 
given that the acceptance of an idea at the organizational level is not necessarily 
followed by related changes in frontline practices (Reay et al., 2013; Zbaracki, 1998). 
Previous studies have thus left a gap in studying how institutional demands travel 
through organizations, resulting in a need to examine the actual “translation work” 
(Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014, p. 251) at an organization’s frontline. The aim of Chapter 
3 of my dissertation therefore is to further develop this understanding, where I will 
show how the activation paradigm is translated into organizational policies and 
frontline practices, by using Sahlin-Andersson’s (1996) editing rules.
3 In this way, Scandinavian institutionalism is comparable to ‘practice theory’, which focuses on what people are actually 
doing (‘praxis’) in their everyday work, rather than solely studying their practices (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen & Van de Ven, 
2009). According to Czarniawska and Sevón (2003), Scandinavian institutionalism can even be seen as a precursor to practice 
theory: “Long before Pierre Bourdieu legitimized ‘social practices’ as an object of study, Nordic researchers studied ‘praxis’ 
(‘practices’ cannot be used in plural in Scandinavian languages)” (p. 13).
‘
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Micro-level interactions
[T]he spread in time and space of anything – claims, orders, artifacts, goods 
– is in the hands of people; each of these people may act in many different 
ways, letting the token drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, or betraying it, 
or adding to it, or appropriating it. […] When no one is there to take up the 
statement or the token then it simply stops (Latour, 1986, p. 267).
As highlighted by the above quote, translators are vital for translation to occur, 
since they “energize an idea any time they translate it for their own or somebody 
else’s use” (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 23). What is more, translation is a 
collective process, as it is the result of the energy given to an idea by “everyone 
in the chain”, with everybody shaping the idea according to his or her different 
interests as it moves from hand to hand (Latour, 1986, p. 267). Social interactions 
are thus central to the translation process (Johnson & Hagström, 2005; Mueller & 
Whittle, 2011).
Although key to the translation of ideas, the micro-level interactions occurring 
during translation have remained rather underexplored so far (Mueller & Whittle, 
2011), with most scholars studying the translation process either from the 
perspective of one specific group of translators (e.g., Boxenbaum, 2006; Teulier & 
Rouleau, 2013) or from the angle of different translators but without consideration 
of their interactions (e.g., Nicolini, 2010; Waldorff, 2013). Addressing the “micro-
interactional work” (Mueller & Whittle, 2011, p. 189) involved in the translation 
process is therefore central to Chapter 4 of my dissertation. To do so, I will combine 
the translation approach with social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), since this theory 
aims to understand workplace behavior by explicitly examining interpersonal 
interactions within organizations while seeing these interactions as guided by 
normative rules (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Di Domenico, Tracey & Haugh, 
2009). 
1.3 Research context 
1.3.1 The Netherlands and Denmark (and Ireland)
Since it is unfortunately impossible to study all European countries in one 
dissertation, I initially included three countries in my study: the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Ireland. A first reason for choosing these countries is their similarity 
in terms of sickness absence rates and the resulting equal challenge to reduce the 
inflow into the sickness (and disability) benefit system (OECD, 2008). Together 
‘
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with their reputation as ‘employment miracles’ regarding their approach to combat 
unemployment (Auer, 2002; Schwartz & Becker, 2005; Torfing, 1999), I expected 
that the three countries would have implemented the activation paradigm in their 
sickness absence policies as well. Another reason for selecting the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Ireland is the difference in the division of responsibilities between 
the government and employers in their national sickness absence policies: while 
the Dutch policies emphasize the (financial) efforts of employers in sickness 
absence management, the Irish policies stress the efforts of the central government. 
Denmark is in between these ‘extremes’, since local governments (municipalities) 
are mainly responsible but employers are increasingly given a role as well (OECD, 
2008). These differences would enable me to study whether a different arrangement 
of the activation policies in terms of roles and responsibilities leads to variation 
in the management of sickness absence, which was the reason for taking a cross-
national perspective.
However, having studied the national sickness absence policies of the three 
countries (see Chapter 2) led me to conclude that the activation paradigm is largely 
absent in the Irish policies. Hence, the OECD’s (2008) conclusion regarding Ireland 
that “[c]ompared to most OECD countries, systems and structures in place are still 
quite traditional, passive and reactive” (p. 29) is still valid more than five years 
later, and the activation paradigm has not yet been picked up in the Irish sickness 
absence policies, despite efforts to do so. Although I still believe that the three-
country comparison would provide interesting insights into different responses to 
growing European-level pressures for activation, this finding meant that Ireland 
no longer presented an appropriate case for studying the microfoundations of the 
activation paradigm. I therefore decided to drop Ireland from further research, and 
to focus on the Netherlands and Denmark.
1.3.2 The healthcare sector and hospitals
I explored the microfoundations of the activation paradigm in an industry where 
sickness absence presents a major challenge: the healthcare sector. First, on average, 
the healthcare sector faces higher sickness absence rates than other industries. In 
2013, the sickness absence rate across the Netherlands and Denmark was 3.9 and 3.8 
percent, respectively, against 4.8 and 6.1 percent in healthcare in the two countries 
(Statistics Netherlands, 2015a; Statistics Denmark, 2015b). These higher percent-
ages have been ascribed to the greater physical and psychosocial workload, expo-
sure to biological agents (i.e. bacteria and viruses), and to reorganizations within 
the healthcare sector (Michie & Williams, 2003; The Inspectorate SZW, 2013). 
Second, and most important in the long run, healthcare organizations are increas-
ingly confronted with employee shortages (Buchan & Aiken, 2008). Estimates by 
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the European Commission predict a lack of 230,000 physicians and 590,000 nurses 
in the European Union by 2020 (Glinos, 2012). This problem is particularly pressing 
given the aging of the (working) population, which increases the demand for care 
but at the same time decreases the supply of healthcare personnel (Buchan & Aiken, 
2008). More generally, examining the healthcare sector is socially relevant, since 
the costs of healthcare are the second highest public expenditures after those on 
social protection. In 2013, the Dutch and Danish government spent 36.7 and 44.0 
percent on social expenditures, respectively, followed by 17.7 and 15.3 percent on 
healthcare (Statistics Netherlands, 2015b; Statistics Denmark, 2015c). These issues 
reveal the importance of managing sickness absence in the healthcare sector and, 
hence, make it a relevant research setting to study how the activation paradigm is 
given shape in practice. 
More specifically, I conducted my research in hospitals, since these organizations 
are internationally comparable in terms of the kind of services delivered (i.e. patient 
care) and in their hybrid organizational structure of “hosting multiple professional 
Table 1.2 Overview of hospitals included in this dissertation
The Netherlands Denmark
City Hospital 
(NL1)a
Private, non-profit hospitalb
± 650 beds, ± 2,500 FTEs
Medical Center
(DK1)
Public, non-profit hospital
± 650 beds, ± 5,500 FTEs
2010: Revision of sickness 
absence policy by a consultancy 
firm; introduction of activation 
paradigm. Managers received 
training, but were supposed to 
educate the employees on their 
wards themselves
2007: Revision of sickness absence 
policy; idea and procedures reflect 
activation elements
SA-ratec at time of study: ± 3.5% SA-rate at time of study: ± 4.0%
Health Clinic
(NL2)
Private, non-profit hospital
± 400 beds, ± 1,600 FTEs
Region Hospital
(DK2)
Public, non-profit hospital
± 700 beds, ± 4,000 FTEs
2010: Revision of sickness 
absence policy by a (different) 
consultancy firm; introduction 
of activation paradigm. All 
managers were trained and 
were assumed to educate their 
employees during employee 
meetings
2011: Revision of sickness absence 
policy by representatives of (HR) 
management and employees, due 
to pressures from the union for 
the equal treatment of employees; 
introduction of activation paradigm
SA-rate at time of study: ± 3.5% SA-rate at time of study: ± 4.5%
Notes: a Names of the hospitals are pseudonyms; b The inclusion of private or public hospitals depends on the 
organization of hospitals in the two countries, but they are all non-profits (NVZ, 2010); c SA = sickness absence
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disciplines and balancing [governmental,] professional and commercial goals” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 355; italics in original; see also Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008). What is more, hospitals are large enough to select sufficient cases of 
long-term sickness absence, and to study this thorny issue without violating the 
anonymity and privacy of individual participants. In addition, to avoid examining 
the peculiarities of a single organization (Bechky, 2011), two hospitals were selected 
in both the Netherlands and Denmark. Since my main issue of interest was to 
understand the translation of the macro-level activation paradigm into micro-level 
sickness absence practices, at the meso level I aimed for as much comparability of 
the hospitals as possible. Therefore, the hospitals were chosen for their similarity 
in type of organization (i.e. non-profits), capacity (i.e. amount of beds) and above-
average hospital size in terms of full-time equivalents (FTEs) (around 1,400 and 
2,000 FTEs in the Netherlands and Denmark, respectively; Danske Regioner, 2015; 
DHD, 2015). Although not part of the selection criteria, all four hospitals appear to 
have low sickness absence rates, compared to the sector average. Table 1.2 provides 
a brief overview of the four hospitals included in my dissertation. 
1.4 Research questions and structure of the dissertation
Just as the ‘travels of ideas’ metaphor, I view my dissertation as a journey from 
the macro, via the meso, to the micro level of analysis. First, Chapter 2 starts off 
at the (inter)national level with a comparison of the activation paradigm in the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland. Then, in Chapter 3, I travel from the macro 
level to the meso and micro level by exploring how the activation paradigm is 
translated into organizational policies and frontline practices of sickness absence 
within the four hospitals. In Chapters 4 and 5, I reside at the micro level (although 
always with an eye on higher levels of analysis), where I unpack how local dyads 
of managers and employees translate the activation paradigm into sickness absence 
practices in their interactions (Chapter 4), and whether and how experiences with 
returning to work differ between cases of physical and mental health complaints 
in the Netherlands and Denmark (Chapter 5). Finally, my journey comes to an end 
in Chapter 6, where I reconnect the three levels and discuss the findings of my 
research, in order to answer the main research question of my dissertation (see 
Section 1.2 and repeated here):
What are the microfoundations of the activation paradigm in sickness absence 
management, within hospitals in the Netherlands and Denmark?
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Chapter 2
Understanding how the activation paradigm is given shape in the sickness absence 
policies at the macro level in the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland is essential 
luggage for travelling to the microfoundations. Developing this understanding is 
central to Chapter 2, “The activation logic in national sickness absence policies: 
Comparing the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland”. In this chapter, I approach the 
activation paradigm as an institutional logic that consists of underlying ideas about 
problems and solutions and an (often neglected) governance system that defines 
responsibilities, routines and regulative instruments for putting these ideas into 
practice. The research question is:
How is the activation logic understood and given shape in the national sick-
ness absence policies in the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, in terms of 
underlying ideas and governance systems?
I study this question by means of a multiple-case study design (Yin, 2009), with the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland as my cases. Data stem from a literature review 
and 18 interviews across the three countries with government officials, represen-
tatives of employers’ associations as well as unions, and with researchers. All the 
interviewees are experts in the field of sickness absence, return to work, employ-
ment and working conditions, or social security in general. 
The chapter shows that while the Netherlands and Denmark have adopted the 
activation paradigm, Ireland has not (leading me to exclude this latter country 
from further study, as I have explained in Section 1.3). In addition, I demonstrate 
that although the underlying ideas of the activation paradigm in the Netherlands 
and Denmark are similar, its governance systems differ when looking at the roles 
and responsibilities of employers and the policy instruments used to trigger their 
behavior in sickness absence management. Theoretically, this chapter points to the 
importance of explicitly including governance systems in studying “institutional 
logics in action” (Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013, p. 5).
Chapter 3
Carrying the information obtained in Chapter 2 in my suitcase, in Chapter 3, 
“Translation in practice: Cherry-picking activation policies”, I study how the 
activation paradigm is translated into organizational sickness absence policies 
(meso level) and frontline practices (micro level) in the four hospitals across the 
Netherlands and Denmark. To do so, I use the translation approach and especially 
Sahlin-Andersson’s (1996) editing rules (see Section 1.2). The research question 
guiding this chapter is as follows:
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How are national activation policies re-contextualized, re-labeled and defined 
into actions within organizational policies of sickness absence, and in daily 
sickness absence practices at the frontline?
To address this question, I use a multiple-case embedded design (Yin, 2009), 
considering the hospitals as my cases and five to six ‘networks of local actors’ around 
long-term sickness absence within each hospital as the embedded units of analysis 
(21 networks in total). Data stem from the hospitals’ sickness absence policies and 
from 61 semi-structured interviews with the most important workplace actors 
involved in the 21 local networks: sick-listed employees, their direct managers, and 
– depending on the country and the hospital – HR managers, union representatives, 
occupational health physicians, and other work and health professionals. 
In brief, I show how the activation paradigm is implemented in the sickness 
absence policies and practices of the Dutch and Danish hospitals through what I refer 
to as ‘selective coupling’ or ‘cherry-picking’: translating only those components 
of the activation policies that primarily serve the hospitals’ business interests 
and not necessarily those of sick-listed employees (compare returning to work ‘as 
soon as possible’ with ‘as soon as possible’, respectively). This chapter reveals how 
‘translation work’ within organizations, and especially at the frontline, determines 
how an idea is finally given shape in actual organizational policies and practices. 
Each editing rule (context, formulation and logic) contributes in its own way to 
achieving a better understanding of how organizational actors merge the demands 
arising from the activation policies with existing pressures in daily operations. 
Chapter 4
In Chapter 4, “Quid pro quo: Understanding the role of social interactions in 
translation processes”, I arrive at the micro level. Here, I build a bridge between the 
translation approach and Blau’s (1964) social exchange theory in ‘a social exchange 
perspective on translation’, in order to understand the micro-level interactions that 
occur in translating the activation paradigm. The research question addressed is:
What role do social interactions play in the translation of macro-ideas (such 
as the activation paradigm) into micro-level practices (like in sickness absence 
management)?
To answer this question, I specifically focus on the social interactions between local 
managers and their sick-listed employees, since they are the most important actors in 
the employment relationship. Methodologically, I consider these dyads as the cases, 
within the context of the four hospitals in the Netherlands and Denmark. Data consist 
of 42 semi-structured interviews with managers and their sick-listed employees.
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In short, in this chapter, I nuance the findings of the previous chapter by 
showing how managers’ translations of the activation paradigm as mainly serving 
the interests of the hospital or those of employees depend on their negative or 
positive perception of the social exchange with their sick-listed employees. As I will 
demonstrate, these perceptions are based on both past and present social exchanges. 
In doing so, this chapter highlights the important role of ‘micro-interactional work’ 
in the translation process. More specifically, it shows how this process is motivated 
by a ‘norm of reciprocity’, therewith further explaining why translation occurs.
Chapter 5
Still residing at the micro level, in Chapter 5, “‘Dis-able bodied’ or ‘dis-able minded’: 
Stakeholders’ return-to-work experiences compared between physical and mental 
health conditions”, I explore whether the return-to-work experiences of the various 
workplace actors involved in sickness absence management differ between cases 
of physical and mental health conditions, in both the Netherlands and Denmark. 
The reason to write this more practice-oriented chapter is that – by the end of 
my PhD trajectory – several researchers appeared to have studied return-to-work 
experiences, but did not explicitly address potential differences between physical 
and mental cases. However, during my research, I noticed how workplace actors 
frequently talked about different return-to-work experiences with different kinds 
of illnesses. The research questions guiding this chapter therefore are as follows: 
How and why do the return-to-work experiences of various workplace stake-
holders differ between physical and mental health conditions, and what are 
the consequences of potentially different experiences for the return-to-work 
process in both health conditions?
As in Chapter 3, I examine these questions by means of a multiple-case embedded 
design (Yin, 2009), but here the two countries are my cases and the networks of local 
actors around physical and mental illnesses are the embedded units of analysis.4 
Data in this chapter stem from the 61 interviews with the workplace actors involved 
in the 21 local networks. 
In brief, the chapter shows that while the activation paradigm does not distinguish 
between causes of absence, the workplace actors argue for a differential approach of 
physical and mental cases, with assessing work ability and following official return-
to-work guidelines being perceived as more important in mental than in physical 
cases. However, I reveal the questionability of this distinction, since both mentally 
4  However, to promote easy reading in this chapter, ‘cases’ refer to instances of sickness absence.
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and physically sick-listed employees seem to benefit from an equal dialogue on work 
ability and the implementation of a return-to-work plan. Although not a theoretical 
chapter, in line with the translation approach, it does show how the original activation 
paradigm is changed when local actors add a (in their eyes, necessary) distinction 
between physical and mental causes of absence to it.
Chapter 6
Finally, in Chapter 6, my journey comes to an end with a general discussion. In this 
chapter, I reconnect the different levels of analysis studied in Chapters 2 to 5 to 
answer the main research question of my dissertation. Subsequently, I discuss the 
theoretical contributions of my dissertation for (Scandinavian) institutional theory 
and the literature on translation in particular, and the practical contributions for 
policy makers and businesses. I also reflect on the research design of my dissertation 
and provide suggestions for future research, and end with a short conclusion. In 
sum, my dissertation tells the journey of a travelling idea, showing how pit stops at 
different locations add to or change (parts of) an idea during its travels. 
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The activation logic in national
sickness absence policies:
Comparing the Netherlands,
Denmark and Ireland
This chapter is based on Vossen, E., & Van Gestel, N. (2015). The activation logic in national sickness absence poli-
cies: Comparing the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 21(2), 165-180. 
An earlier version of this chapter was presented as a paper at the 2013 International Labor and Employment 
Relations Association (ILERA) Conference, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, June 20-22, Track 4: ‘New forms of 
regulation and governance’.  
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This chapter compares sickness absence policies in the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Ireland, examining whether and how the institutional logic of ‘activation’ 
that is paramount in Europe is understood and given shape in each country. 
They differ in their support for the underlying ideas of ‘activation’, and 
especially vary in the design of their governance systems, as can be seen in the 
allocation of responsibilities, the description of return-to-work routines and 
the use of regulative instruments. These findings contribute to institutional 
theory by demonstrating the important but often neglected role of national 
governance systems in the macro-micro linkage between institutional logics 
and organizational and individual behavior. Since sickness absence is a 
major cause of workforce inactivity, the practical relevance of this study is 
the comparative reflection of recent policy developments to improve sickness 
absence management. 
2.1 Introduction
Since the 1990s the ‘activation logic’, which regards paid work as a better type of 
welfare than benefit receipt, has changed European welfare states from passive to 
active benefit systems (Eichhorst et al., 2008; Kluve et al., 2007; Serrano Pascual, 
2004; Weishaupt, 2011). The essence of the activation logic is to increase labor market 
participation by facilitating access to employment and to inhibit exit from the labor 
market on unconditional benefit receipt. This should ultimately prevent dependency 
on social benefits, promote social inclusion and decrease public spending, so that 
the welfare state remains financially viable (Aust et al., 2012; Eichhorst et al., 2008). 
Although the activation logic has been implemented widely, more attention 
is paid to unemployment and social assistance than to sickness absence (OECD, 
2008), which can be defined as “absence from work that is attributed to sickness 
by the employee and accepted as such by the employer” (Whitaker, 2001, p. 420). 
The limited attention to sickness absence is remarkable, since it is a major cause 
of workforce inactivity (OECD, 2006) and has significant economic and social 
implications for the employee, the employer and the wider society (see Chapter 1; 
Whitaker, 2001). Moreover, sickness absence rates are expected to increase because 
of an aging workforce, unhealthy lifestyles and growing work pressure, which may 
result in greater risks of chronic diseases and psychosocial problems (Kirsten, 2008). 
Addressing sickness absence problems should thus have a high priority for national 
governments as well as for local actors, in particular for employers and employees.
Within the area of sickness absence, the activation logic stresses that work-
related illness should be prevented and that employees with a reduced capacity for 
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work should be kept on the labor market (Høgelund, 2003). Rather than regarding 
sickness absence as “uncontrollable and, hence, not subject to […] action” (Patton 
& Johns, 2012, p. 229), the underlying idea is that being sick does not (necessarily) 
mean that one cannot work and that continuing work while being ill may even have 
a positive influence on a full return to work (Roeters, 2005). Consequently, sickness 
absence policies should no longer stress an employee’s inability to work, but his 
or her residual capacity for work (OECD, 2008). Along with a shift in underlying 
ideas, the activation logic also entails a new perspective on governance. Instead 
of governing sickness absence merely at the national level, with the government, 
employers’ associations and trade unions in control, a devolution of governance 
to localities is promoted, for example to individual employers and employees or 
to municipalities (Etherington & Ingold, 2012; Jessop, 2002). Local actors are thus 
assumed to play an important role in preventing sickness absence from work and to 
ensure an early return to work (Eichhorst et al., 2008; Kluve et al., 2007).
The aim of this chapter is to compare sickness absence policies in the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, examining whether and how the activation logic 
is understood and given shape in each. We have selected these countries for two 
reasons. First, they have similar sickness absence rates and therefore share an equal 
challenge of reducing recourse to sickness benefits (OECD, 2008). Second, since 
these countries are said to have been particularly successful in activation when it 
comes to unemployment (Auer, 2002; Torfing, 1999), it seems likely that they have 
also taken up the activation logic in the area of sickness absence. Despite a similar 
challenge to reduce sickness absence rates, each country has its own history and 
traditions that may create distinctive responses. We therefore wish to explain both 
similarities and differences between the policies of these three countries. 
This chapter is structured as follows. We start with a discussion of the theoretical 
background, grounded in the literature on institutional logics. We define the 
activation logic as an institutional logic and show how institutional logics consist 
of ‘underlying ideas’ and ‘governance systems’. We then describe the methods of our 
study, and discuss whether and how the activation logic is understood and given 
shape in national sickness absence policies in terms of their underlying ideas and 
governance systems. Next, drawing on expert interviews, we attempt to understand 
similarities and differences in the adoption of the activation logic, and discuss the 
impact of the governance systems on the role of employers in each country. Finally, 
we discuss the implications of our study and develop suggestions for future research. 
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2.2 Institutional logics and the logic of activation
The logic of activation can be perceived as an institutional logic, since it involves 
a fundamental reorientation of the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
elements of the welfare state (Greenwood, Díaz, Li & Lorente, 2010; Scott, 2008). 
Institutional logics can be defined as the “formal and informal rules of action, 
interaction and interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers” (Thornton 
& Ocasio, 1999, p. 804); they specify “the content and meaning of institutions” 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 100) by providing the means by which specified ends 
are to be achieved (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 251). Decision makers – whether 
at the individual, organizational or societal level – are assumed to comply with 
these rules in order to make sense of situations and thereby to behave appropriately 
and gain approval from important referents (Greenwood et al., 2011). Understanding 
the actions of decision-makers thus necessitates studying the institutional logics 
surrounding these actions. 
Institutional logics refer not to specific laws or policies but to the underlying ideas 
(Greenwood et al., 2010), in particular about the specification of problems and the 
justification of solutions (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002). Underlying ideas 
may, for example, define “what kind of state intervention is appropriate […] and 
which actors need to be organized” (Weishaupt, 2011, p. 63). Institutional logics are 
accompanied by governance systems (Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003; Thornton et al., 
2012), which can be defined as the “institutional structures of authority transposing 
public law into action” (Weishaupt, 2011, p. 63). As such, they are regulatory 
and normative means which guide and control behavior, guarantee stability and 
maintain order; they involve a division of responsibilities, a description of routines 
and a choice for regulative instruments (Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002; Scott, 
2008; Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Caronna, 2000). Thus while underlying ideas provide 
a substantive framework for understanding problems and developing solutions, 
governance systems confine action to this framework. 
While institutional theorists have paid ample attention to the underlying ideas 
of institutional logics, their focus on the accompanying governance systems has 
been limited (Dacin et al., 2002; Suddaby, Cooper & Greenwood, 2007). This is 
surprising, since the latter are a crucial factor in understanding “institutional logics 
in action” (Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013, p. 5), as they attempt to influence and 
control behavior (Dacin et al., 2002, p. 51). In this chapter we aim to contribute to 
the current debate in institutional theory on the relationship between institutional 
logics and organizational and individual behavior, by examining the role of national 
governance systems in understanding this macro-micro linkage. By conducting a 
cross-national study, we examine the relationship between the underlying ideas and 
governance systems of an institutional logic: the activation logic. 
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2.3 Methods
We conducted case study research, since this helped us gain insight into the 
perspectives of multiple stakeholders on national sickness absence policies. We 
first performed a literature review, involving legal documents such as laws and 
policies, policy evaluations and scientific articles on the activation logic and its 
implementation in different fields. This enabled us to understand the state of the art 
of the Dutch, Danish and Irish national sickness absence policies. Between September 
2012 and May 2013 we undertook 18 expert interviews in the three countries, seeking 
the experts’ reflections on the underlying ideas of the sickness absence policies and 
whether and how the activation logic has changed the governance systems of these 
policies (see Appendix A for the interview guide). The interviews were conducted 
face-to-face (with one exception) and the respondents included a diversity of 
stakeholders in each country: government officials, representatives of employers’ 
associations, union representatives and researchers; Table 2.1 provides an overview 
of the respondents by country. All were involved in constructing, implementing or 
researching policies in the area of sickness absence, return to work, employment 
and working conditions or social security in general. The interviews were semi-
structured and took between 41 and 92 minutes, 72 minutes on average. They were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim, providing some 230 pages of transcripts. 
Table 2.1 Overview of respondents
NL DK IE
Government (G)a 2 - 2
Employers’ associations (EA)a 2 1 1
Trade union (TU)a 1 1 1
Researchers (R)a 2 3 2
Total 7 5 6
Note: a These abbreviations are used in the text to refer to interviews.
We analyzed the data by means of the two-step process described by Eisenhardt 
(1989). In the first step we created detailed case study descriptions for each 
country, in which the perspectives of the various respondents were highlighted, 
including similarities and differences between views within one country. In the 
second step we conducted cross-case comparisons in order to reveal similarities and 
differences between the three countries. As noted above, we concentrated on the 
underlying ideas and governance systems of the national sickness absence policies. 
Regarding the underlying ideas, we focused on the perspective on the sickness 
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absence problems and the ideas about how and by whom sickness absence should 
be addressed. With regard to the governance systems, we looked at the allocation 
of responsibilities and their regulation in the national policies. We distinguished 
between the allocation of the financial responsibility to compensate for a sick-
listed employees’ loss of income, and the assignment of the responsibility and the 
description of routines regarding their return to work (Knegt & Westerveld, 2008). 
Regarding the regulation of responsibilities, we identified three policy instruments 
defined by Vedung (1998): sticks (regulations with or without sanctions), carrots 
(subsidies and taxes) and sermons (moral persuasion).
2.4 Sickness absence policies in the Netherlands, Denmark 
  and Ireland
In this section we describe the national sickness absence policies in the three coun-
tries, first elaborating on their underlying ideas and subsequently outlining their 
various governance systems. 
Underlying ideas
In the Netherlands, the exceptional rates of sickness absence and disability – around 
7 and 15 percent, respectively (Cox, 1998; Van Gestel et al., 2013) – led prime 
minister Ruud Lubbers to declare in 1990 that “the Netherlands is sick”; it was 
necessary to change Dutch attitudes towards sickness absence (Høgelund, 2003). 
This initiated the reform of the national sickness absence policies: during the 
1990s and 2000s a series of regulations was introduced that adopted the activation 
logic (Sol et al., 2008; Van Gestel et al., 2013). Consequently, the responsibilities 
for sickness absence were devolved to individual employers and employees. The 
underlying idea was that employers and employees are in the best place to prevent 
sickness absence from work and to ensure an early return to work, since they 
are closest to the workplace (Knegt & Westerveld, 2008). This idea also led to the 
belief that the risk of sickness absence no longer needed collective coverage and 
that employers could bear the costs (Yerkes, 2011). Moreover, the Wet Verbetering 
Poortwachter (Gatekeeper Improvement Act, 2002) and the Wet Werk en Inkomen 
naar Arbeidsvermogen (Work and Income According to Capacity Act, 2006) shifted 
the focus from employees’ incapacity to their residual work capacity.
In Denmark, the activation logic was embraced in the 2000s, when political 
attention was drawn to the high sickness absence rate, between 6.6 and 7.5 
percent in the period 2000-07 (Johansen, Bihrmann, Mikkelsen & Lynge, 2009). 
The Employment Ministry issued action plans and initiated campaigns with such 
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titles as ‘This is What We are Doing about Sickness Absence’, ‘Sickness Absence: A 
Common Challenge’ and ‘Sick with the Job’ (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2003, 2008, 
2010) and amendments to the Lov om Sygedagpenge (Sickness Benefit Act, 2003, 
2005, 2010), in order to change the focus from an employee’s loss of ability to his 
or her ability to work, and to stress that being ill and having a job are not mutually 
exclusive. Along with this new view on sickness absence, the responsibilities were 
(further) devolved to municipalities and employers. The underlying idea was that 
municipalities can be more responsive towards local and individual situations, 
since they are able to bridge the gap between policies and problems (Jensen, 1999) 
of sickness absence. However, it is increasingly recognized that bringing down 
sickness absence is a shared responsibility and that employers (and employees) 
should be given responsibilities as well (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2008).
In Ireland, by contrast, with a short-term sickness absence rate of around 4 
percent and around 1 percent for long-term sickness absence since 1996 (OECD, 
2008), the activation logic has not yet been formally adopted in national policies. 
The emphasis on an employee’s residual capacity for work is not present: “The 
original […] premise that when you’re sick you should be in bed […] is still what 
drives our system” (EA). Receiving sickness benefit is seen as an entitlement, not 
conditional upon individual efforts to return to work. However, the government has 
lately undertaken initiatives towards implementing the activation logic, “waking up 
to the fact that […] an awful lot of people are in that grey space between being fit for 
work and being unfit for work” (G1). For example, a Partial Capacity Benefit Scheme 
(2012) has been introduced, allowing employees who are ill for more than six months 
to work while receiving a partial sickness benefit. Moreover, the Department of 
Social Protection tried in 2012 to devolve part of the financial responsibility for 
sickness absence to employers, with the initiative for a statutory sick pay period of 
four weeks.
Governance systems 
The three countries show important differences in their governance systems for 
sickness absence, summarized in Table 2.2. Below, we describe the differences in 
more detail.
The consensus in the Netherlands about devolving sickness absence issues to 
local actors led to the allocation of both financial and return-to-work responsibilities 
to employers (and employees) (Van Oorschot, 2006). The degree of responsibility for 
Dutch employers has become unique in Europe, and has been labeled ‘going Dutch’ 
in sickness absence policies (Knegt & Westerveld, 2008). The privatization of the 
Ziektewet (Sickness Benefit Act) has radically increased employers’ responsibility 
to compensate (from day one) at least 70 percent of an employee’s salary, from six 
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weeks in 1994 to one year in 1996 and two years in 2004 (Wet Verlenging Loon-
doorbetalingsverplichting bij Ziekte, VLZ) (Yerkes, 2011). Furthermore, a detailed 
legal procedure laid down in the Wet Verbetering Poortwachter has made employers 
responsible for return to work, either in their own organization (‘first-tier return 
to work’) or in another (‘second-tier return to work’). Moreover, according to the 
WIA, employers are obliged to take care of the return to work of employees with 
a remaining work capacity of more than 65 percent after two years of sickness 
absence (OECD, 2008). Employers who fail to comply are sanctioned, for example 
by having to pay an employee’s salary for an additional year or the benefit costs of 
partially disabled workers for a maximum of ten years.
While Dutch employers thus bear full responsibility for sickness absence for 
two years, the legal framework directs their behavior. This combination of local 
responsibilities and state action is described as ‘managed liberalization’: “On the 
one hand, the role of the market in the system of social security is increased, but on 
the other hand, the state tries to manage this market and so it limits the freedom of 
choice” (Van der Veen & Trommel, 1999, p. 297). The regulation of Dutch employers is 
described as a carrot-and-stick-approach (Cox, 1998; Van Oorschot & Abrahamson, 
2003). The sticks comprise the laws mentioned above, supported by sanctions, while 
the carrots are financial incentives taking the form of differentiated premia paid 
by employers for the sickness and disability benefit schemes (Wet Modernisering 
Ziektewet, Act on Modernizing the Sickness Benefit Act, 2013; Wet Financiering 
Sociale Verzekeringen, Act on Financing Social Security, 2004). Despite devolution 
to local actors, we thus see that government is as much in control as before the 
decentralization (Knegt & Westerveld, 2008).  
Table 2.2 Sickness absence policies in the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland
NL DK IE
Governance 
system
Decentralized: 
employers
Decentralized: municipali-
ties and employers
Centralized: Department of 
Social Protection (DSP)
Financial 
responsibility
Employers pay at least 70% 
of salary for the first 2 
years, no waiting period
Employers pay the first 30 
days, municipalities until 
1 year, no waiting period
DSP pays 1 or 2 years
after a waiting period
of 3 days
Return-to-
work respon-
sibilities and 
routines
Employers responsible; 
steps and timeframe are 
formulated within the
Wet Verbetering 
Poortwachter
Municipalities mainly 
responsible; steps and 
timeframe for employers 
defined in the Lov om 
Sygedagpenge 
No regulations for the return 
to work of sick-
listed employees
Regulation of 
employers’ re- 
sponsibilities
Many sticks, with sanctions; 
strong carrots; few sermons
Sticks, no sanctions; few 
carrots; many sermons
No sticks; some carrots;
few sermons
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Although municipalities (Kommuner) in Denmark have been financially 
responsible for sick-listed employees since 1973 (nowadays up to one year of 
sickness absence), the implementation of the activation logic led to a full devolution 
of responsibilities when they also became responsible for the return to work in 
2003 (Johansen et al., 2008). This leaves few legal responsibilities for employers 
(Aust et al., 2012), which fits with the Danish flexicurity system: a high level of 
flexibility for the employer to hire and fire combined with strong social security 
for citizens (Johansen et al., 2008). However, with the implementation of the 
activation logic, some responsibilities for sickness absence were simultaneously 
devolved to employers (and employees). Employers are required to pay for 30 days 
from the first day of sickness absence since 2010 (often extended through collective 
agreements). This entails an increase from 15 days in 1993 and 21 days in 2008 
(Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen, 2011; Johansen et al., 2008). Moreover, employers are 
given more responsibilities for facilitating the return to work, such as having an 
interview with the employee within four weeks of sickness absence, making a 
joint certification of the functional (in)capacities of the employee, and producing a 
return-to-work plan on the employee’s request, if the employee is unable to return 
to work within eight weeks (Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen, 2011). 
The Danish approach to regulating employers’ behavior relies on the sticks 
within the Lov om Sygedagpenge, but without sanctions, backed up with sermons 
such as the campaigns and national action plans described earlier. This manner of 
regulating characterizes the ‘Danish model’ (Etherington & Ingold, 2012), in which 
there are “few legal instruments targeted at the labor market and much more is 
left to agreement between the social partners” (R3). This approach should lead to 
voluntary initiatives, related to the discourse of social responsibility in Denmark 
(Rosdahl, 2002). However, it is also used as a way for employers to legitimize their 
actions: “It’s more easy for an employer to explain why he thinks it’s a good thing to 
have this [sickness absence] conversation when it’s written in the law” (EA). Finally, 
there are some carrots to help employers retain sick-listed employees; for example, a 
partial recovery scheme (delvis raskmeldinger, phased return to work) and a partial 
sickness absence scheme (delvis sygemelding, partial sick leave).
In contrast to the Dutch and Danish cases, responsibilities within the Irish 
sickness absence policies are centralized at the level of the national government, 
resting (mainly) with the Department of Social Protection. It administers income 
support during sickness absence for one or two years (depending on social insurance 
contributions), after a waiting period of three days (OECD, 2008). There are no legal 
responsibilities for employers to compensate a sick-listed employee’s loss of income, 
nor are they obliged to provide return-to-work measures (OECD, 2008; Wynne & 
McAnaney, 2004). Their only obligation is to provide the employee with a written 
statement of the terms and conditions relating to sickness absence, for example, 
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wage payment, within two months of the start of employment (Conroy, n.d.). As a 
government representative explained, “in a way it comes down to the […] personal 
attitude of the employer and the culture [of] the organization” (G1). Employers often 
do top up the sickness benefit to the employee’s full salary (OECD, 2008), record 
absence and conduct return-to-work interviews (IBEC, 2011). Moreover, there are 
some voluntary initiatives to set guidelines on how to manage sickness absence and 
return to work, for example the Workplace Safety Initiative by the social partners 
in 2004 (Conroy, n.d.) and the work of the National Disability Authority (NDA, n.d.). 
The Irish approach towards regulating employers’ behavior consists (solely) of 
carrots (McGuinness, O’Connell, Kelly & Walsh, 2011; Murphy, 2009), since there are 
many subsidy schemes available to employers, such as the Employment Support and 
Wage Subsidy Schemes. However, these schemes focus on hiring the unemployed 
or inactive disabled rather than retaining sick-listed employees, or only target 
employees who are ill for more than six months, like the Partial Capacity Benefit 
Scheme. Moreover, some subsidy schemes are difficult to access or are infrequently 
used (IBEC, 2012; Wynne & McAnaney, 2004). 
In sum, our study reveals how sickness absence policies in the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Ireland involve different governance systems. The Netherlands 
devolves responsibilities to employers, with public law binding their actions. 
Denmark, with its “munipalization of employment policy” (Etherington & Ingold, 
2012, p. 37), makes municipalities mainly responsible (and employers to an 
increasing extent) for governing sickness absence, although bound by the Lov om 
Sygedagpenge. In Ireland, the national government retains sole responsibility for 
the governance of sickness absence. This implies that the devolution of governance 
inherent in the activation logic has only occurred in the Netherlands and Denmark, 
but with respect to different local actors: employers and municipalities.
2.5 Similarities and differences
By drawing from our expert interviews, we compare the underlying ideas of the 
Dutch, Danish and Irish sickness absence policies to understand similarities and 
differences in the implementation of the activation logic. Subsequently, we compare 
and discuss the impact of the governance systems on the role of employers in the 
three countries. 
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Underlying ideas: Understanding similarities and differences in the 
implementation of the activation logic
To quote a Danish respondent, “it’s very clear that in the last decade the pendulum in 
all European countries has swung from accepting passivity towards putting much 
more efforts in activation” (R3). Whereas this has also been acknowledged in the 
literature on activation (Kluve et al., 2007; Weishaupt, 2011), our study shows that 
this is far less true for sickness absence policies in Ireland than in the Netherlands 
and Denmark. In the latter two countries the activation logic in the area of sickness 
absence shows a shifting focus from work inabilities to remaining work capacity, 
a devolution of responsibilities to localities (employers or municipalities), and the 
(increasing) recognition that solving sickness absence problems is a matter between 
the employee and his or her employer. 
In contrast, the Irish sickness absence policies are said to reside in a ‘policy 
paralysis’ regarding the implementation of the activation logic (Murphy, 2009). 
According to the Irish experts, the underlying ideas of the activation logic are not 
implemented within sickness absence policies. This means that there is no national 
strategy for activation that guides local actions. As an Irish researcher expressed it, 
“the discussion is basically confirming that in the absence of an activation strategy 
the changes shouldn’t happen, because really, we don’t know what we are doing and 
we don’t know why we are doing it” (R1). The employers’ representative confirms 
this interpretation: “Our system hasn’t caught up with that it’s actually good to be 
at work and you’re better off […] staying active and coming back part-time” (EA).
Despite this situation, there does seem to be support for the activation logic 
in Ireland, in particular from the government and from IBEC, the employers’ 
confederation. For example, employers would agree with a more structured return-
to-work process that focuses on an employee’s capacities for work (IBEC, 2012). If 
other actors also start to recognize the activation logic as a convincing format to 
solve the problem of sickness absence, it might be just a matter of time before this 
support will affect the national policies. On the other hand, our study shows that it is 
not certain whether enough support will be mobilized soon. For instance, the union 
representative argues that they would oppose the paradigm if it means “more blame 
being put on the worker” and if employees would return to work without having “a 
career progression in front of them” (TU). One government representative adds to 
this that employees see activation measures as “an attack on social insurance rights” 
but also argues that chances are small, given the current economic recession, that 
“developmental, positive measures are going to be welcomed” by employers (G1). In 
addition, the two researchers are not optimistic, since earlier initiatives have failed 
as well, as with ‘The Developmental Welfare State’ proposals (Murphy, 2009). 
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Apparently, creating a shared understanding of the sickness absence problem 
and justifying the activation logic as the solution for this problem is a prerequisite 
for change, since it generates the legitimacy needed for implementation and finally 
for institutionalization (Greenwood et al., 2002). This seems to have occurred in 
the Netherlands (framing the sickness absence problem as a national problem) and 
in Denmark (framing it as a shared challenge) (see also Cox, 2001), but the Irish 
government struggles at this point: “It’s hard to articulate a vision that sort of says 
it’s not just about reducing expenditures, we’re trying to do something positive here 
as well” (G1). This may be due to the framing of the problem and the language that 
is used. For example, while in the Netherlands and Denmark the concept of ‘rights 
and obligations’ is used to argue for the conditionality of sickness benefits (Van 
Oorschot & Abrahamson, 2003), Ireland still speaks of entitlements: “We don’t tend 
to word things that way. If you look at some of the [government] websites, what is 
written on top is ‘entitlement’. That’s a very different way of saying things” (G2). 
With a clientelistic political system, politicians are less inclined to “do things that 
would upset the voter” (R1) and thus to use harsher language. 
Another explanation for the differences between the countries may be the urgency 
of the problem: whereas sickness absence (and disability) has historically been the 
most salient problem for the welfare state in the Netherlands and, albeit in a more 
gradual development, in Denmark (Høgelund, 2003), for Ireland unemployment has 
been an “easy option” (R1), a “quicker win” (EA), or at least a more urgent issue 
(Murphy, 2009) compared to sickness absence. The unemployment rate was almost 
14 percent in 1990, and although it decreased to around four percent in 2000, it has 
risen again to 13 percent in 2013 (Eurostat, 2016). Nevertheless, the growing number 
of sickness beneficiaries, over 80,000 recipients in 2010, compared to around 55,000 
in 2002 (Central Statistics Office, 2013; OECD, 2008) and the deficit in the sickness 
benefit fund may lead to a shared sense of urgency in the future: “Now this fund is 
in deficit, […] it is actually getting a bit of attention” (EA). 
Governance systems and the role of employers
The strengthened role for employers in sickness absence management, as occurring 
in the Netherlands and increasingly also in Denmark, implies an extension of the 
employment contract, since it is no longer solely defined as an agreement in which 
the employee agrees to perform work and the employer in return offers work and 
pay. It now also includes an agreement whereby the employer provides for return-
to-work services and (temporarily) adjusted work, even if the employee is not able 
to carry out the agreed tasks. Employers thus now (are obliged to) take up part of 
the traditional function of the welfare state, as the employment contract is “being 
mobilized for public purposes” (Knegt & Westerveld, 2008, p. 100).
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 The role of employers is, however, disputed in all three countries. Discussion in the 
Netherlands revolves around the question whether employers’ responsibilities have 
gone too far, especially in comparison to other countries. For instance, the degree 
of responsibility is particularly problematic for small and medium enterprises, since 
these “employers are incentivized but don’t have the measures to act upon that” (EA2). 
They lack the necessary finances, knowledge and possibilities for return to work 
(Van Gestel et al., 2013). Nevertheless, according to the FNV (Federatie Nederlandse 
Vakbeweging), the main Dutch union confederation, the activation logic has been 
interpreted by Dutch employers as “an unbridled shifting [of responsibilities] to 
employees” (Van den Boom, Konijnenberg & Lotterman, 2013, p. 4). This coincides 
with the discussion in Denmark, which is about whether employers’ responsibilities 
are sufficient. For example, while our union representative argues that employers 
“are only focusing on the employees and their responsibility to go back to work, 
and don’t focus on working conditions and occupational health, and bringing 
down safety risks” (TU), the employers’ representative comments that “if our costs 
are heightened even more […], more companies are forced to fire their employees, 
because simply it’s going to cost too much to keep them” (EA). This is supposed to 
counteract the aims of the activation logic.
Finally, and in contrast to both the Dutch and Danish cases, the debate in Ireland 
concerns who should be responsible for sickness absence, with the main actors 
(national government, employers and employees) pointing fingers to each other. For 
example, the employers’ representative argues that the national government should 
create return-to-work possibilities, because “the phased return […] essentially 
isn’t supported by the illness benefit system” and that employees should take their 
responsibilities in returning to work, since “they don’t always see work as part of 
the rehabilitation” (EA). At the same time, the union representative insists that “we 
would like to see more responsibilities on employers to have in place measures that 
allow […] a phased return to work or […] to change the way work is organized”; 
the government should take a more active role in this, since “when it’s not in the 
law, employers won’t do it” (TU). Finally, according to one of the government 
representatives, “it would’ve been a positive thing to have some kind of a statutory 
scheme where employers are required to engage more actively” (G1). The problem 
seems that nobody wants to take the responsibility, as that would involve bearing 
the costs (a wage payment period for employers or fewer entitlements for employees).
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2.6 Conclusion and discussion
The aim of this chapter has been to compare whether and how the activation logic 
is understood and given shape in sickness absence policies in the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Ireland. In our qualitative comparative study we found large variation 
between the three countries, despite a common challenge to address sickness absence 
problems. The underlying ideas of the activation logic are only supported in the 
national sickness absence policies in the Netherlands and Denmark, while Ireland 
has not (yet) implemented these ideas as a solution to its problems. In addition, 
the national governance systems regarding sickness absence display considerable 
variation in the division and regulation of responsibilities. While these rest with the 
national government in Ireland, in Denmark they are devolved to municipalities and 
(increasingly) to employers, and in the Netherlands most are put on employers. The 
three countries also use different instruments in regulating these responsibilities: 
while the Netherlands draws on ‘must rules’ (Van Raak, De Rijk & Morsa, 2005) and 
sanctions, Denmark employs softer ‘may rules’ and Ireland has not implemented any 
regulations so far. 
These findings may question the existence of a single activation logic. Earlier 
studies, such as the journal issue edited by Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer (2004), 
already pointed to a large variation in the meaning and content of activation 
policies in Europe. Our study adds to this conclusion from the less researched area 
of sickness absence. However, we support Serrano Pascual’s (2004) argument to 
distinguish between ideology and implementation. Our study demonstrates that 
the ideology of the activation logic tends to converge between countries (once 
adopted, as in the Netherlands and Denmark), while the implementation remains 
different, for example in terms of regulative instruments (sticks, carrots, sermons) 
and a distinctive division of tasks between government, social partners, individual 
employers and employees (governance system). Variation in the activation logic 
thus seems to concentrate on the level of governance systems, which confirms the 
importance of (national) governance systems in studies on activation.
Theoretically, our findings imply that an institutional logic is not necessarily 
aligned to one particular governance system, as is often (implicitly) assumed in 
institutional theory (Scott et al., 2000). The underlying ideas of an institutional logic 
can be associated with various governance systems, and these may convey different 
organizing principles to guide behavior of organizations and individuals. Our study 
thus highlights the important role of national governance systems as ‘mediators in 
the process of logic implementation’ or ‘institutional logics in action’ (Greenwood et 
al., 2010; Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013). Given the variety in national governance 
systems related to a specific institutional logic, a similar set of underlying ideas 
may thus create a diverse impact on the behavior of organizations and individuals. 
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Addressing this variety and its consequences would deepen our understanding 
of the macro-micro linkage between institutional logics and organizational and 
individual behavior (Thornton et al., 2012).
Our study points to several interesting avenues for future research. One approach 
might be to examine more closely the relationships between the national government, 
employers’ associations and unions in studying the sickness absence policies in the 
three countries. In particular, the role of the social partners in constructing these 
policies seems relevant in explaining national differences. According to our data they 
seem to have greater influence on the national sickness absence policies in Denmark 
and Ireland than in the Netherlands. This may allow them to resist a devolution 
of responsibilities from the national level to organizations and individuals. In 
the Dutch case, the government has developed considerable autonomy in sickness 
absence policies since the mid-1990s, as a political consequence of the disability 
crisis (Cox, 2001; Knegt & Westerveld, 2008; Van Oorschot & Abrahamson, 2003). By 
setting aside the social partners (Høgelund, 2003), the national government created 
the opportunity to install a dominant role in sickness absence policies for individual 
employers – albeit under legally defined conditions. Conversely, in countries (such 
as Denmark and Ireland) where the role of the social partners in labor market and 
social security issues is more influential, the government is less able to devolve 
responsibilities to the level of organizations and individuals.  
Another interesting avenue for future research relates to the debate on historical 
convergence and divergence (Beckert, 2010; Serrano Pascual, 2004). Considering 
the sequence in which the activation logic is implemented in the sickness absence 
policies in the three countries (the Netherlands in the 1990s, Denmark in the 2000s 
and Ireland not yet), it can be hypothesized that it is only a matter of time before 
Denmark and Ireland will adopt a similar system to the Netherlands. This might 
especially be expected since the Netherlands has come to be seen as a successful 
frontrunner in implementing the activation logic (Sol et al., 2008). However, it 
is far from certain whether the Dutch example will become a template for other 
countries, since we found reluctance among Danish and Irish experts towards the 
Dutch system, especially towards the huge responsibilities for employers and a 
(supposedly) small role for the government. From this perspective a situation of 
persistent difference is more likely. This shows the need for comparative research 
on these policy developments with a longitudinal perspective. Related to this, we 
call for studies that aim to explain why the activation logic is implemented in one 
sub-field of social policy and not (or less) elsewhere. Generally, the field of sickness 
absence policies has received less attention in the implementation of the activation 
logic, as contrasted to employment policy (OECD, 2008). This issue may however be 
different for various countries, since our data revealed how it is related to national 
political deals in reforming the welfare state (Høgelund, 2003; Murphy, 2009). 
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Finally, an important issue for a future research agenda is whether the different 
roles assigned to actors in national policies will lead to different local actions. In 
the case of sickness absence management it can be expected that Dutch employers, 
having more incentives for actions in managing sickness absence than their 
counterparts in Denmark and Ireland, consequently put more effort into preventing 
health problems at work and retaining sick-listed employees. However, employers in 
Denmark or Ireland are probably motivated by incentives other than regulations and 
sanctions, and it would be theoretically as well as empirically relevant to compare 
the outcomes of different modes of governance. Studying the role of employers 
in sickness absence management, and the use of different regulatory instruments 
(sticks, carrots or sermons), may thus shed light on the actual importance of national 
governance systems for daily practices within organizations. 
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Translation in practice:
Cherry-picking activation policies
An earlier version of this chapter was presented as a paper at the 2014 European Network for Social Policy 
Analysis (ESPAnet) Conference in Oslo, Norway, September 4-6, in track 9a: ‘Work and Welfare: the role of 
employers’ as: Vossen, E., Van Gestel, N., Rouwette, E.A.J.A., & Van der Heijden, B.I.J.M. (2014). Translating 
activation policies in the Netherlands and Denmark: The role of employers in sickness absence management.
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Building on the concept of translation and the editing rules in Scandinavian 
institutionalism, this chapter examines how national policies for ‘activation’ 
in sickness absence management are translated into organizational policies 
and frontline practices in four hospitals across the Netherlands and Denmark. 
Based on documents and 61 interviews with multiple frontline actors, our 
findings reveal ‘cherry-picking’ as a strategy to selectively translate national 
policies into daily practices in a manner that primarily serves organizational 
interests. Although each editing rule contributes in its own way, we show that 
especially their interconnectedness across levels adds to understanding the 
translation process. These findings highlight the importance for translation 
studies to take a multi-level approach that incorporates the sayings and 
doings of multiple interacting actors. 
3.1 Introduction
Sickness absence, or absence from work that is ascribed to sickness (Whitaker, 2001, 
p. 420), is associated with high economic and social costs for employees, employers 
and for society in general. Recognition of these costs has made the prevention and 
reduction of sickness absence a top priority for countries across Europe (Johansen 
et al., 2009; OECD, 2010). Consequently, many European governments have adopted 
‘activation policies’ in their sickness benefit systems during the past two decades 
(OECD, 2010). 
Activation policies stress the promotion of an early and sustainable return 
to work of sick-listed employees (Hetzler, 2009), in order to advance individuals’ 
welfare by enhancing social inclusion as well as to reduce the costs of the welfare 
state by securing labor supply (OECD, 2010). To achieve these dual goals, the focus 
in sickness benefit systems has shifted from determining the impairments of sick-
listed employees, to “identifying that part of the individual’s total capacity for work 
that can still be used”, for example by adjusting the work(place) or the working 
hours (Hetzler, 2009, p. 376). This implies that being sick no longer equals the 
inability to work and thus the need to obtain a sickness benefit. 
A significant change in this context is the devolution of (part of) the financial 
and return-to-work responsibilities regarding sickness absence from national 
governments to organizations, based on the assumption that the latter “are in a good 
position to judge what work their employees can still do and what work or workplace 
adjustments might be needed to accommodate the health problem that has arisen” 
(OECD, 2010, p. 14). Organizations, either public or private, are thus urged to (partly) 
take over former national public duties (Knegt & Westerveld, 2008). However, to 
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date, little is known about how the activation policies are actually implemented in 
the daily management of sickness absence within organizations (e.g., Nyberg, 2012; 
OECD, 2010; Seing, MacEachen, Ståhl & Ekberg, 2015; Tjulin, MacEachen & Ekberg, 
2011). This is remarkable, given that the functioning of activation policies not only 
depends on an appropriate policy design, but also on the acceptance of these policies 
in the organizations responsible for implementing them (Eichhorst et al., 2008).
In this chapter, we aim to unpack how national activation policies are translated 
into the actual management of sickness absence within organizations. We do so 
in the specific setting of four non-profit hospitals across the Netherlands and 
Denmark, since an international comparison of similar phenomena in different 
contexts adds to obtaining generalizable insights into the translation process 
(McDermott, Fitzgerald & Buchanan, 2013, p. S94). In our study, we examine both 
the hospitals’ sickness absence policies and the daily practices of sickness absence 
in networks of local actors. These networks include multiple actors involved in 
sickness absence management, for example, sick-listed employees, line managers 
and – where relevant – HR managers, union representatives, occupational health 
physicians, and other work and health professionals. So far, most research on the 
translation of activation policies has focused on a subset of these actors (for rare 
exceptions, see Nyberg, 2012; Seing et al., 2015; Tjulin, MacEachen & Ekberg, 2011), 
which does not allow for a multi-angle view on the translation of these national 
policies in day-to-day practices of sickness absence. This lack of attention to multiple 
actors is surprising, since effective implementation of these policies depends on 
the collaboration between multiple stakeholders in sickness absence management 
(Tiedtke et al., 2012).
Our theoretical framework is based on the concept of translation, or “the more or 
less deliberate transformation of practices and/or ideas that happens when various 
actors try to transfer and implement them” (Røvik, 2011, p. 642), and therefore 
fits particularly well with our research aim. We perceive translation as an editing 
process in which actors, as editors, are guided by certain editing rules that influ-
ence how new ideas are re-contextualized, re-labeled and defined into actions 
(Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Our paper contributes to the scholarly literature on trans-
lation in three ways. By examining both the process and outcome of translation, 
we first show how “the editing rules are performed in practice” (Teulier & Rouleau, 
2013, p. 309) on both the organizational and the frontline level. In so doing, our 
research highlights the interconnectedness of these editing rules, and points to 
the importance of taking a multi-level approach in translation studies. Second, 
we reveal how frontline actors couple national activation policies to their sick-
ness absence practices by means of ‘cherry-picking’. This response allows actors to 
implement national policies, yet in a manner that promotes organizational business 
interests rather than intended policy aims. Finally, by studying networks of local 
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actors instead of a single super- or subordinate actor, our study highlights how the 
translation process resembles a ‘battlefield’, where different actors with different 
interests vie for supremacy (Johnson & Hagström, 2005, p. 383). We show how the 
interests of some actors (in our case, those representing ‘the employer’) are often 
met at the expense of those of others (employees).
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We begin by explaining translation 
as our theoretical framework, which is followed by an explication of the activation 
policies in the Netherlands and Denmark. Subsequently, we elaborate on the methods 
of our study. Then, we show how the activation policies are translated into sickness 
absence policies (organizational level) and practices (frontline level). Finally, we 
discuss our research findings and their implications for the literature on translation. 
3.2 The translation framework
The spread of ideas (or policies, practices) has traditionally been studied as a process 
of diffusion, in which ideas are treated as “‘out there’ and as adopted more or less 
‘as is’” (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin & Suddaby, 2008, p. 17; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). 
In this approach, actors are seen as passive adopters, who conform to new ideas 
to gain legitimacy and in so doing install rather homogeneous practices (Sahlin & 
Wedlin, 2008). Consequently, diffusion studies remain rather silent on the process 
by which new ideas “wind their way through organizations” and become adapted to 
fit the local context (Ansari, Fiss & Zajac, 2010, p. 67; Reay et al., 2013). Examining 
idea spreading as a process of ‘translation’ – as in Scandinavian institutionalism – 
has gained increasing attention to address this research gap, since the translation 
approach focuses on how actors within organizations actively interpret and 
enact ideas in their daily practices (Boxenbaum & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2009; 
Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996). 
Translation occurs when “T, a translator, transforms A – the source to be translated 
– into B – the target of the translation – in a local context” (Teulier & Rouleau, 
2013, p. 312). This process consecutively involves selecting an idea, disembedding 
it from the old setting in terms of time and spatial features, and re-embeddeding it 
in a new context by translating the idea into practices. These practices are then at 
times materialized into action, and if repeated, they may become institutionalized 
(Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996). The translation process is said to follow three implicit 
editing rules, informed by the institutional environment (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; 
Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Rules of context help to disembed policies from their original 
context and to re-contextualize them in a new setting, enabling actors to make sense of 
and embed new ideas in their local context. Editing rules of formulation entail the re- 
labeling of ideas in a manner that is appropriate to the new setting, so that ideas 
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are described in a different, yet recognizable way. Finally, rules of logic clarify the 
rationale or plot behind ideas, and describe “‘how-to’ recipes” or logics of action 
(Morris & Lancaster, 2006, p. 218; Helin & Sandström, 2010; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). 
In our study, we build on recent literature that applied these editing rules (e.g., Helin 
& Sandström, 2010; Morris & Lancaster, 2006) to examine how “translation is done in 
practice” (Teulier & Rouleau, 2013, p. 314), a topic to which we turn now.
Exploring translation work at the frontline
Although an interest in intra-organizational processes is what distinguishes the 
translation approach from diffusion studies (Boxenbaum & Strandgaard Pedersen, 
2009; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2003), the materialization of ideas into frontline 
practices has received little research attention so far (Ansari et al., 2010; Helin & 
Sandström, 2010; Reay et al., 2013). This seems due to the tendency to focus on 
understanding the outcome of translation (i.e. the difference between the original 
idea and its translation) rather than the translation process (Teulier & Rouleau, 2013, 
p. 309), and to equate changes in ideas with changes in practices (Reay et al., 2013). 
For instance, Boxenbaum (2006) studied how a group of business actors in two Danish 
firms turned the concept of diversity management into a novel managerial practice, 
yet the article leaves the reader wondering how this practice was implemented at the 
frontline. Similarly, in studying how communication directors translated the idea of 
reputation management in Norwegian hospitals, Wæraas and Sataøen (2014) explained 
the occurrence of “parallel understandings and outcomes of a modified version of 
reputation management” (p. 243), but left aside the experience and performance of 
this idea in practice. Although these studies provide rich insights into the adaptation 
of ideas as they travel, there remains a need to further examine the “translation 
work” (Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014, p. 251) in frontline practices, since “ultimately, it is 
changes in day-to-day work that are required – not just the organizational adoption 
(or not) of the idea of a new practice” (Reay et al., 2013, p. 986).
The relatively few studies that examined translation processes at the frontline 
have shown how actors at this level may “deliberately try to translate an idea or a 
practice in a manner that aligns with their own interests” (Boxenbaum & Strandgaard 
Pedersen, 2009, p. 192). For example, Helin and Sandström (2010) studied how 
a corporate code of ethics imposed by an American multinational on a Swedish 
subsidiary was re-contextualized, re-labeled and explained by organizational 
members. These members implemented the code, yet simultaneously resisted it by 
distancing themselves from the code through devaluating its content and effect, 
and playing down social referents. Nyberg and Mueller (2009), in their study of 
a change program aimed at homogenizing cultures within the call centers of an 
Australian insurance company, revealed that while senior management described 
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its implementation as successful, locally the program was resisted as department 
managers, team leaders and employees kept on emphasizing differences. These 
studies thus underscore the importance of including the frontline level to achieve a 
more complete understanding of the translation process. 
The relevance of the frontline level is also highlighted in the literature on 
‘decoupling’ (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Bromley & Powell, 2012). First, in response 
to new policies, policy-practice decoupling may occur as an organization’s symbolic 
adoption of policies without actual changes in practices, creating legitimacy while 
preserving efficiency (Bromley & Powell, 2012; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Second, 
due to increasing demands for transparency and accountability, organizations may 
also resort to means-ends decoupling, where policies are implemented, but “scant 
evidence exists to show that these activities are linked to organizational effectiveness 
or outcomes” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 496). However, when looking at the 
frontline, we might find actors attempting to re-couple these disconnected policies 
and practices or means and ends. For example, in studying the take up of certified 
management systems in the field of health and safety in Danish companies, Rocha 
and Granerud (2011) revealed that while top management symbolically adopted these 
systems to gain external legitimacy, workers appropriated management’s adoption 
motives to improve their working conditions. In addition, Kern, Laguecir and Leca 
(2013) examined the adoption of the casemix, a tool to measure the economic 
performance of patient treatment, in two French hospital departments. The authors 
showed that while surgeons only symbolically adopted the casemix, cardiologists 
coupled this tool to their own ends in budget allocation. These decoupling studies 
illustrate how frontline actions largely determine whether new ideas become part of 
everyday practice or remain as window-dressing (Bromley, Hwang & Powell, 2012), 
again pointing to the need to examine the frontline.
In this chapter, we join these efforts by unpacking how national activation 
policies are translated into organizational policies as well as into daily practices of 
sickness absence by networks of local actors. Based on our literature review and the 
three editing rules of context, formulation and logic, we formulated the following 
research question: How are national activation policies re-contextualized, re-labeled 
and defined into actions within (1) organizational policies of sickness absence, and in 
(2) daily sickness absence practices at the frontline? Before answering this question, 
we first elaborate on the activation policies in the Netherlands and Denmark and 
explain our research methods.
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3.3 Activation policies in the Netherlands and Denmark
We focus on the activation policies of the Netherlands and Denmark, since both 
countries are seen as frontrunners in activating their sickness benefit systems 
(Etherington & Ingold, 2012; Sol et al., 2008), yet differ regarding the involvement 
of organizations (see Chapter 2; OECD, 2008). In light of increasing concerns about 
the future of the welfare state, the rise of the sickness absence rate to around seven 
percent in both the Netherlands and Denmark led to the idea that “sickness absence 
has increased to an unprecedentedly high level” that warranted political actions 
(Johansen et al., 2009, pp. 334-335; Yerkes, 2011). Consequently, the two countries 
introduced activation policies to reduce the number of sickness benefit recipients 
(albeit with an interval of about a decade) as an attempt to keep the welfare state 
financially viable in the future (Eichhorst et al., 2008). We now briefly describe the 
Dutch and Danish activation policies, and their implications for organizations.
In the Netherlands, activation policies were introduced since the mid-1990s 
as a series of regulations aimed at activating sick-listed employees to return to 
work, especially the Gatekeeper Improvement Act (Wet Verbetering Poortwachter, 
2002), the Extended Compulsory Sick Pay Act (Wet Verlenging Loondoorbetalings- 
verplichting bij Ziekte, 2004) and the Work and Income according to Capacity Act 
(Wet Werk en Inkomen naar Arbeidsvermogen, 2006). Within these regulations, 
responsibilities were devolved from government to organizations, based on the 
assumptions that they are “in the best position to effectuate prevention and reinte-
gration” (Knegt & Westerveld, 2008, p. 90) and are able to bear the costs of sickness 
absence (Yerkes, 2011). Consequently, organizations in the Netherlands nowadays 
carry the full costs of sickness absence (up to two years for each employee) and face 
detailed national regulations for return-to-work actions.
By contrast, when Denmark implemented its activation policies in the 2000s via 
national action plans, campaigns and amendments to the Sickness Benefit Act (Lov 
om Sygedagpenge, 2003, 2005, 2010), the responsibilities for activating sick-listed 
employees were almost fully devolved to municipalities (Johansen et al., 2008) so as 
to obtain a higher degree of responsiveness towards local and individual problems 
(Jensen, 1999).5 Accordingly, although Danish organizations are stimulated to 
implement activation policies, the salary of sick-listed employees is mostly collectively 
covered (except for the first thirty days and potential extensions via collective 
agreements) and there are less strict regulations for organizations to manage the 
return-to-work process. The different implications of the national activation policies 
for organizations in the Netherlands and Denmark are displayed in Table 3.1.
5 Since this study focuses on intra-organizational dynamics, the role of municipalities (as external parties) is less prominent in 
this chapter.
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Table 3.1 Responsibilities of Dutch and Danish organizations according to the
   activation policies
The Netherlands Denmark
Financial 
responsibility
Organizations pay for the first 2 years of 
sickness absence, at least 70% of wages per 
year with a maximum of 170% over 2 years
Organizations pay for the first 30 days of 
sickness absence, thereafter municipalities 
pay a reimbursement for up to 1 year
Return-
to-work 
responsibility
Organizations are obliged (with sanctions) to 
take certain steps during the first 2 years of 
sickness absence:
- Within 1 week: notification of sickness 
absence at occupational health physician/
service
- Within 6 weeks: problem analysis
- Within 8 weeks: return-to-work plan
- Every 6 weeks: follow-up meetings 
- After 46-52 weeks: first year evaluation
- After 87 weeks: final evaluation, 
completion of return-to-work file
Organizations are urged (without sanctions) to 
take certain steps during sickness absence:
- Within 4 weeks: sickness absence 
interview
- Within 5 weeks: notification of sickness 
absence at the municipality regarding 
reimbursement
- Possibility attest (declaration of the 
functional (in)capacities of the employee)
- After 8 weeks: return-to-work plan (on 
employee’s request)
Sanctions Additional year of sick pay; paying disability 
benefit of partially disabled workers for max. 
10 years
No sanctions
Employment 
protection
Generally no dismissals allowed Dismissals are allowed 
Source: For NL: Gatekeeper Improvement Act (2002), Extended Compulsory Sick Pay Act (2004), Work and Income 
according to Capacity Act (2006); for DK: Sickness Benefit Act (2010) 
The aforementioned shows that the activation policies have been introduced in both 
countries between five and twenty years ago. It may thus be assumed that their 
implementation is in an advanced stage at the time of our study, rather than in a 
phase where actors still need to become familiar with these policies.
3.4 Methods
To unpack how national activation policies are translated into organizational poli-
cies and frontline sickness absence practices, we have applied a multiple-case 
embedded design (Yin, 2009, p. 47), with the four hospitals as our cases and the 
networks of local actors as the embedded units of analysis. Our study was conducted 
in the period December 2012 to August 2014.
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Research setting and cases
The setting of our research consisted of healthcare organizations (hospitals), since 
the issue of sickness absence is especially relevant here, for two reasons. First, 
healthcare organizations face relatively high sickness absence rates, which has 
been attributed to the nature of the work, the high work pressure and far-reaching 
reforms of the healthcare sector (Michie & Williams, 2003). For instance, across the 
Netherlands and Denmark, the sickness absence rate is four percent, versus around 
five and six percent in healthcare in the two countries (figures for 2013; Statistics 
Denmark, 2015b; Statistics Netherlands, 2015a). Second, and perhaps most important 
in the long run, healthcare organizations are increasingly confronted with employee 
shortages. This problem is particularly urgent in the light of the aging (working) 
population, which raises the demand for care but simultaneously reduces the supply 
of healthcare workers (Buchan & Aiken, 2008). These pressures, together with the 
national activation policies, urge hospitals to manage sickness absence. 
In each country, we included two hospitals in order to prevent drawing 
conclusions on the specifics of a single case: City Hospital (CH) and Health Clinic (HC) 
in the Netherlands and Medical Center (MC) and Region Hospital (RH) in Denmark 
(pseudonyms). These hospitals are all non-profit hospitals, located in different regions 
and employing between 2,500 and 5,000 employees. Although we did not explicitly 
sample on their sickness absence rates, these hospitals appear rather successful in 
managing sickness absence in terms of outcomes, with absence rates below the 
healthcare average and for the two Dutch hospitals even below the national average 
(their rates varied between 3.4 and 4.7 percent). However, these sickness absence 
rates say little about the actual process of translating national activation policies into 
organizational policies and frontline practices, which is the focus of our study.
Data collection
Data consisted of the hospitals’ sickness absence policies (representing the 
organizational level) as well as interviews with frontline actors. Concerning the 
latter, we selected five to six networks of local actors around long-term sickness 
absence (i.e. absence for six weeks or longer) in each hospital, leading to a total of 21 
networks of local actors. We conducted interviews with the frontline actors involved 
in these networks, in addition to some general interviews, resulting in a grand total 
of 61 interviews. An overview of the local actors by network is provided in Table 
3.2; it should be noted that differences in the amount of interviews per hospital 
are related to variations in both the national context (e.g., Dutch organizations are 
obliged to involve an occupational health physician in cases of long-term absence) 
and the organizational strategy towards sickness absence management.
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Table 3.2 Overview of networks of local actors
Network of 
local actors
City Hospital
(CH)
Health Clinic
(HC)
Medical Center 
(MC)
Region Hospital 
(RH)
1 SE/LM/HR1/OHP2/WHP3 SE/LM/HR5/WHP-1/WHP-2 SE/LM SE/LM
2 SE/LM/HR1/OHP2/WHP3 SE/LM/HR5/WHP-3 SE/LM SE/LM
3 SE/LM/HR/OHP2/WHP3 SE/LM/HR/WHP-4 SE/LM SE/LM
4 SE/LM/HR4/OHP2 SE/LM/HR/WHP-1/WHP-4 SE/LM SE/LM
5 SE/LM/HR4/OHP2 SE/LM/HR/WHP-1 SE/LM SE/LM
6 - - SE/LM -
General 
interviews
- OHP HR/UR/WHP HR/UR
Total interviews 15 19 15 12
Notes: 1,2,3,4,5 Equal numbers imply that the same person is involved in more than one network
Explanation of abbreviations in order of appearance: SE: sick-listed employee, LM: line manager, HR: Human 
Resource manager, OHP: occupational health physician, WHP: work and health professional, UR: union repre-
sentative
In selecting these networks of actors, we strove for diversity regarding the cause of 
the absence and the age, gender, job and ward of the sick-listed employee, in order 
to obtain a broad view on frontline sickness absence practices. This has resulted in 
the inclusion of 13 networks around physical health complaints, such as musculo-
skeletal diseases and cancer; and eight networks around mental health complaints, 
like stress, depression and burnout. Diversity was furthermore achieved in terms 
of the sick-listed employees’ jobs and wards, with 14 nurses, four nurse or nutrition 
assistants, two medical secretaries and one HR manager, who were all employed on 
different wards or belonged to a different network of actors (especially with other 
managers). Finally, the employees were absent for an average of 9.2 months and 
their age ranged from 28 to 59 years. The division of gender was skewed (three men 
and 18 women), but this is representative of the healthcare workforce (WHO, 2008).
Interviews were semi-structured and followed a topic list (see Appendix B). 
Topics covered during the interviews were (1) the actors’ current job and profes-
sional background, (2) their perceptions of the cause of and solution for the sick-
ness absence, (3) their views on their own role in the return-to-work process, (4) 
their perspective on the ideal and actual role of the other actors in sickness absence 
management, and (5) the actions that are taken, such as adjustments of work or 
working hours. The interviews lasted 40-60 minutes and only took longer when 
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respondents were involved in more than one network. All interviews were recorded 
and transcribed verbatim, totaling around 720 pages of transcripts. 
Data analysis
We analyzed the interviews according to the stepwise process described by Eisenhardt 
(1989), which was facilitated by MAXQDA, a software package for qualitative data 
analysis. We first constructed “detailed case study write-ups” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 
540) in order to become highly familiar with the cases and explore their uniqueness. 
This means that for each hospital, we summarized the perspectives of the actors in 
the local networks according to the aforementioned interview topics, leading to 106 
pages of case study write-ups. 
Second, in the cross-case analysis, we compared the hospitals regarding the 
three editing rules (context, formulation, logic) in translating the activation policies 
into sickness absence policies and practices. Since these implicit rules can only 
be assessed from actors’ rationalizations of actions (Helin & Sandström, 2010), we 
scanned the hospitals’ policies and the interview data on the presence of these 
editing rules. Regarding the rule of context, our spotlight was on the re-embedding 
or re-contextualization of the activation policies in a healthcare setting, which 
seemed easy (and even stricter) on the organizational level, but highly complicated 
at the frontline due to ‘balancing acts’ between managerial and public roles and 
the ‘demedicalization’ of sickness absence. For the rule of formulation, we focused 
on the re-labeling or re-framing of the activation policies in a way that makes 
them appropriate for the healthcare context, which revealed in the emphasis on 
‘disconnecting sickness and absence’ in the organizational policies, and in the 
cherry-picking of returning to work ‘as soon as possible’ by frontline actors. Finally, 
concerning the rule of logic, we looked at the definition of actions in sickness absence 
management, and found a copying of ‘equal treatment’ on the organizational level, 
but the opposite emphasis on ‘tailored actions’ at the frontline. 
3.5 Translating national activation policies in hospitals
In this section we analyze how national activation policies in the Netherlands and 
Denmark are (1) re-contextualized following the editing rule of context, (2) re-labeled 
according to the rule of formulation, and (3) defined into actions as per rule of logic, 
in both the hospitals’ sickness absence policies and in frontline practices.
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Context: Re-contextualizing activation policies
Organizational level
The four hospitals in our study have taken up the central idea of the activation 
policies to ensure the return to work of sick-listed employees by means of an active 
approach and a focus on remaining work capacity. For example, Health Clinic 
mentions, “The policy […] is that employees who have some mobility, return to 
work as soon as possible, either in their own or in adjusted work”. Likewise, Region 
Hospital describes, “The sickness absence policy should ensure a quick follow-up 
and an active approach in relation to work”. 
Although all hospitals have adopted the idea of activation, closer inspection 
revealed an important difference in translating the procedures of the activation 
policies. While the Dutch hospitals have literally copied these procedures in 
their organizational policies, in the Danish hospitals we observed that they are 
extended (e.g., with conducting follow-up meetings) or presented more strictly than 
prescribed by the national government (e.g., an obligation to make a return-to-
work plan, regardless of whether the employee makes a request). In so doing, the 
Danish hospitals moved towards the stricter sickness absence policies of their Dutch 
counterparts. Despite the different national policy contexts, we thus perceive that 
at the organizational level the hospitals have installed rather homogeneous policies 
for sickness absence management.
Moreover, we noticed an essential addition to the national activation policies in 
the hospitals in both the Netherlands and Denmark. That is, while the activation 
policies in the two countries do not include an explicit notion on the legitimacy 
of absence, all hospitals distinguish between legitimate absence and frequent or 
atypical absence (e.g., ‘Friday- and Monday-illnesses’), and measures are added to 
the policies in order to reduce this ‘illegitimate’ absence. For example, a dialogue 
between manager and employee is prescribed whenever the employee has been 
absent three or four times in 12 months (CH/HC/MC) or in five months (RH). 
Re-contextualization in the hospitals’ policies thus means a more stringent control 
of sickness absence than prescribed in the national activation policies.
Frontline level
Re-contextualizing is not only relevant at the level of the organizational policies, 
but also (and even more) in frontline practices. Our data show that in re-embedding 
the national and organizational policies in their practices, especially frontline 
managers feel that they wear (at least) two hats in managing sickness absence: 
On the one hand, they need to ensure an adequate return to work of sick-listed 
employees, while on the other hand, they have to run a ward and make sure 
that other employees and patients do not suffer the consequences of the absence. 
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According to the managers, these goals are hard to unite, since investing their 
time and efforts in helping a sick-listed employee reduces the time they can spend 
on running daily business, including paying attention to co-workers. As Table 3.3 
illustrates, re-contextualizing activation policies at the frontline requires managers 
to take on a hybrid role to unite public and managerial goals, which they perceive 
as a complex “balancing act”. 
Table 3.3 Re-contextualizing activation policies at the frontline: illustrations of 
   balancing acts
CH As a manager, you sometimes have to perform a balancing act. For the sick-listed employee, 
you want to get things done as well as possible, but […] you also have a team that shouldn’t be 
affected too much  (Manager CH-3)
HC I do my best for the sick-listed employee, without losing sight of the organization’s interests. And 
sometimes that’s a balancing act, and […] it’s not always appreciated, from both sides (Manager 
HC-3)
MC You want to help the ones who are ill, but you have 60 other people to take care of too […]. And 
sometimes that’s difficult (Manager MC-6)
RH I evaluate my approach [in sickness absence management] by placing two things side by side: the 
cost-benefit for the ward and the cost-benefit for her [the sick-listed employee]. So like, is there 
consensus between these two? (Manager RH-3)
Another issue for frontline managers in re-contextualizing the activation policies 
relates to the policies’ emphasis on the remaining ability to work of sick-listed 
employees rather than their disabilities. Frontline actors described this as the 
‘demedicalization’ of absence, that is, no longer “defining a problem in medical 
terms, [or] using medical language to describe a problem” (Conrad, 1992, p. 211). 
Since this new focus on abilities requires a non-medical perspective on sickness 
absence, it is at odds with the daily medical practices in the hospitals that are 
centered on (the treatment of) illnesses. Seeing that “80 percent of the team leaders 
are people with a medical background” (HR manager HC-1/2), demedicalization 
is described as particularly challenging for managers: “In the hospital, it’s very 
difficult to apply a behavioural model [based on abilities rather than inabilities], 
because they [the managers] are medically trained. So in no time they are talking 
about medical issues” (HR manager CH-4/5).
In sum, re-contextualizing the activation policies varied between the 
organizational level and the frontline. While in the hospitals’ policies a picture 
of uncomplicated compliance revealed, and even an extension of the activation 
policies to enable stricter absence control (e.g., by introducing measures for 
illegitimate absence); at the frontline a more complicated situation emerged due to 
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the presence of multiple and contradictory pressures (i.e. public versus managerial 
aims, demedicalization in a healthcare environment). These findings show the 
significance of re-contextualization in translation processes at the frontline, where 
policies have to be embedded in existing local practices.
Formulation: Re-labeling activation policies
Organizational level
Our data highlight that the appropriateness of the activation policies is described in 
the hospitals’ policies by re-labeling them as beneficial to both the hospitals and the 
sick-listed employees. The hospitals frame their own interests in translation in terms 
of “reducing and maintaining absence at a low level” (CH/HC/RH/MC), “raising 
productivity” (HC) and “increasing the quality of patient care” (CH). The activation 
policies are thus perceived as a tool that contributes to the hospitals’ main targets of 
healthcare quality and efficiency. Simultaneously, they are framed in the hospitals’ 
documents as being beneficial to sick-listed employees: “(Adjusted) work is often the 
best medicine, next to some rest. The structure of being (partly) at work and having 
contacts with colleagues often contributes to returning to work” (HC, emphasis in 
original). Hence, the activation policies, and the focus on remaining (partly) at work 
in particular, are described as advantageous for sick-listed employees as well. 
Additionally, in order to persuade actors of the appropriateness of the activation 
policies, three of the four hospitals explicitly stress the notion of these policies 
that being sick does not equal the inability to work. For example, Health Clinic 
uses the slogan “sickness happens, absence is a choice”, and City Hospital stresses 
the distinction between sickness and absence as “sickness happens, absence has 
to be discussed”. This means that although sickness might be unavoidable, being 
absent involves a behavioral choice that should be avoided as much as possible 
by seeking opportunities for adjusted work – thus providing a starting-point to 
support the employee. Region Hospital describes this issue as, “In general, sickness 
is unavoidable absence. However, the employee has the duty to cooperate actively 
in returning to work as soon as possible”. Using these formulations, the national 
activation policies are framed at the organizational level as being beneficial for both 
organizations and sick-listed employees, and actions are justified by disconnecting 
sickness and absence. 
Frontline level
When analyzing the re-labeling of the activation policies at the frontline, we found 
an even more profound formulation. Rather than emphasizing absence as a choice 
or a matter for discussion, workplace actors (and managers in particular) cherry-
picked the phrase “as soon as possible”, by which they expressed the importance 
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of an early (partial) return to work for the recovery of sick-listed employees. In so 
doing, frontline actors often prioritized the time component (‘soon’) instead of the 
ability component (‘possible’) in sickness absence management. This appears to be 
related to pressures to increase the quantity and quality of patient care, coupled 
with employee shortages. Having to wear two different hats, while at the same time 
being “very, very busy”, “too busy”, “so busy”, or “more busy” seems to explain 
managers’ focus on an early return to work. The emphasis on an early return to 
work in re-labeling the activation policies is illustrated in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Re-labeling activation policies at the frontline: illustrations
CH I try to get them [sick-listed employees] back to the workplace quickly, even if it’s just for half a 
day. I try to set ambitious goals; after all, you can always go slower (Manager CH-2) 
HC I think it [the national and organizational policy] has changed the work ethos, in that people are 
[…] saying: ‘I’m paid by the hospital so I have to return to work as soon as possible’ (Work and 
health professional-2)
MC It’s very important to come back to work as fast as possible, and perhaps do some other things 
than in your ordinary job (Work and health professional)
RH The employees know […] you have to participate actively in getting back, because otherwise there 
will be sanctions (Union representative)
 
Although frontline actors themselves only explicitly mentioned the pressures of 
an early return to work in relation to illegitimate absence (e.g., frequently absent 
employees “feel the hot breath on the backs of their necks”, manager CH-2), we 
found that long-term sick-listed employees who cannot return to work early (in the 
eyes of other actors involved), feel pressured in their return-to-work process as well. 
These employees seem to realize that the formulation of ‘choice’ or ‘discussion’ (as 
in the organizational policies) does not imply a real space for negotiating options. 
Rather, they are requested to take an active attitude (e.g., by keeping contact with 
the ward, showing progress in increasing working hours) and to express their 
willingness to return to work. Compliance with these requests seems necessary in 
order to keep managers supportive in the return-to-work process, since – due to 
the disconnection of sickness and absence – any other (i.e. ‘passive’) behavior is 
attributed to an employee’s lack of motivation. Table 3.5 illustrates the impact of 
re-labeling activation as an early return to work on employees at the frontline.
 Overall, in re-labeling the national activation policies, profound editing occurred 
at both organizational and frontline levels, by cherry-picking those elements of 
these policies that support the control and reduction of sickness absence. At the 
organizational level, we observed that the disconnection between sickness and 
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absence within the national policies is used to justify activation measures in 
case of sickness, which are framed as benefitting the hospital as well as the sick-
listed employee. Yet, at the frontline the national and organizational policies are 
translated even more profoundly, by cherry-picking the notion of returning to work 
as soon as possible. This translation appeared to have adverse effects on sick-listed 
employees who cannot live up to this expectation, and shows how the translation 
process involves a variety of interests, which apparently cannot all be met at once. 
Logic: defining actions
Organizational level
Similar to the national activation policies prescribing (more or less strict) standard 
procedures to achieve equal treatment in sickness absence management, at the 
organizational level, we observed that all hospitals mention their policies to be 
“applicable to all employees” (CH/HC), in order to guarantee “overall consistency in 
the way sickness absence is handled” (RH), by “applying uniform rules and procedures 
for all employees” (MC). Whereas implementing these actions is described as the 
shared responsibility of employers and sick-listed employees within the activation 
policies, this is translated by the hospitals as managers and sick-listed employees, 
with the other actors (e.g., HR managers, occupational health physicians and union 
representatives) being given a role as advisor. As City Hospital argues, “Manager 
and employee are jointly responsible for making proper arrangements in relation to 
sickness absence; others have an advisory role”. Hence, the hospitals aim to ensure 
the equal treatment of sick-listed employees via standard procedures, for which 
manager and employee are jointly responsible.
Table 3.5 Impact of re-labeling activation policies in frontline practices on employees
CH She [the manager] called me every time and pushed me to come and have coffee, because I 
shouldn’t lose contact with the ward. […] [I]n the beginning I just didn’t feel like doing that 
(Employee CH-5)
HC He [the occupational health physician] said: ‘Either you’re going to work more hours […] or you 
can stay at home’ […] After that meeting I was so upset that I got panic attacks (Employee HC-2)
MC I think I did it [pushing myself over my limits] because […] I wanted to please my employer. I 
wanted to show him ‘I want this work and I want to get back’ (Employee MC-2)
RH I wish I could have started up with some hours or less days […], but if the department has to 
function we have to be there all the time […]. They expect you to be here for a 100 percent 
(Employee RH-1)
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Frontline level
Despite the discursive support for the activation policies shown in the rule of context 
and formulation, our data reveal that this support is not followed by a translation 
of prescribed actions. We observed that frontline actors disagree with using the 
standard procedures of the national and organizational policies, and emphasize 
applying tailored actions instead, thereby rendering the prescribed procedures less 
legitimate. Table 3.6 shows how frontline actors in the four hospitals perceive the 
importance of discretion and tailor-made practices in the translation of activation 
policies into actions. 
However, applying tailored actions does not mean that frontline actors always 
strive for the most appropriate return-to-work process, or know how to do so. 
Rather, we noticed that when actors do not follow the national and organizational 
procedures appropriately (e.g., when they do not make return-to-work plans, deviate 
from established time frames, or install too strict time frames), this seriously 
impedes the return-to-work process. Consider the following example of a network 
around a nurse at Medical Center who was absent because of a depression, where the 
manager did not see the necessity to make a return-to-work plan:  
 
No, I didn’t make it [the return-to-work plan]. It’s more a kind of gut feeling, 
what can I do to get her back, how can I make her see the positive of going 
back to work? (Manager MC-2)
However, for the sick-listed nurse, a structured return-to-work plan appeared to be 
“the main thing in getting back”:
The one thing I was missing was an overview. I couldn’t deal with all the pressures 
and all the things I didn’t know about what would happen (Employee MC-2)
‘
‘
Table 3.6 Tailored actions at the frontline: illustrations
CH You have to be able to play with the rules of the game, so that you can create reasonable 
solutions for all parties […]. So I think there should be some room for maneuver (HR manager 
CH-4/5)
HC The sickness absence policy […] is a tool, but it should remain tailored to the individual, 
because you can’t lump all absence cases together as if they were the same (Work and health 
professional-1)
MC Of course we have to follow the rules, but […] you can follow the rules more or less strictly and 
you can be flexible, because I think the focus should be on the employee (HR manager)
RH I think every sickness is individual and I will manage it individually. I don’t think there’s a uniform 
recipe (Manager RH-1)
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Another example concerns a local network at Region Hospital around a medical 
secretary who was absent for a cancer treatment. The manager explained how she 
still has to push the employee for a quicker return to work, although a return- 
to-work plan was agreed upon:
I think it’s taking a long time to get to the normal work[ing hours]. […] We 
have reached a limit where we have to get her to work more (Manager RH-5)
Simultaneously, the sick-listed secretary mentioned how she felt pressured when 
her manager tried to deviate from the established time frame at every meeting, as it 
impeded her return to work:
It [the meeting] always ended up with ‘do you think you can take some more 
hours now?’ […] Instead of, when […] we made an agreement of ‘this is how it’s 
going to be’, then leave it [at that] rather than pushing all the time (Employee 
RH-5)
Although the frontline actors’ preference for tailored actions sounds intuitively 
more appealing than the use of standard procedures, the return-to-work process 
thus frequently appeared obstructed by a custom-made approach, since it was often 
based on the hospital’s business interest of an early return to work. Only when 
actions were also based on an understanding of the employee’s needs (in terms of 
time frames and work adjustments), returning to work proceeded without problems. 
While discursive support for the activation policies was shown at the organizational 
and frontline level in re-contextualizing and re-labeling, this support does not 
result in a copying of the actions defined at the national and organizational level. 
Instead, the prescribed actions often proved not to be translated in frontline actions 
as intended, but rather in a way that merely pushes for an early return to work. 
In conclusion, by means of Sahlin-Andersson’s (1996) three editing rules, we 
have shown how national activation policies in the Netherlands and Denmark are 
modified in different ways when they are translated at the organizational and 
frontline level. While re-contextualizing, re-labeling and defining actions in the 
hospitals’ policies mainly revealed compliance with the activation policies, yet in a 
more stringent sense (e.g., with a focus on control); at the frontline level, we found a 
sharp discrepancy between (discursive support for) the national and organizational 
policies and frontline actions. These findings were noticeably similar across the 
hospitals and the two countries, even despite different national pressures.
‘
‘
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3.6 Discussion
This chapter unpacked how national activation policies are translated into the daily 
management of sickness absence. In this section, we describe how our findings may 
advance the scholarly literature on translation.
Connecting editing rules on multiple levels
The application of the three editing rules (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) in our study 
enabled us to understand how the translation process occurs in everyday practices, 
addressing an important gap in translation research (Helin & Sandström, 2010; Reay 
et al., 2013; Teulier & Rouleau, 2013). Each editing rule contributed to understanding 
the translation process in its own way. 
The rule of context illuminated the often neglected role of the wider context 
in the process of translation (Waldorff, 2010), and especially showed the impact of 
the specific (healthcare) setting on further translations in the rules of formulation 
and logic. This is recognized by Sahlin and Wedlin (2008), who stated that 
“[a]t first glance, editing processes might seem to be creative and open-ended”, 
yet on closer inspection, “edited stories reveal how […] translations were formed 
by the institutional setting in which they were performed” (p. 225). We showed 
how frontline managers translated the activation policies in their daily practices 
by adding a strong focus on the ‘soon’ of returning to work and neglecting the 
national and organizational procedures for the sake of ‘tailored actions’. On the 
surface, this seemed to indicate room for discretion and individual choice, but our 
analysis revealed how managers’ behavior was strongly affected by the hospital 
setting with its strong pressures on efficiency and a specific (medical) way of 
dealing with sickness absence. This institutional setting seemed more influential 
than the different national policy contexts, since the translation process appeared 
rather homogeneous in the four hospitals across the Netherlands and Denmark.
The rules of formulation and logic clarified the distinction between the 
framing of the activation policies and the translation of these policies into actions, 
respectively. Especially at the frontline, we found that the rationale for actions was 
informed by, but not necessarily followed the framing of the policies at this level. 
More importantly, the interconnectedness of both rules also occurred across levels. 
For instance, while we observed how frontline actors framed an early return to work 
as especially beneficial for sick-listed employees, their logic of action centered on 
the hospitals’ efficiency goals rather than the wellbeing of employees. The one-sided 
emphasis on efficiency did not stem from actors’ formulations at the frontline, but 
was rationalized by the separation of sickness and absence in the organizational 
policies (‘absence is a choice’). In order to understand the materialization of ideas 
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into everyday practices, our findings herewith point to the importance of linking 
the different, yet interconnected editing rules of formulation and logic, where the 
former is more about “justifying and legitimizing language” while the latter entails 
“the materialization of a concept into practice” (Waldorff, 2010, p. 23). What is 
more, by combining the analytical framework of the three editing rules (context, 
formulation and logic) with the study of translation in organizational policies as 
well as in frontline practices, our research stresses the need to take a multi-level 
approach in translation studies.
Cherry-picking as translation work at the frontline
The translation work in our study can be perceived as an instance of selective 
coupling (Pache & Santos, 2013b) at the frontline, which we call ‘cherry-picking’. That 
is, institutional pressures (here, the national activation policies) and organizational 
practices that were once loosely connected become tightly coupled (Hallett, 
2010, p. 53) by selecting the best or most desirable elements of these pressures 
(Vedung, 2015). For example, we observed that by stressing the time component 
of the national activation policies (i.e. an ‘early return to work’), frontline actors 
(and managers in particular) translated those aspects of the activation policies that 
aligned with the hospital’s business interests. The national activation policies were 
thus implemented in the Dutch and Danish hospitals, yet in a way that supports 
organizational practices more than public welfare goals. These findings add to our 
understanding of how and why frontline actors may play an important role in the 
materialization of policies into practices by cherry-picking policy elements.
Reflecting on the decoupling literature, our research revealed that instead of 
symbolically adopting policies but not implementing them in practice (policy-
practice decoupling), or implementing policies without establishing a clear link to 
core organizational goals (means-ends decoupling; Bromley & Powell, 2012), the 
frontline actors in our study selectively engaged with national activation policies 
in their sickness absence practices in a manner that clearly links to organizational 
goals of efficiency. Frontline actors thus did not resist the activation policies (in 
fact, they all saw the value of these policies), but translated them in a way that fits 
the hospital’s business purposes. 
This cherry-picking was not so much a deliberate action of frontline managers 
to let the business interests of the hospitals prevail. Cherry-picking the time 
component of the activation policies enabled frontline managers to “carve out a 
space for autonomy that could allow them to go on with their [managerial] work” 
(Helin & Sandström, 2010, p. 596), while simultaneously complying with their 
public role following the national policies. Although perceived as a balancing act, 
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managers succeeded to combine both roles by (unintentionally) separating their talk 
(as in the editing rule of formulation) from their actions (as per rule of logic) (see 
also Brunsson, 2003). Whereas managers’ talk helped them to perform a public and 
caring role (by arguing for the benefits of an early return to work for the recovery 
of sick-listed employees), their actions contributed to fulfilling a managerial 
role (by pushing for a quick return to work, regardless of the employee’s needs), 
thereby solving the frontline managers’ internal conflicts. In this way, our findings 
contribute to previous research on the influence of (multiple) institutional pressures 
on the translation process (e.g., Lindberg, 2014; Waldorff, 2013), by showing how 
cherry-picking enables actors to merge the demands arising from national policies 
with other existing pressures in everyday frontline practices.
Varieties of interests in translation processes
A third contribution of our study relates to the consideration of interests in transla-
tion processes. Our findings highlight that the translation process should be seen as 
“a battle between competing interpretations vying for supremacy”, where different 
actors have different potentials to influence the accomplishment of their interests 
(Johnson & Hagström, 2005, p. 372). We showed that the interests of the actors 
who represent ‘the employer’ were often met at the expense of those of sick-listed 
employees. Given that translation processes involve a multiplicity of actors, our 
research underscores the necessity for translation studies to not only examine the 
interests of the “idea seller” (in our case, national governments), but also those of 
multiple “idea-translators” in their micro-interactional work (Mueller & Whittle, 
2011, p. 192/203). This goes further than including actors in key strategic posi-
tions (e.g., top managers), but also the subordinate actors at the frontline (Rocha 
& Granerud, 2011). In our study, we addressed this issue by including networks of 
local actors.
Our findings reflect the unequal power positions in translation processes, and the 
fact that managers in our study ultimately seemed to hold the “trump card” (Seing 
et al., 2012, p. 563) in decisions about return-to-work issues, for example about the 
timing and pace of the return to work. This inequality in power positions seems the 
consequence of making one person (the manager) responsible for managing sickness 
absence, as in the hospitals’ policies, while that person also has clear interests in 
running a ward. Hence, these findings call for translation studies that explicitly 
zoom in on the interests and the interactional work of multiple actors, and their 
consequences for the process and outcome of translation. 
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3.7 Conclusion
Although the introduction of national activation policies has ascribed an increasingly 
important role to organizations in sickness absence management, so far, little is 
known of how these policies are translated into the day-to-day management of 
sickness absence. At the same time, our theoretical understanding of how translation 
occurs in practice is rather limited. In addressing these gaps, a detailed examination 
of organizational policies and 21 networks of local actors in two Dutch and two 
Danish hospitals revealed a discrepancy between the aims of the activation policies 
and local sickness absence practices, as the result of the translation of these policies 
by multiple frontline actors. By applying Sahlin-Andersson’s (1996) three editing 
rules, we uncovered how the activation policies were coupled to existing sickness 
absence practices by cherry-picking those aspects of these policies that serve the 
organization’s business interests – although this approach often ran counter to the 
interests of sick-listed employees. These findings highlight the need for translation 
studies to incorporate multiple interacting actors and their sayings and doings in a 
multi-level approach.
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Quid pro quo:
Understanding the role of social
interactions in translation processes
An earlier version of this chapter was presented as a paper at the 2014 European Group for Organizational 
Studies (EGOS) Conference, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, July 3-5, subtheme 60: ‘Rethinking responses to orga-
nizational complexity’, as Vossen, E., & Van Gestel, N. (2014). The complexity of individual responses to institu-
tional logics: The case of the activation logic in sickness absence management.
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In this chapter, we examine the role of social interactions in translating macro-
ideas into micro-level practices. The macro-idea under study is the ‘activation 
paradigm’ that is paramount in European welfare states and is to be translated 
into local sickness absence practices, which we studied within four hospitals 
across the Netherlands and Denmark. While social interactions involved in 
the translation process have remained relatively unexplored in institutional 
studies so far, we use social exchange theory to complement the translation 
approach. Using a case study design, our findings reveal that the managers’ 
translation of the activation paradigm varies along with their positive or 
negative perception of past and present social interactions with their sick-
listed employees. We also find that the link between the activation paradigm 
and its implementation in practice is stronger when managers’ perceptions of 
the social interaction are negative rather than positive. This chapter highlights 
the importance of social interactions in understanding the macro-micro 
linkage between macro-ideas and practices within organizations. 
4.1 Introduction
Within institutional theory, translation refers to “the more or less deliberate 
transformation of practices and/or ideas that happens when various actors try to 
transfer and implement them” (Røvik, 2011, p. 642). Although translation thus 
ascribes an active role to actors in interpreting and enacting new ideas in local 
practices (Boxenbaum & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2009; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008), 
the ‘micro-interactional work’ through which ideas are translated on local levels 
has been largely overlooked so far (Mueller & Whittle, 2011, p. 189). Recently, 
institutional scholars call for more attention to the process through which ideas (or 
policies, practices) “wind their way through organizations” (Ansari et al., 2010, p. 
67; Helin & Sandström, 2010; Morris & Lancaster, 2006; Nicolini, 2010; Reay et al., 
2013). They argue that the translation approach, which is central to Scandinavian 
institutionalism (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996), not only 
needs to focus on the outcome of translation in terms of changes in travelling 
ideas, but also on the process through which ideas are translated into frontline 
practices in a way that fits the interests of local actors (Ansari et al., 2010; Reay et 
al., 2013; Teulier & Rouleau, 2013). Given that “the translation process never takes 
place independently of social power relationships” (Johnson & Hagström, 2005, p. 
373) and social interactions thus “comprise a major part of the very ‘stuff’ involved 
in translating ideas” (Mueller & Whittle, 2011, p. 189), it seems warranted to include 
social interactions in examining the translation process.
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Hence, in this paper, we aim to understand the role of social interactions in 
translation processes. The research question is: What role do social interactions 
play in the translation of macro-ideas into micro-level practices? The micro-level 
practices in this study entail the sickness absence practices of local managers within 
hospitals. The macro-idea to be translated is the ‘activation paradigm’, a profound 
idea that is adopted since the 1990s by many European countries to curb sharply 
rising welfare costs (Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011; Serrano Pascual, 2007; Weishaupt, 
2011). In short, the activation paradigm stresses ‘work’ – or a higher employment 
rate – as the solution to keep the welfare state financially viable, which requires 
the inclusion of people with disabilities (Eichhorst et al., 2008; OECD, 2010). In 
the area of sickness absence, the activation paradigm implies that being sick no 
longer equals the inability to work. In contrast to previous ideas that stress ‘(bed) 
rest’ for treating health problems (MacEachen et al., 2007), the activation paradigm 
emphasizes that most sick-listed employees have “some ‘healthy’ capacity that can 
be discovered alongside the reduced capacity for work” (Hetzler, 2009, p. 376), and 
that can be used to perform adjusted work. To put this idea into practice, employers 
(usually the direct managers of employees) have been ascribed an increased role in 
activating sick-listed employees to return to work (OECD, 2010).
Although the macro-idea of activation has become a legitimate discourse at the 
political level to address the mobilization of benefit recipients to take up or remain 
at work (Weishaupt, 2011), knowledge of its actual implementation in practice is 
limited (Eichhorst et al., 2008; OECD, 2010) and critical comments have been voiced 
more recently (e.g., Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011; Hetzler, 2009; MacEachen et al., 2007). 
Studies have pointed to sick-listed employees’ experiences of being pushed to 
return to work (Taylor, Baldry, Bain & Ellis, 2003; Taylor, Cunningham, Newsome 
& Scholarios, 2010), and warned against the possible use of stronger hiring criteria 
based on health conditions instead of the inclusion of people with disabilities at the 
workplace (OECD, 2010). To develop a detailed view on the translation process and 
its consequences within organizations, in this paper we examine the role of micro-
level interactions in how local managers translate the macro-idea of activation into 
their sickness absence practices. Our empirical setting consists of four hospitals 
across the Netherlands and Denmark, both countries being seen as frontrunners in 
national policies for activation (see the methods section below). 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we elaborate on the theoretical 
framework of our study, which combines the translation literature with the notion of 
‘social exchange’, in order to put social interactions front and center. We then outline 
the methods of our research. Subsequently, based on 42 interviews with managers 
and sick-listed employees (21 dyads), our study reveals how local translations are 
dependent on the managers’ positive or negative perception of past and present social 
exchanges with their employees. We show how the translation process is guided by 
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a ‘norm of reciprocity’, where the managers’ actions entail the scorekeeping of the 
discharge of obligations and successive reciprocation decisions. Hence, translation 
processes appear to follow a quid-pro-quo logic, based on the managers’ perception 
of social interactions. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for the 
translation literature and we reflect on our social exchange perspective on translation.
4.2 A social exchange perspective on translation
Despite an increasing number of studies that examine the process through which 
ideas are translated into local practices (e.g., Helin & Sandström, 2010; Reay et al., 
2013), rather than focusing solely on its outcome in terms of the “differences between 
the original idea and its translation” (Teulier & Rouleau, 2013, p. 309), the social 
interactions involved in the translation process have remained relatively unexplored 
to date (Mueller & Whittle, 2011). This seems partly due to the tendency to study the 
translation process from the perspective of a single group of actors (e.g., Boxenbaum, 
2006; Teulier & Rouleau, 2013; Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014). For instance, Van Gestel and 
Nyberg (2009) revealed the process through which national sickness absence policies 
were translated in Dutch law firms, and showed how the national policies’ focus 
on managing long-term absence was shifted to controlling the short-term absence 
of certain groups of distrusted employees. However, since the authors centered on 
the perspective of HR managers, they left aside “the interaction of various interests 
in the translation process” (p. 557). Other studies included the perspectives of 
different translators, but did not explicitly address their interactions (e.g., Nicolini, 
2010; Waldorff, 2013). Waldorff (2013), for example, showed how various groups of 
actors in 18 Danish municipalities translated the idea of the health care center into 
three distinct organizational innovations, yet, as the author noted, “[t]he design of 
this study did not facilitate an in depth analysis of the interaction between actor 
groups in each municipality” (p. 232). Although these studies have increased our 
understanding of the translation process, the translation approach seems in need of 
a “sophisticated set of concepts to understand the detailed, micro-level interactions 
through which ideas are translated” (Mueller & Whittle, 2011, p. 189).
To explain how social interactions at local levels affect the meaning and 
enactment of macro-ideas, some scholars used the ‘inhabited institutions approach’ 
(Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) that aims to bring “work activity, social interaction, 
and local meaning-making back into the picture” in institutional theory (Hallett, 
2010, p. 66; Delbridge & Edwards, 2013). For example, Hallett (2010) examined how 
the principal of an elementary school implemented new ideas for accountability 
in monitoring practices. Since these practices conflicted with the established 
autonomy of teachers, they – in their turn – constructed a negative collective 
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meaning of the new practices, in order to prevent the coupling of accountability 
ideas to their teaching practices. As another example, Binder (2007) showed how 
the directors of three departments within one transitional housing organization in 
the US responded differently to federal funding policies, based on their professional 
values, interests, but also on their interactions with co-workers. While these studies 
point to the relevance of social interactions in studying implementation processes, 
the inhabited institutions approach apparently does not yet offer “an infrastructure 
for understanding how inhabitants across similar organizations translate and twist 
these larger institutional meanings in ways that are both similar and different” 
(Fine & Hallet, 2014, p. 13). The translation approach is able to provide such a 
foundation, but – as we saw above – needs a vehicle to understand the micro-
interactional work that occurs during translation processes.
In this study, we propose that combining the translation approach with the notion 
of social exchange may enable a better insight into the role of social interactions in 
the translation of ideas. Social exchange theory (SET) aims to understand workplace 
behavior (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) by examining “interpersonal interactions 
from an exchange perspective in which social costs and benefits are ‘traded’ in 
relationships governed by normative rules and agreements” (Di Domenico et al., 
2009, p. 890). The core normative rule in SET is the ‘norm of reciprocity’, which 
entails that each participant in a social exchange should repay any social benefit or 
service received (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Lioukas & Reuer, 2015). Although 
the notion of social exchange has not been explicitly linked to translation, a few 
authors demonstrated the potential usefulness of SET to understand the spread of 
ideas. Westphal and Zajac (1997), for instance, revealed how the dissemination of the 
practice of corporate board independence in US organizations was either impeded 
or facilitated depending on whether CEO-directors reciprocated or defected social 
exchanges with other CEOs. Similarly, Westphal, Park, McDonald and Hayward 
(2012) showed how the receipt of impression management support from another CEO 
increased the likelihood of reciprocation towards the benefactor, and even towards 
other CEOs. These studies highlight how the spread of ideas is influenced by the 
occurrence (or not) of reciprocity in social exchanges, and suggest the potential 
relevance of SET in unpacking social interactions in translation processes.
To best align SET with our translation approach linking macro-ideas to micro-
level practices and interactional work, we choose Blau’s (1964) interpretation of 
SET out of the different theoretical perspectives subsumed under this theory 
(Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler & Schminke, 2001; Mitchell, Cropanzano & Quisenberry, 
2012), since it “probably presents the most comprehensive portrayal of the context 
of exchanges” (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2004, p. 11). According to Blau (1964), 
social structures provide the guiding norms and principles for subsequent (inter)
action in groups as well as dyads, which is essential for social exchanges to 
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persist: “Without social norms […] the trust required for social exchange would be 
jeopardized, and social exchange could not serve as a self-regulating mechanism 
within the limits of these norms” (p. 255). Institutional norms and principles result 
from the differentiation of power in group social exchanges (as one member is able 
to provide more benefits than others), the legitimation of these power differences (as 
the benefits received from the ‘superior’ member outweigh the costs of compliance), 
and the resulting organization of individuals and groups in common endeavors. 
This might subsequently lead to the emergence of institutions, since members 
become interested in preserving the established order and its accompanying norms 
and principles. In Blau’s (1964) version of SET, social exchanges thus constitute the 
microfoundation of social structure, and these structures – in their turn – provide 
“certain ‘rules’ of exchange” (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005, p. 875).
Here, we examine social exchange at the workplace in the dyad between employer 
(i.e. manager) and employee, in its institutional context and guided by a norm of 
reciprocity (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2004). Blau (1964) defined a dyadic social 
exchange relationship as “the joint product of the actions of both individuals, with 
the action of each being dependent on those of the other” (p. 4). A social exchange 
starts as a voluntary action of one individual (A) towards another person (B), which 
is driven by the expected social benefits that can be obtained through interactions 
with B (e.g., commitment, social acceptance, respect). In this way, translating macro-
ideas can be seen as a kind of inducement, since actors gain social acceptance and 
are able to prevent feelings of guilt in return for their conformity to the social 
norms put forward by these ideas (Blau, 1964). As a consequence of actor A’s action, 
a general expectation for B is created to reciprocate actor A by providing a benefit or 
service in the future, which may again be expressed in conformity to social norms. 
In so doing, a norm of reciprocity is created, as the basis for “perpetuating the 
ongoing fulfillment of obligations and strengthening indebtedness” (Coyle-Shapiro 
& Conway, 2004, p. 9). To illustrate, Song, Tsui and Law (2009) found that CEOs who 
are perceived to care for the needs of employees and to make long-term investments 
in employment relationships, were reciprocated by their employees with strong 
commitment and high performance.
Since the social obligations involved in social exchanges are unspecified in terms 
of their content and timing, how and when reciprocation should occur is usually 
unclear and left to the discretion of B (Shore, Tetrick, Lynch & Barksdale, 2006). 
This open-endedness may create a “space for translation” (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996, 
p. 79) where macro-ideas and their social norms are accepted, modified, deflected, 
betrayed, added to, appropriated, or dropped (Nicolini, 2010, p. 1013; Latour, 
1986) in reciprocation. However, the continuity of a social exchange necessitates 
a feeling of trust that B (and A, vice versa) will discharge his or her obligation, 
and that neither side will engage in self-interested or opportunistic behavior, as 
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this would violate social norms of appropriate conduct and especially the norms 
of reciprocity that both actors have “internalized and institutionalized in their 
relationship” (Lioukas & Reuer, 2015, p. 6). Thus, when mutual trust is obtained, 
the social exchange may continue as long as obligations are fulfilled (Blau, 1964), 
although during each exchange, the idea to be traded is likely to be continuously 
reinterpreted and transformed in order to fit the interests of the parties involved 
(Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Nicolini, 2010). Based on the above, we believe that 
combining the translation approach with SET enables a better insight into the role 
of social interactions in translation processes.
4.3 Methods
Research setting
To study how managers translate the activation paradigm into sickness absence 
practices in social interactions with their employees, we focused on the Netherlands 
and Denmark, being seen as leading examples regarding the adoption of the 
activation paradigm in national sickness absence policies (Etherington & Ingold, 
2012; Sol et al., 2008). Consequently, organizations in both countries are nowadays 
faced with national policies to ‘activate’ sick-listed employees. The national 
policies in both countries stimulate the process of returning to work via procedural 
guidelines for organizations, for example, to analyze the functional (in)capacities of 
sick-listed employees, to develop a return-to-work plan and to take related follow-up 
steps in case of sickness absence. Dutch employers even bear the full financial 
responsibilities during sickness absence for up to two years (for an in-depth study 
of the national policies in the Netherlands and Denmark, see Chapter 2). 
To avoid basing conclusions on the specific “entanglements of organizational 
life” (Bechky, 2011, p. 1162), the translators in our study were selected from two 
Dutch and two Danish hospitals. We chose to conduct our study within hospitals, 
since they are internationally comparable in terms of their services and structure. 
Moreover, the issue of sickness absence is particularly urgent in healthcare 
organizations: sickness absence rates are, on average, higher in the healthcare sector 
compared to other industries (e.g., the professional and financial services sectors; 
Statistics Denmark, 2015b; Statistics Netherlands, 2015a). More generally, public 
expenditures are highest on healthcare, after those on social security (OECD, 2014), 
and are expected to grow even more as a result of the aging population, which 
increases the demand for care and simultaneously reduces the supply of healthcare 
workers (Buchan & Aiken, 2008). The above issues make the healthcare sector a 
relevant research setting, and hospitals are of a convenient size to study social 
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exchanges between managers and employees in the translation process without 
violating the anonymity of participants. 
The hospitals in our study (H1 and H2 in the Netherlands, and H3 and H4 in 
Denmark) are comparable in terms of their organization type (non-profit hospitals), 
staff numbers (relatively high; 3,400 fulltime equivalents on average), and capacity 
(between 400 and 700 beds). Sickness absence rates in the hospitals range from 3.4 
to 4.7 percent, which is below the Dutch and Danish healthcare average of about five 
and six percent, respectively (figures for 2013; Statistics Denmark, 2015b; Statistics 
Netherlands, 2015a). All hospitals under study revised their sickness absence policies 
in the years prior to our research, and now include similar activation components, 
such as procedures for early contact with sick-listed employees, for a certification 
of the functional (in)capacities of the employee, and for a return-to-work plan. The 
inclusion of hospitals in these front-running countries in terms of the adoption of the 
activation paradigm in national sickness absence policies thus seems to allow tracing 
the interaction mechanisms through which translation occurs at the micro level.
Research methods
The empirical study was conducted from December 2012 to August 2014. As our 
units of analysis, we selected 21 manager-employee dyads (i.e. five to six dyads per 
hospital in both countries) revolving around long-term sickness absence, which we 
defined as “absenteeism during a period of six weeks or more” (Dekkers-Sanchez et 
al., 2008, p. 156). Per dyad, semi-structured interviews were held with the manager 
and the sick-listed employee separately, resulting in a total of 42 in-depth interviews. 
The use of matched pairs enabled a two-sided view on the dyadic social exchange, 
which – as we will reveal later on – turned out to be highly important, given the 
different perceptions of managers and employees of their social interaction, and the 
resulting consequences of these differences. 
The sick-listed employees were selected by our contact persons, which were either 
HR managers or managers on occupational health and safety or return-to-work 
issues. In selecting from the available long-term sick-listed employees, we strove for 
diversity in terms of the employees’ age, gender, job, ward and absence cause. This 
resulted in a sample of employees aged between 28 and 58 years old (42 years on 
average), with a job as a nurse, nutrition or nurse assistant, medical secretary or HR 
manager, and employed at different wards or else under the supervision of different 
managers. Most employees were employed in the hospital for five years or more. The 
sample furthermore met our desired diversity, since 13 employees were absent from 
work due to physical health complaints (e.g., cancer and musculoskeletal diseases), 
and eight employees were sick-listed because of mental health complaints (e.g., 
stress, burnout and depression). They were absent for an average of 9.2 months. The 
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division of gender was skewed (three men and 18 women), but this is representative 
of the labor force in the healthcare sector (WHO, 2008). 
Only when the sick-listed employees gave their consent to participate, their 
managers were asked to participate in our study. Most of these managers were 
“the first level of management to whom non-managerial employees report” (Hales, 
2005, p. 473; italics in original), such as team leaders or nurse managers. With 
one exception, they were all women and two-thirds of them were employed as a 
manager in their hospital for five years or more; only two managers were employed 
for a shorter time (three and six months). Most managers were thus well experienced 
at their management jobs. 
We started each interview by explaining the research and asking permission to 
record the interview. In order to acquire background information of the respondents 
and the sickness absence, we first posed questions about their current job and tasks, 
and their perceptions of the cause of and solution for the absence. To solicit the 
opinions of respondents on the social exchange with their manager or employee, 
we asked questions about (1) the respondents’ views on their own role and (2) on the 
ideal and actual role of their manager or employee in managing sickness absence, 
and (3) their perspective on the interactions with their manager or employee. 
Finally, we asked about (4) the respondents’ perceptions of (the effectiveness of) 
the actions that are taken; that is, whether and how procedures defined in the 
hospital’s sickness absence policies are followed (see Appendix B for the topic list 
and interview guide). The interviews lasted 45 to 60 minutes, with a few exceptions. 
They were transcribed verbatim, totaling around 400 pages of transcripts. 
The data were analyzed by means of open, axial and selective coding techniques 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), which was supported by the use of MAXQDA, a software 
package for qualitative data analysis. Open coding involved constantly switching 
between and comparing the interview transcripts of the managers and the employees. 
We started by exploring the managers’ transcripts for their perceptions of the 
sick-listed employees, which was triggered by recurring quotes stating that they 
“know their employees”. We wanted to understand the content of this knowledge. 
Following this, the employees’ transcripts were coded for their perceptions of their 
own role and contributions to the sickness absence process. Subsequently, we coded 
for instances where managers talked about their own role in the particular dyad 
and the actions they had taken. This step was repeated to explore examples where 
employees told us about the actual and ideal role of their managers, and the actions 
that were taken. Finally, we explored the transcripts for instances where managers 
and employees talked about their interactions. Based on this open coding, a list of 
categories emerged.
Second, in axial and selective coding, we used Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 
organizational scheme, which allows researchers to relate categories to subcategories 
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that explain the conditions leading to, and the (inter)actions and consequences 
resulting from these categories. We found one overarching category, which in one 
hospital was explicitly called the “green or red emotional bank account”, referring 
to a manager’s positive or negative conclusion about the social exchange with 
the employee. We discovered this phenomenon more implicitly in the other three 
hospitals, and defined it as the judgment by managers of the need to reciprocate sick-
listed employees. This judgment appeared to arise from managers’ perceptions of the 
behavior of sick-listed employees in past and present social exchanges, and resulted 
in either flexible or strict translations of the activation paradigm. This ultimately 
seemed to lead to either an uncomplicated or a problematic return-to-work process, 
depending on the match between the perceptions of the managers and those of 
their sick-listed employees. Our data coding structure is displayed in Figure 4.1 
and reveals how managers’ translations of the activation paradigm appear to entail 
reciprocation decisions, which are highly dependent on their positive perception 
(‘green score’) or negative perception (‘red score’) of the performance of their sick-
listed employees in past and present social exchanges. These findings were rather 
similar across the hospitals as well as the two countries.
4.4 Quid pro quo: Social exchanges in translation processes 
In analyzing our data, we specifically focused on how reciprocity takes shape and 
influences the translation process in the social exchange between managers and 
their employees. Our data show how the managers’ translations of the macro-idea 
of activation are inextricably linked to their perceptions of the social exchange 
with their sick-listed employees. After close examination of our data, we discovered 
two steps in the translation process: (1) keeping score by managers as a way to 
classify the social exchange, and (2) deciding whether or not to reciprocate. Below 
we elaborate on these steps in more detail.
Managers’ scorekeeping of the social exchange
Social exchanges are based on the obligation of one actor to reciprocate another 
actor for the benefits or services that the latter has provided (and vice versa). In 
this way, a norm of reciprocity is created that supports the continuous discharge 
of obligations and strengthens indebtedness. However, sickness absence seems to 
cause a breach in the social exchange between the manager and the employee, for 
which “the one who signs an employment contract [and becomes ill] is primarily 
responsible, because s/he can no longer fulfill his or her obligations” (Manager 
H2-5). This breach appears to prompt managers to (implicitly) evaluate whether they 
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still have an obligation to reciprocate the sick-listed employee (e.g., by helping with 
returning to work or retaining the employee). The managers in our study seemed 
to derive their answer from their positive or negative perception of the social 
exchange, which is based on a classification of sick-listed employees into being 
either in surplus or in deficit in terms of discharging their obligations, respectively. 
In one hospital, a positive perception is described as the employee having a ‘green 
emotional bank account’ (i.e. being in surplus) and a negative perception as a ‘red 
emotional bank account’ (i.e. being in deficit): 
This is an employee who has, as we call it, a ‘very green emotional bank 
account’: she’s an employee with lots of credits […]. This also determines how 
your sickness absence is dealt with (Manager H1-1)
Our study indicates that keeping score of the sick-listed employees’ fulfillment of 
obligations affects whether managers experience an obligation to reciprocate (i.e. 
only for employees with a green emotional bank account) and ultimately influences 
how the activation paradigm is translated into sickness absence practices. Managers’ 
scorekeeping seemed based on criteria that are related to their perception of the 
behavior of sick-listed employees in both past social exchanges (before the illness) 
and present social exchanges (during the illness of the employee). In Table 4.1 (left-
hand columns) we have illustrated how and why the managers in each of our 21 
cases classified their employees as either scoring ‘green’ or ‘red’ on their emotional 
Figure 4.1 Data coding structure
‘
Perceptions of past and present social 
exchange 
Managers’ perception of:
- Past behavior of employee (value for the 
workplace, loyalty; tenure; sickness absence 
frequency)
-  Present behavior of employee (active 
attitude to return to work; transparency 
about medical conditions)
Score of social exchange 
“Green or red emotional bank account” 
(i.e. managers’ judgment of presence or
absence of need to reciprocate)
Subsequent social exchange
Managers’ reciprocation decision:
1 Green score: flexible translation of 
activation paradigm
2  Red score: strict translation of 
activation paradigm
Consequences of social exchange
1 Perception manager = perception employee: 
uncomplicated return to work (green score)
2 Perception manager ≠ perception employee: 
problematic return to work (red score)
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bank account, and how employees viewed their own discharge of obligations (right-
hand column). Next, we first elaborate on the managers’ criteria of scorekeeping 
(the left-hand columns in Table 4.1).
Past social exchange. One manager mentioned the relevance of the behavior 
of the sick-listed employee in past social exchanges as follows: “Every case is 
different, but it [the handling of the sickness absence case] also depends on the kind 
of employee one was before the sickness absence” (H1-5). A first criterion related 
to past social exchange is the managers’ perception of the value of the sick-listed 
employee for the workplace and his or her loyalty to the organization. Apparently, 
having been a ‘valuable’ employee creates a norm of reciprocity for managers to “do 
something in return” (H1-3), primarily by offering more time and room to return 
to work. 
Other criteria are the length of employment (tenure) and the frequency of sick-
ness absence of the sick-listed employee. Employees who have a long tenure and are 
infrequently absent are given more credits than the ones with a short tenure and/or 
a high absence frequency. For instance, one manager evaluated her social exchange 
with a long-term sick-listed employee positively, only because of the employee’s 
tenure of over 15 years. She explicitly mentioned that otherwise she would have 
evaluated the case negatively: “If I had an employee who has only been with me for 
a short time, it would be different: If you had been here for less than one year and 
were absent two to three months, that’s not okay” (H4-2). It seems that sick-listed 
employees with a short tenure have not yet earned enough credits in the eyes of 
their managers to create a norm of reciprocity, and managers appear less committed 
to those employees. Another manager explained the importance of the employee’s 
sickness absence frequency in determining her approach: “I hope that the employees 
who [seldom] get sick […] know that they are protected in another way than the other 
ones who […] are sick about four or five times in a period of six months” (H4-3). 
Present social exchange. The most important criterion related to the present social 
exchange, is the managers’ perception of the active attitude of sick-listed employees 
to return to work. Managers clearly valued sick-listed employees who they labeled 
as ‘active’ more than those who they considered ‘passive’, and were more inclined to 
make efforts to ensure the return to work of the former. Displaying an active atti-
tude, for example by taking initiative to contact the manager or seeking alterna-
tive work at the department, thus seems to create a strong obligation for managers 
to reciprocate this behavior, as expressed by one of the managers: “She [the sick-
listed employee] plays a really active role, […] she’s just thinking a way ahead […]. 
So we do what we can to help her” (H4-3). Sick-listed employees also recognize the 
importance of showing an active attitude to return to work, as one of them illus-
trated: “It [the return to work] is only because […] I showed up with an impression of 
willingness, that this [returning to my job] is something I want and this is what I’m 
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determined to do” (H3-6). A positive perception of the social exchange, in the above 
case based on an active attitude, thus strongly affects how the activation paradigm 
is translated into micro-level practices. However, some employees expressed that 
being more active in their return to work was too much to ask, for instance, when 
they were still in treatment for their illness (H4-5) or needed more time to recu-
perate and to get their (private) life back on track (H1-5/H3-2).
A second criterion related to the managers’ perception of the present social 
exchange is the transparency of the sick-listed employee about his or her (dis)abili-
ties, especially in relation to work. Being transparent reduces possible doubts of the 
manager about the existence and the course of the illness, and therewith improves 
the mutual bond of trust between manager and employee, which is key to the social 
exchange. Transparency about the health problems of employees is also seen as 
providing the manager “a tool to manage the illness” (H3-2) by giving knowledge 
about how to follow-up and support the sick-listed employee. However, managers 
might expect information about medical conditions that they deem necessary to 
manage the return to work, but which they are legally forbidden to ask for. Some 
employees ‘voluntarily’ cross their privacy boundaries, whereas others hold on to 
their legal right not to elaborate on the details of their illness but then have to suffer 
the consequences of a possible negative perception of their manager. This shows 
how the macro-idea of activation, when translated during micro-interactional work, 
may conflict with other macro-ideas, for example about privacy.    
The above demonstrates that scorekeeping is grounded on the managers’ 
perceptions of the obligations that sick-listed employees should fulfill. Interestingly, 
while these expectations about obligations have been found in all four hospitals in 
our study, they concern unspecified obligations in the social exchange (in terms of 
what is exactly meant by being a ‘valuable’ employee, having ‘sufficient’ tenure, 
being ‘infrequently’ absent, displaying an ‘active’ attitude and being ‘transparent’ 
about medical conditions). The unspecific nature of obligations makes them prone 
to different interpretations. For example, regarding transparency, one manager was 
displeased with the employee’s behavior and described that “in this case, we could 
have talked more open about some things”, while the employee labeled her behavior 
as transparent: “I felt like I told her [the manager] everything” (H3-6). The different 
(perceptions of) obligations for behavior in past and present social exchanges 
particularly seem to surface when sickness absence puts the social exchange under 
pressure, and sick-listed employees are no longer able to discharge their normal 
obligations to work.
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Case Manager Employee
Score Criteriona Perception of employee’s discharge of 
obligations
Perception of own discharge
of obligations
The Netherlands
H1-1
Woman 
nurse
Green Value 
for the 
workplace 
(past)
She’s an employee who has a lot of 
knowledge; she has always been there for 
the workplace.
I’ve been at the ward for 5 years 
now, so […] my leader knows that
I’ll always jump in [in case of 
problems with shifts].
H1-2
Man 
nutrition 
assistant
Red High 
absence 
frequency 
(past)
He has had a lot of absence hours […] 
and his absence is no longer tolerated […] 
despite his medical background.
I’ve been called in for meetings 
for a few times because of my 
sickness absence frequency, but it 
is all explainable.
H1-3
Woman 
nurse
Green Active 
attitude 
(present)
If you’re talking about employees who 
want to present themselves as active, 
then she’s really one of them.
I’m working very hard to recover, 
because I want to do what it takes 
to get it done.
H1-4
Woman 
nurse
Green Active 
attitude 
(present)
She showed that she wanted to return 
to work and that she wanted to do what 
it takes.
I immediately said that this [job] is 
what I want to do and what I want 
to keep doing.
H1-5
Woman 
nurse
Red No active 
attitude 
(present)
Taking initiative to recover, taking action 
to get something done or to change 
something […] that’s what went wrong.
At a certain point, I took the 
initiative myself to call them […].
I think they appreciated that I took 
the initiative. 
H2-1
Woman 
nutrition 
assistant
Green Active 
attitude 
(present)
She’s very motivated, she really wants 
to as well. She puts everything aside to 
make this work.
I do everything within my ability
[to return to work].
H2-2
Woman 
nurse
Green Trans-
parency 
(present)
She’s someone who is very open about 
what’s wrong with her, also to me.
I already told her earlier that 
I didn’t feel very well […]. 
She knows that I want to do 
everything well and I’m very eager 
to move forward.
H2-3
Woman 
nurse
Green Active 
attitude 
(present)
She’s someone who really wants to return 
to work, who you don’t need to motivate.
There’s only one person who 
wants to return to work for 32 
hours on this ward and that’s me, 
[…] that’s what I really want.
H2-4
Man 
nurse
Green Value 
for the 
workplace 
(past)
He’s someone with a lot of goodwill […] 
and then you have to say ‘you have to 
stop working’.
I should’ve kept silent about my 
health complaints; then I might
still be working now. But I’m just 
too honest in that regard.
H2-5
Woman 
HR 
manager
Red No trans-
parency 
(present) 
I notice that I’m reaching a limit, because 
she sometimes doesn’t tell me things […] 
and that’s not nice.
I’ve always been very open about 
it [the health complaints] to my 
manager.
Table 4.1  Perceptions of the discharge of obligations in social exchanges
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Case Manager Employee
Score Criteriona Perception of employee’s discharge of 
obligations
Perception of own discharge
of obligations
Denmark
H3-1
Woman 
nurse
Green Value 
for the 
workplace 
(past)
[She] is a very important person in my 
department, she’s very clever and good 
at her job.
I believe that I can get well [and 
return to work fully] so I don’t 
get fired.
H3-2
Woman 
nurse
Red No active 
attitude 
(present)
Sometimes from my part of the table I 
think, ‘well, now it’s time for you to get 
along here’ […]. [So] I have to push her.
I pushed myself because I wanted 
to get back to work and I wanted 
to please my employer, […] to show 
him that […] ‘I want to get back’. 
H3-3
Woman 
nurse
Green Active 
attitude 
(present)
Especially this one is very active in saying 
‘I want to’.
I really wanted to go back to work, 
because I thought it was a long 
time to be away [from work].
H3-4
Woman 
nurse
Green Active 
attitude 
(present)
She would like to come back to work. I’m the person who doesn’t want 
to be ill; I would like to get my life 
back on track.
H3-5
Woman 
medical 
secretary
Green Active 
attitude 
(present)
I expect her to do the utmost to come 
back to work. And I know she wants that, 
she really wants that.
I would like to come back to work 
very much.
H3-6
Woman 
nurse
Red No trans-
parency 
(present) 
Sometimes we didn’t know what was 
good for her and sometimes that had to 
do with that she didn’t tell us.
I was honest from the beginning 
but I didn’t get it back.
H4-1
Woman 
nurse 
assistant
Red High 
absence 
frequency 
(past)
I don’t know her that well, […] [but] she 
has been sick for many times […]. You’re 
not allowed to be that much ill on this 
ward.
I’m a very open person, so telling 
them [about the illness] and being 
active in my role […], I think it’s in 
my best interest and in theirs.
H4-2
Woman 
nurse
Green Tenure 
(past)
I think there’s a difference if […] you have 
an employee who has been with you for 
10 years and has done a good job.
I think I’ve done everything I could 
[…]. [But] they could see that […] 
I wasn’t very well; […] they know 
me for 7 years now.
H4-3
Woman 
nurse 
assistant
Green Low 
absence 
frequency 
(past)
Before [the sickness] she was fully 
functional, happy, glad for her work, 
stable, no leave of absence.
I’ve missed going to work; my 
work has been a very important 
thing for me.
H4-4
Man 
nurse
Red No active 
attitude 
(present)
I think he has done what he could do, […] 
but it was very slow and he always told 
me ‘not so quick, I have to get back very 
slowly’.
She wants me to get back to work 
as soon as possible, but I really 
have to […] be very, very conscious 
about how do I feel about this.
H4-5
Woman 
medical 
secretary
Red No active 
attitude 
(present)
I expect her to work when she’s here and 
maybe I want some more action when 
she’s here […] to show us that she wants 
this.
It’s not like I go home and take a 
rest because that’s fun, no, I go 
home because I need it.
Note: a We have divided these cases according to the criterion of behavior in past and present social echanges 
that seemed primary, but it should be noted that some of the managers mentioned more than one criterion.
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Decision to reciprocate and its consequences
The open-endedness of social obligations appears to create a space for translation 
that enables local managers to translate the activation paradigm more or less strictly, 
depending on their positive or negative perception of the social exchange with their 
employees. More specifically, while managers seemed to reciprocate green-scoring 
employees by translating the activation paradigm in a flexible way, they trans-
lated this paradigm in a manner that pressures red-scoring employees to return to 
work as soon as possible, regardless of the employees’ needs. The managers often 
felt entangled in a web of contextual pressures, with on the one hand the macro-
idea of activation and its accompanying demands to use the sick-listed employ-
ee’s residual work capacities, and on the other hand the organizational pressures to 
run their department as efficiently as possible. The managers described their own 
position in dealing with these pressures as a ‘balancing act’ (see Chapter 3). As one 
Dutch manager expressed: “I do my best for the sick-listed employee, without losing 
sight of the organization’s interests. And sometimes that’s a balancing act” (H2-3). 
A manager in a Danish hospital told us how she has to align the demands for social 
inclusion and efficiency: “I evaluate my approach [in sickness absence manage-
ment] by placing two things side by side: the cost-benefit for the ward and the 
cost-benefit for her [the sick-listed employee]. So like, is there consensus between 
these two?” (H4-3). The managers’ reciprocation decisions, which are based on their 
perceptions of the social exchange with their sick-listed employees, are thus made 
in a context of multiple pressures.
At the point of materializing the activation paradigm into actual practices, the 
perceptions of the sick-listed employees become even more relevant to gauge the 
consequences of managers’ translations: the (mis)match between the perceptions 
of managers and employees regarding the latter’s discharge of obligations seems to 
influence the return-to-work process and the employment relationship (it is now up 
to employees to implicitly judge whether there still is a norm of reciprocity). Below, 
we will elaborate on the different translations and their consequences.
Translation in case of a green score. Managers appeared to stretch the rules and 
regulations of the activation paradigm when they assigned sick-listed employees a 
green score. This translation entails that managers based their approach towards 
the return-to-work process primarily on the employees’ needs, and postponed the 
requirements of the activation paradigm to give them more time and opportunities 
to return to work. As one manager argued, activation “shouldn’t become a deten-
tion, where you have to come to work because that’s better for our sickness absence 
rate” (H1-1). Other managers described the importance of tailoring the return-
to-work process to the employees’ needs by saying, “it’s important that the nurse 
thinks it’s okay, because I don’t think you get anything good out of pressuring” 
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(H3-4) and “what I think is the most important, is what she thinks and feels. […] I 
rather have her taking it slow and thinking: yes, this went well!” (H2-2). In their 
turn, the particular employees said about their managers, “she gave me the time 
and […] the space to fully recover” (H3-4) and “my manager shows me […] that I can 
take my time” (H2-2).
A flexible translation of the activation paradigm also meant postponing the 
dismissal of sick-listed employees. For example, one manager in a Danish hospital 
delayed making an analysis of the functional (in)capacities of the sick-listed 
employee, in order to prevent her from being dismissed, as she said: “It’s a way I 
want to bend the rules. So every time we talked about making it […] I said, ‘let’s 
wait’ […]. If we would have made it, she would have been fired earlier”. The employee 
in this case noticed “that somehow they have been able to give me a long period 
[to return to work] and perhaps longer than the most will experience at their work” 
(H3-1). In general, when managers perceived the social exchange positively and 
responded by stretching the return-to-work procedures put forward by the acti-
vation paradigm, cases were unproblematic since the managers’ perceptions were 
congruent with those of employees regarding their own discharge of obligations 
(see Table 4.1). In these cases, employees seemed very positive about being given the 
time and room to return to work by their managers.
Translation in case of a red score. By contrast, in case of a red score, managers 
seemed to translate the activation paradigm in a way that pressures employees to 
return to work as soon as possible, without first taking their perceptions and needs 
into account. For instance, while one manager told us about an employee who she 
labeled as passive that “if she’s not showing that she can get here every day and 
work, maybe we have to fire her”, the employee described returning to work as “a 
big pressure” while also undergoing an intensive treatment for her illness (H4-5). 
Another manager described how she only keeps calling the sick-listed employees 
who she perceives as passive in order to push them to return to work: “If you 
continue to call them to ask how they’re doing […], they feel rushed [to return 
to work]. For some people this isn’t necessary: those [people] you need to slow 
down because they want too much too quickly” (H1-5). These quotes illustrate that 
managers do follow the requirements of the activation paradigm, but vary in their 
specific translations according to their perception of the social exchange. 
As shown in Table 4.1, a red score and the resulting decision of the managers not 
to reciprocate do not match the sick-listed employees’ perceptions of the extent to 
which obligations have been fulfilled, for example, performing well enough (H2-5), 
being active enough (H1-5/H3-2/H4-4), being sufficiently transparent (H3-6), or 
being infrequently absent (H1-2). For instance, one manager disapproved the (in her 
eyes) non-active behavior of the employee, saying “I expect her to work when she’s 
here and maybe I want some more action when she’s here […] to show us that she 
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wants this”. The employee in this case has a rather opposite view, since she felt that 
she does as much as she can: “it’s not like I go home and take a rest because that’s 
fun, no, I go home because I need it” (H4-5). In addition, in at least one case this 
mismatch occurs because the employee bases her perceptions of her own discharge 
of obligations on different criteria than the manager, with the employee saying that 
she is “very open” and “active” while her manager referred to the employee’s high 
absence frequency (H4-1). Either way, when managers perceived the social exchange 
negatively, cases were problematic and disagreements most often concerned the 
timing and pace of the return to work. Sick-listed employees seemed to feel that 
the organization’s interests prevailed over their wellbeing, which is marked by 
one employee saying: “It would have been nice if someone supported me more […], 
[someone] who supported my wellbeing, not just getting me back quickly” (H3-5). 
Generally, in these red-score cases, the mismatch between perceptions of social 
exchanges in the translation process led to frustration for the sick-listed employees. 
Their perception does not seem to play a role in the managers’ (negative) recipro-
cation decisions. Based on our data, it seems as if the criteria for social obligations 
as well as the different perceptions of the social exchange are not openly discussed 
between managers and employees.   
In conclusion, managers’ perceptions of the social exchange with their sick-
listed employees greatly impact how they translate the activation paradigm into 
sickness absence practices. We found that the link between the activation paradigm 
and its implementation in practice is stronger when managers’ perceptions of the 
social interaction are negative rather than positive. The implications of this para-
digm thus vary for sick-listed employees, despite the aim of the activation paradigm 
to guarantee an equal return-to-work process for employees.
4.5 Conclusion and discussion
This chapter sought a better insight into the role of social interactions in the process 
of translating macro-ideas into micro-level practices. Based on the translation 
literature, we proposed that our understanding of this process could be improved 
by drawing on the notion of social exchange. We constructed a social exchange 
perspective on translation to examine how local managers translate the ‘activation 
paradigm’ in sickness absence practices, in interactions with their employees. 
Our findings revealed that translations vary along with the managers’ positive 
perception (‘green score’) or negative perception (‘red score’) of the past and present 
social exchange with their sick-listed employees. Our data have thus highlighted 
the interactive quality of the translation process. We also found that the practical 
implications of the translation of the macro-idea of activation are stronger when 
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managers’ perceptions of the social interaction with employees are negative rather 
than positive. Below, we discuss how our findings contribute to the existing 
scholarly literature on translation.
First, taking a social exchange perspective helped to better understand the role 
of social interactions in the translation of macro-ideas into local practices at the 
scope of day-to-day encounters. By focusing on social exchanges between local 
managers and employees, our research not only underscores that “activity at the 
front line matters” (Reay et al., 2013, p. 988) in the translation process, but especially 
reveals the relevance of social interactions between local actors in the translation 
of macro-ideas. We thus support the perspective that ideas are spread through 
“interaction and negotiation/contestation” (Sturdy, 2002, p. 132; Mueller & Whittle, 
2011), yet our study further explains how these interactions involve exchanges of 
unspecified social obligations between local actors, and different views may occur 
over the discharge of these obligations. Social exchanges and, more specifically, 
the managers’ perceptions of these exchanges then influence how macro-ideas are 
finally materialized into local practices. We thus argue that translation studies 
should not only include the sellers of ideas (e.g., at the macro level), but also the 
multiple “idea-translators” (Mueller & Whittle, 2011, p. 203) and their interactions 
at the frontline.
Using the notion of social exchange to study translation processes particularly 
helped to shed light on the motivations for appropriate behavior when translating 
macro-ideas into local practices. While in Scandinavian institutional theory, 
behavior is said to be driven by “internalized prescriptions of what is socially defined 
as normal, true, right or good” (following the logic of appropriateness) (March & 
Olsen, 2006, p. 690), we argue that the motivation to act appropriately depends 
on the presence of a norm of reciprocity. The presence of this norm, in its turn, 
depends on the appropriateness of the behavior of the other in the social interaction. 
We thus demonstrate that people are motivated (or not) to translate ideas based on 
their scorekeeping of the other’s discharge of social obligations. In line with SET, 
it appears that “people are primarily concerned about whether a […] relationship is 
balanced, and keep track of how far out of balance it is” (Fiske, 1992, p. 691). Hence, 
in combining SET and the translation approach, our findings refine the operation of 
the logic of appropriateness as a ‘quid-pro-quo mechanism’, in which the translation 
of macro-ideas is based on the scorekeeping of social exchanges, and subsequent 
reciprocation decisions. 
The emphasis on the managers’ perceptions of the social exchange in the 
translation process was particularly important, since – in our study – employees’ 
views of the appropriateness of their behavior in past and present social exchanges 
were apparently not solicited by managers: managers and employees never seemed 
to communicate about their expectations of appropriate behavior. This demonstrates 
92
how translation processes reside in the individual’s (in our study, the manager’s) 
mind, but are based on (perceptions of) social interactions. In conclusion, the 
notion of social exchange proved a useful tool to address the largely overlooked 
“micro-interactional work” (Mueller & Whittle, 2011, p. 189) involved in translation 
processes. Our study highlights that it is in particular the managers’ perceptions of 
the social exchange that motivates their decision if and how to reciprocate when 
translating macro-ideas into local practices.
A second contribution of our study is that we have demonstrated how contextual 
pressures affect local social interactions in translation processes and resulting 
practices. We herewith respond to critiques that translation studies have paid “little 
attention to how the institutional context has an impact on actors’ creation of a 
local social meaning” (Waldorff, 2010, p. 25; see also Kirckpatrick, Bullinger, Lega 
& Dent, 2013). Our study shows that the different kinds of translation based on 
green/red scores were not available to managers as written or explicit “rules to 
follow”, but rather revealed as “rules which have been followed” as we studied the 
translation process in hindsight (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996, p. 85). These rule-like 
patterns are assumed to be formed by the institutional context in which they occur 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 2013; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). 
In particular, our research shows that these contextual pressures exist at 
multiple levels. First, the quid-pro-quo nature of translations at the micro level can 
be perceived as influenced by the activation paradigm at the macro level, where 
a reciprocity norm is reflected in making rights on social benefits conditional on 
active efforts to return to work (Serrano Pascual, 2007). Second, managers need 
to combine this macro-idea about activation and reciprocity with organizational 
demands to run a department and transfer an image of appropriate (sickness absence) 
behavior towards co-workers and senior management in their day-to-day work. As 
MacEachen et al. (2007) put it, “[t]he state-mandated requirement for employers to 
negotiate and accommodate workers’ recovery at work disrupts normal workplace 
social relations, which are based on the goal of production” (p. 57). The contextual 
pressures available at multiple levels influenced how managers defined the content 
of the ‘quo’ that is to be fulfilled in order to receive the ‘quid’, and therewith affect 
micro-level social exchanges in translation processes. Hence, we do not only 
demonstrate the relevance of considering the context in studies on translation, but 
particularly argue that this context is inherently multi-level (see also McDermott 
et al., 2013). In our study, the similarity in sickness absence practices across the 
hospitals and the two countries reveals how considering multiple demands in the 
local context is at least as important as including the macro-institutional context in 
studying translation processes (see also Waldorff, 2013).
Although the notion of social exchange has added to our understanding of 
translating macro-ideas into micro-level practices, we also see some limitations. One 
93
Ch
ap
te
r 
4 
 S
oc
ia
l i
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
 in
 tr
an
sl
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
se
s
is that it may be particularly applicable to ideas that affect reciprocal relationships, 
where interactions are “guided by an expectation of return or behavior in kind” (Di 
Domenico et al., 2009, p. 891). In our case, the activation paradigm is directly focused 
on the relationship between managers and employees (Knegt & Westerveld, 2008), 
which, in its turn, affects how this paradigm is translated. Combining the translation 
approach and SET thus seems especially fruitful where the implementation of ideas 
is dependent on “feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust” (Blau, 1964, 
p. 94), as for instance can be expected with the materialization into local practices 
of diversity management (e.g., Boxenbaum, 2006) or socially responsible workforce 
reduction (e.g., Bergström, 2007). However, taking a social exchange perspective on 
translation may be less applicable when ideas do not directly influence reciprocal 
relationships, such as with the introduction of lean management (e.g., Morris & 
Lancaster, 2006) or information technology systems (e.g., Nicolini, 2010; Teulier & 
Rouleau, 2013). This is not to say that social interactions are not involved in the 
translation of these ideas, policies or practices, but they are not characterized by 
reciprocity or “mutual giving” (Cropanzano et al., 2001, p. 50) and hence, might be 
less suitable to study from a social exchange perspective.
Considering potential avenues for future research, studies into the role of social 
interactions in translation processes can be extended to other types of social 
interaction than a dyadic social exchange. For example, it can also be explored 
as a generalized social exchange in order to address interactions in larger groups: 
“generalized social exchanges take place in groups of at least three parties, and there 
is no direct reciprocity among them” (Das & Teng, 2002, p. 448; italics in original). In 
generalized social exchanges, it is assumed that an actor who received a benefit or 
service from another actor in the past, will reciprocate this behavior towards a third 
actor; or that an actor provides a benefit or service to another actor out of beliefs 
that s/he has done the same for others (Westphal et al., 2012; Westphal & Zajac, 
1997). The consequences of interactions between two actors may thus go beyond 
the dyadic exchange, and extend to other social exchanges in the translation of 
ideas (e.g., see Westphal & Zajac, 1997). The previous highlights the different ways 
(dyadic, generalized) in which social exchanges can be insightful to enlighten our 
understanding of the role of social interactions in translation processes.
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‘Dis-able bodied’ or ‘dis-able minded’:
Stakeholders’ return-to-work experiences 
compared between physical and
mental health conditions
This chapter is based on Vossen, E., Van Gestel, N., Van der Heijden, B.I.J.M., & Rouwette, E.A.J.A. (2016). 
‘Dis-able bodied’ or ‘dis-able minded’: Stakeholders’ return-to-work experiences compared between 
physical and mental health conditions. Disability and Rehabilitation, advance online publication, DOI: 
10.3109/09638288.2016.1172675. 
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This chapter aims to explore if and why the return-to-work (RTW) experiences 
of various workplace stakeholders in the Netherlands and Denmark differ 
between physical and mental health conditions, and to understand the 
consequences of potentially different experiences for the RTW process in both 
health conditions. We studied 21 cases of long-term sickness absence, and held 
a total of 61 semi-structured interviews with the various actors involved in 
these cases. Our findings revealed that physical cases were seen as ‘easy’ and 
mental cases as ‘difficult’ to manage, based on the visibility and predictability 
of health complaints. On this ground, assessing work ability and following 
required RTW actions were perceived as more urgent in mental than in 
physical cases. Despite these perceptions, in practice, the assessment of work 
ability seemed to impair the RTW process in mental cases (but not in physical 
ones), and the (non-)uptake of RTW actions appeared to have similar results 
in both mental and physical cases. With these outcomes, the effectiveness of 
a differential approach is questioned, and the relevance of a bidirectional 
dialogue on work ability and a phased RTW plan is highlighted, regardless 
of the absence cause. Our study also demonstrates how policymakers need to 
strike a balance between obligatory and permissive legislation to better involve 
workplaces in RTW issues.
5.1 Introduction 
During the past two decades, the main purpose of many European welfare states in 
case of sickness absence has changed from providing benefits, to activating sick-
listed employees to return to work (RTW) early (Cox, 1998; OECD, 2010). These 
‘activation policies’ regard work as a better form of welfare than passive benefit 
receipt (Weishaupt, 2011), and therefore promote an early RTW of sick-listed 
employees before they have reached full recovery (MacEachen, Clarke, Franche & 
Irvin, 2006). Hence, the focus is no longer on determining the inabilities of sick-
listed employees, but on discovering their remaining ability to work, despite their 
illness (Hetzler, 2009). The emphasis on work has led to an increasingly important 
role for employers (and workplaces) in the RTW process, which is based on the belief 
that they are well positioned to judge what work their employees can still perform 
as well as the required work(place) adjustments (OECD, 2010). In so doing, employers 
are expected to be able to reduce the economic burden of sickness absence to society 
(Seing et al., 2014). Consequently, the RTW process has become the domain of a 
multiplicity of workplace stakeholders, such as sick-listed employees, immediate 
supervisors, HR managers, occupational health physicians (OHPs), unions, and 
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co-workers (Franche et al., 2005; Loisel et al., 2005; MacEachen et al., 2006). 
 Recently, researchers are catching up on their understanding of how workplace 
actors actually experience the RTW process, thereby revealing how workplace 
relations – especially those between sick-listed employees and employers 
(represented by supervisors and HR managers) – affect this process. Several studies 
demonstrated that employers appear to have the upper hand in decisions about RTW 
issues, for example about work(place) adjustments or the timing and speed of the 
RTW (Hoefsmit et al., 2013; Nyberg, 2012; Seing et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2010). In 
making these decisions, employers seem to base their approach, inter alia, on their 
perceptions of the sick-listed employee’s image, attitude, personality and openness 
about the illness in relation to work (see Chapter 4; Maiwald, De Rijk, Guzman, 
Schonstein & Yassi, 2011; Tiedtke, Donceel, De Rijk & Dierckx de Casterlé, 2014). 
Moreover, employers’ actions appear influenced by the value and the replaceability 
of the sick-listed employee, and by the presence of goodwill and trust (Lemieux, 
Durand & Hong, 2011; MacEachen et al., 2006; Seing et al., 2015; Ståhl, Müssener & 
Svensson, 2012; Stochkendahl, Myburgh, Young & Hartvigsen, 2015; Tiedtke et al., 
2012). Finally, research has pointed to the potentially facilitating role of OHPs in the 
RTW process (MacEachen et al., 2006), the stimulating role of unions on employers 
taking proactive RTW measures (Corbière et al., 2015; Franche et al., 2005), and to 
the relevance of co-workers in the phase before, during and after the RTW (Larsen, 
Labriola, Nielsen & Petersen, 2014; Tjulin, MacEachen, Stiwne & Ekberg, 2011). 
As such, these studies highlight the significance (and complexity) of workplace 
relations and multidisciplinary collaboration in the RTW process. 
However, to date, empirical research that explicitly compares stakeholders’ 
RTW experiences in cases of physical versus mental health conditions is scarce 
(Durand, Corbière, Coutu, Reinharz & Albert, 2014; MacEachen et al., 2006). This 
is because scholars have either addressed these experiences in relation to a specific 
symptom group, such as musculoskeletal disorders (Loisel et al., 2005; Maiwald et 
al., 2011), cancer (Tiedtke et al., 2014; Tiedtke et al., 2012), common mental disorders 
(Lemieux et al., 2011; Noordik, Nieuwenhuijsen, Varekamp, Van der Klink & Van 
Dijk, 2011) and depression (Corbière et al., 2015), or have not distinguished between 
the two health conditions in their findings (Nyberg, 2012; Seing et al., 2015; Ståhl 
et al., 2012; Stochkendahl et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2010). As a result, the limited 
available research has proven inconclusive so far: While some literature reviews 
suggest the existence of similarities between RTW experiences in physical (here, 
musculoskeletal) and mental health conditions (Durand et al., 2014), such as the 
importance of work adjustments (Andersen, Nielsen & Brinkmann, 2012; MacEachen 
et al., 2006), qualitative studies noted differences in these experiences between both 
health conditions. For instance, with regard to early contact, Tjulin et al. (2011) 
found that supervisors and co-workers felt that the timing of the RTW should vary 
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between physical and mental illnesses, and Hoefsmit et al. (2013) observed that in 
mental cases, supervisors and employees tended to not have early contact, compared 
to physical cases. The inconclusiveness of evidence leaves a significant gap in the 
existing literature, since understanding how the RTW process can be tailored (or 
might not need to be tailored) to the needs of the physically or mentally sick-listed 
employee may promote an earlier RTW, and in so doing create a ‘win-win situation’ 
(Tiedtke et al., 2012; Tjulin, MacEachen & Ekberg, 2011) for all parties involved. 
In this chapter, we therefore aim (1) to explore if and why the RTW experiences 
of various workplace stakeholders differ between physical and mental health condi-
tions, and (2) to understand the consequences of potentially different experiences 
for the RTW process in both health conditions. Since legislation has been shown to 
affect workplace stakeholders’ RTW behavior (Hoefsmit et al., 2013; Van Raak et al., 
2005), for instance by giving actors their ‘teeth’ to act (De Rijk, Van Raak & Van 
der Made, 2007), this research examined actual RTW processes in two countries 
to take this influence into account: the Netherlands and Denmark. These countries 
are viewed as frontrunners in the ‘activation’ of sick-listed employees to RTW early 
(Etherington & Ingold, 2012; Sol et al., 2008), yet differ regarding the degree to 
which workplaces are given a statutory role in this process (see Chapter 2). The RTW 
legislation of the two countries is further explained and compared below.
5.2 Methods
To explore workplace stakeholders’ RTW experiences in physical versus mental 
health conditions, we used a comparative multiple-case study design. This design 
is particularly convenient to perform a multi-stakeholder analysis, especially in 
unexplored research areas (Fitzgerald & Dopson, 2009). The study was conducted 
from December 2012 to August 2014.
Research setting
This research was carried out in four non-profit hospitals, equally divided over 
the Netherlands and Denmark. Workplace actors in both countries have obtained a 
statutory role in activating sick-listed employees to RTW early, albeit to a different 
extent. Legislation in the Netherlands stipulates that the RTW process is the shared 
responsibility of employers and employees; by contrast, since legislation in Denmark 
places the responsibility to initiate the RTW process with municipalities, less policy 
initiatives are focused on workplace actors, who are the focus of this study. As 
shown in Table 5.1, the Dutch RTW legislation for workplaces is characterized by 
extensive, obligatory ‘must rules’ coupled with sanctions (Van Raak et al., 2005), 
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whereas noncompulsory ‘may rules’ (without sanctions) are characteristic of the 
Danish legislation (Chapter 2). However, despite this difference, the legislation 
contains similar ‘activation’ components in both countries, such as an analysis of 
the remaining work ability of sick-listed employees (i.e. the problem analysis in 
the Netherlands and the possibility attest in Denmark), a RTW plan, and meetings 
between sick-listed employees and their employers. Including these two countries 
with their different policies enables a better understanding of the influence of 
legislation on the behavior of workplace actors in the RTW process.
Table 5.1 Legal financial and RTW responsibilities of workplace actors in the Netherlands 
   and Denmark
The Netherlands Denmark
Financial 
responsibility
Employers pay for the first 2 year of 
sickness absence, at least 70% of wages 
per year with a maximum of 170% over 
2 years
Employers pay for the first 30 days 
of sickness absence, thereafter 
municipalities pay a reimbursement for 
up to 1 year
RTW 
responsibility
- Within 1 week: notification of sickness 
absence at OHP/service (employer)
- Within 6 weeks: problem analysis 
(declaration of the functional (in)
capacities of the employee) (OHP)
- Within 8 weeks: RTW plan (employer 
and employee)
- Every 6 weeks: follow-up meetings 
(employer and employee)
- After 46-52 weeks: first year 
evaluation (employer and employee)
- After 87-91 weeks: final evaluation 
(employer and employee)
- After 93 weeks: employee applies 
for disability benefit at Employment 
Insurance Agency
- Within 4 weeks: sickness absence 
interview (employer and employee)
- Within 5 weeks: notification of 
sickness absence at the municipality 
(employer)
- After 8 weeks: RTW plan (on 
employee’s request) (employer and 
employee)
- Possibility attest (declaration of 
the functional (in)capacities of the 
employee) (first page: employer and 
employee, second page: general 
physician)
- Employer is allowed to ask medical 
certificate and statement of duration
Sanctions For employer: third year of sick pay, 
paying disability benefit of partially 
disabled workers for max. 10 years
For employee: being withhold wage 
payment, denied access to disability 
benefit after 2 years
For employer: no sanctions
For employee: being withhold wage 
payment from employer or sickness 
benefit from municipality
Employment 
protection
Generally no dismissals possible Possibility to dismiss
Source: For NL: Gatekeeper Improvement Act (2002), Extended Compulsory Sick Pay Act (2004), Work and Income 
according to Capacity Act (2006). For DK: Sickness Benefit Act (2010)
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Sample and procedure
We included a total of 21 cases of long-term sickness absence, defined as absence 
for six weeks or longer, in this research (five to six cases per hospital in both the 
Netherlands and Denmark). These cases were purposefully selected to achieve diversity 
with regard to the type of the health condition (physical or mental) as well as the job 
and ward of the sick-listed employee, in order to include as many different workplace 
actors as possible. This has led to a sample consisting of 13 cases of physical illnesses 
(e.g., musculoskeletal disorders, neurological disorders and cancer) and eight cases of 
mental illnesses (common mental disorders, such as stress, burnout and depression). 
On average, the employees were absent from work for 9.2 months. They were all 
employed on different wards in the hospitals, or else had different supervisors. 
 The final data set consisted of 61 semi-structured interviews with the workplace 
actors involved in the 21 sickness absence cases. This means that in the Dutch cases, 
the sick-listed employee, the supervisor, the HR manager, and the OHP were included, 
and – where relevant – other work and health professionals. In the Danish cases, 
the sick-listed employee and the supervisor were interviewed as the main workplace 
actors involved, and in each hospital an HR manager and a union representative were 
interviewed. Additionally, in one Danish hospital a work and health professional was 
included. An overview of the interviewees and the characteristics of each sickness 
absence case is provided in Table 5.2; it should be noted that the difference in the 
number of interviews per country is related to variations in national and organizational 
policies (e.g., the involvement of the OHP in the RTW process is obligatory in the 
Netherlands but not in Denmark).
The interviews were semi-structured and guided by a topic list for both physical 
and mental cases (see Appendix B). Topics entailed: (1) the interviewees’ current 
tasks and professional background, (2) their views on the cause and solution for the 
sickness absence, (3) their perceptions of their own role in the RTW process, (4) their 
perspectives on the ideal and actual roles of the other workplace actors involved, and 
on (5) (the effectiveness of) the RTW actions that are taken, like adjustments of the 
work(place) or working hours. The interviews took between 40 to 60 minutes, with 
a few exceptions (e.g., they could last two hours when interviewees were involved 
in multiple cases). They were recorded (with permission) and transcribed verbatim, 
leading to a total of 728 pages of transcripts.
Data analysis
Data analysis was done according to open, axial and selective coding techniques 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), supported by the use of MAXQDA, a software program for 
qualitative data analysis. First, the interview transcripts were coded line-by-line 
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Table 5.2 Overview of sickness absence cases and interviewees 
Case Employee characteristics
Gender, age, position
Health condition Intervieweesa,b
The Netherlands
NL-1 Woman, 35-40, nurse Physical SE/SV/HR1/OHP2/WHP-1
NL-2 Man, 35-40, nutrition assistant Physical SE/SV/HR1/OHP2/WHP-1
NL-3 Woman, 40-45, nurse Physical SE/SV/HR/OHP2/WHP-1
NL-4 Woman, 35-40, nurse Mental SE/SV/HR3/OHP2
NL-5 Woman, 40-45, nurse Mental SE/SV/HR3/OHP2
NL-6 Woman, 55-60, nutrition assistant Physical SE/SV/HR4/WHP-2/WHP-3
NL-7 Woman, 30-35, nurse Mental SE/SV/HR4/WHP-4
NL-8 Woman, 35-40, nurse Physical SE/SV/HR/WHP-5
NL-9 Man, 55-60, nurse Physical SE/SV/HR/WHP-2/WHP-5 
NL-10 Woman, 55-60, HR manager Physical SE/SV/HR/WHP-2
N/a Additional interview OHP
Denmark
DK-1 Woman, 35-40, nurse Mental SE/SV
DK-2 Woman, 30-35, nurse Mental SE/SV
DK-3 Woman, 25-30, nurse Physical SE/SV
DK-4 Woman, 55-60, nurse Physical SE/SV
DK-5 Woman, 30-35, medical secretary Physical SE/SV
DK-6 Woman, 30-35, nurse Mental SE/SV
DK-7 Woman, 35-40, nurse assistant Physical SE/SV
DK-8 Woman, 45-50, nurse Mental SE/SV
DK-9 Woman, 55-60, nurse assistant Physical SE/SV
DK-10 Man, 40-45, nurse Mental SE/SV
DK-11 Woman, 40-45, medical secretary Physical SE/SV
N/a Additional interviews HR (2)/UR (2)/WHP
Notes: a Differences in the number of interviews per country are related to variations in national and organiza-
tional policies. b Explanation of abbreviations for interviewees in order of appearance: SE: sick-listed employee, 
SV: supervisor, HR: HR manager, OHP: occupational health physician, WHP: work and health professional, UR: 
union representative. 1,2,3,4 Equal numbers imply that the same interviewee is involved in more cases.
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following the topics of our topic list. We also coded for instances where workplace 
stakeholders made explicit distinctions between (the RTW process in case of) 
physical and mental illnesses. This open coding resulted in a list of categories, 
which we subsequently structured and elaborated using Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 
organizational scheme or ‘paradigm’. The paradigm enables researchers to code around 
the axis of categories, by relating them to subcategories that define the conditions, 
(inter)actions and consequences leading to or flowing from these categories. Finally, 
in selective coding, we were able to distinguish two core categories (or phenomena) 
as the main themes in our comparison of workplace stakeholders’ RTW experiences 
between physical and mental health conditions: (1) conflicting interpretations of work 
ability, and (2) different perceptions of required RTW actions. Figure 5.1 illustrates 
our data coding structure and shows how the interplay between different perceptions 
of physical and mental illnesses and the RTW legislation in the Netherlands and 
Denmark play a role in shaping our two main themes, and the resulting (inter)actions 
in and consequences for the RTW process.
Ethical considerations
Although approval by an ethical committee for this type of study is not required 
in the Netherlands and Denmark, all procedures followed were in accordance 
with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later 
amendments. The sickness absence cases were selected by our contact person within 
the hospitals, which was an HR manager, a manager on occupational health issues, or 
one of the work and health professionals. Potential participants were given written 
Figure 5.1 Data coding structure 
   Source (for picture): Hjarsbech et al. (2015).
Conditions
Different perceptions 
of physical and mental 
illnesses
x
RTW legislation in NL 
and DK
Phenomena 
(main themes)
1 Conflicting interpre-
tations of work ability
2 Different perceptions of 
required RTW actions
Consequences
Impairment of RTW process
(Inter)actions
1 Unidirectional communi-
cation (mental cases, NL)
2 Phased RTW plans not 
made, not based on 
employees’ needs or 
changed
 (mental and physical 
cases, DK)
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or oral information about the research. Only when the sick-listed employees gave 
their consent to participate, the other actors involved in the cases were asked for 
their participation. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants 
included in the study. Moreover, at the start of each interview, participants were 
assured of anonymity and confidentiality in handling the data.
5.3 Findings
In comparing stakeholders’ RTW experiences between physical and mental health 
conditions, we will present the findings following the two main themes that have 
been revealed during data analysis: (1) conflicting interpretations of work ability, 
and (2) different perceptions of required RTW actions. The conditions, (inter)actions 
and consequences leading to or resulting from each theme (Figure 5.1) are woven into 
our storyline. Since the first theme mainly occurred in the Netherlands, we take the 
Dutch cases as a starting-point and compare these with the Danish ones, revealing 
how the assessment of work ability works out differently for mental and physical 
cases. By contrast, the second theme is presented by comparing the Danish cases 
with the Dutch ones, and demonstrates how the (non-)uptake of actions has similar 
implications for (inter)actions and consequences in mental and physical cases.
Conflicting interpretations of work ability
The workplace stakeholders in our study seemed to have different perceptions of 
physical and mental illnesses in relation to managing the RTW process. In both 
countries, they argued how – in their experience – physical cases are mostly 
‘easy’ to manage because of the overall visibility of the health complaints and the 
general predictability of their course and duration, whereas mental cases are seen 
as ‘difficult’ due to the lack of these characteristics:
Physical complaints are much easier for everybody. There is a clear time frame 
and that’s it, and it’s much more accepted by everyone (Supervisor NL-5; 
emphasis added)
It would be much easier if it were a broken leg or a cancer disease. When it’s 
a depression or another kind of mental illness, it’s very difficult to manage 
(Supervisor DK-2; emphasis added)
Because of the invisibility of mental health complaints and apparent doubts about 
the credibility of the diagnosis (are they ‘really ill’?), mentally sick-listed employees 
‘
‘
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seemingly have to work harder to prove the existence of their illness and to convince 
others of their (in)ability to work than physically sick-listed employees. This is 
illustrated by the following examples:
Physical illness: They’ve all seen me with my bald head […] so then you don’t 
need to explain (Employee NL-3)
Mental illness: I was having a hard time telling them [about the illness], because 
[…] no one can see it actually (Employee DK-6)
Starting-point: the Netherlands
In our Dutch cases, the assessment of the sick-listed employee’s work ability by 
the OHP (the statutory problem analysis, see Table 5.1) is indeed perceived as more 
urgent to manage the RTW process in mental than in physical cases. As one HR 
manager, for instance, explained: 
With mentally sick-listed employees, we often need the advice of the OHP. […] 
In case of something physical, [like] a broken leg, it’s clear: six weeks using 
crutches, no physical load. But in case of a burnout? […] In those cases, the 
OHP and the occupational health nurse are the two players we often consult 
(HR manager NL-6/7) 
However, in the mental cases in our research, the ‘subjectivity’ of mental illnesses 
led to conflicting interpretations of the employee’s work ability between the OHP 
and the sick-listed employee. That is, in their assessment of the remaining ability 
to work, the two OHPs included in our study seemed to doubt the severity of the 
illness (e.g., “people who are diagnosed with a burnout have nothing more than 
an adjustment disorder, are mildly overworked”, NL1-5) and therefore decided that 
working while having a mental illness is not necessarily harmful for the sick-listed 
employee’s recovery. Although the mentally sick-listed employees argued that 
they wanted to RTW as soon as possible as well, they did not share the OHP’s 
interpretation of a full ability to work (“In the beginning, I really wasn’t able to 
work”, NL-4), and described that they needed a (slower) phased RTW.
 However, upon closer inspection of the data, the conflicting interpretations per 
se did not seem to cause frictions between OHPs and sick-listed employees, but 
rather the way in which these assessments of work ability were communicated. 
As one of the work and health professionals described, “the OHP [of this hospital] 
can be confrontational, and I think that’s okay, but I always say, ‘it’s the tone that 
makes the music’” (WHP-2 NL-6/9/10). Indeed, the mentally sick-listed employees 
argued that the OHPs’ directness in stating that they were able to work without 
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having listened to their story first, appeared to “cut the ground from under their 
feet” (NL-5/7). As a result of not acknowledging the employees’ illnesses, according 
to the supervisors and HR managers, the employees were set back in their recovery 
and the RTW process took longer than might have been necessary. An illustration 
of such a mental case is provided in Table 5.3. 
By contrast, these conflicting interpretations of work ability did not occur in the 
physical cases, where the sick-listed employees appreciated the directness and crit-
ical view of the two OHPs in our study. 
Comparing with Denmark
Although disagreements about work ability (especially in relation to the speed of 
the RTW) occurred in Danish mental cases as well; here, the RTW process appeared 
ameliorated by the inclusion of a union representative and/or a municipality 
councilor, who served as the sick-listed employee’s ‘backup’. That is, in mental cases, 
the union representative and the municipality councilor acted first and foremost as 
the employee’s support (their “second pair of ears and eyes”, UR DK-2). This occurred 
either ‘front stage’, by reminding the workplace actors of the rights of sick-listed 
employees and signaling when rules are not followed in joint meetings, or ‘back 
stage’, by explaining the employer’s expectations towards sick-listed employees 
in conversations with the employees only. Moreover, union representatives and 
municipality councilors seemed able to counterbalance a supervisor’s push for a (too) 
quick RTW, as “the little voice of morality […] maintaining social responsibility” 
(UR DK-2). One employee described the role of the municipality councilor as follows:
Table 5.3 Example of conflicting interpretations of work ability in a mental case in the 
   Netherlands
OHP
Judgement of 
work ability in 
mental cases
99 percent of the mental health complaints that I come across are related to the private 
domain, and then I need to say, “the day has 24 hours, the week has 7 days, we have an 
employment contract for 24 hours, so you can come here [to work], it’s good for you, and 
you have plenty of hours left to solve your problems” (NL 1-5)
Employee,
supervisor 
and HR 
manager 
Describing
how the 
response of 
the OHP has 
delayed the 
RTW process
In the beginning it [the RTW] took much longer because of the OHP. I told him how I felt […] 
and then he said “[…] I hear that you only work 23 hours a week so you have enough time 
left to work on yourself, so I don’t see any problem why you can’t work” […] I felt like he cut 
the ground from under my feet (Employee NL-5)
The involvement of the OHP in this case has […] delayed and impaired the process. […] 
Of course you want an employee to RTW as soon as possible, […] but in this case he gave 
such a blunt advise: “you have to return or else you’ll lose your job” (Supervisor NL-5)
The OHP is very firm in his judgment of mental health problems […]. And that may backfire, 
so that employees don’t want to RTW (HR manager NL-4/5) 
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He [the municipality councilor] did a great job and he was on my side, he was 
helping me and he was not pushing me back to work […]. That really made a 
difference (Employee DK-2, mental health condition)
Another sick-listed employee confirmed the union representative’s own role descrip-
tion as being “a catalyst in the process” (UR DK-1):
It [the RTW] is only because my union person said that it would be good that 
I showed up with an impression of willingness, that this [returning to work] 
is something I want and this is what I’m determined to do (Employee DK-6, 
mental health condition)
The union representative and the municipality councilor were not involved or had 
a less significant role in physical sickness absence cases. Only in one case (DK-11), 
where the RTW process did not match the department head’s personal experiences 
with a cancer illness, the union representative had a similar role as in the mental 
cases.
Different perceptions of required RTW actions
According to the Dutch and Danish workplace stakeholders in this study (except for 
the sick-listed employees), the RTW process requires different actions based on the 
absence cause. While physical cases are perceived as in no need of strictly following 
official guidelines, because of their (generally) clearer and more predictable 
trajectories; mental cases are considered as requiring frequent contacts and a 
gradual build-up of hours and tasks according to a RTW plan, due to the subjectivity 
of mental health complaints and their varying trajectories and durations. As two 
workplace stakeholders explained:
People who are ill for mental reasons create such a barrier [to RTW] if they 
don’t stay in touch with the workplace, [...] so you need to make sure that you 
keep in contact, even if it’s only to have a cup of coffee or to go for a short 
walk (HR manager NL-9)
You make the small [RTW] steps and have more frequent meetings with 
someone with a mental illness than you have in case of a bad knee or a bone 
break (Supervisor DK-5)  
‘
‘
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Starting-point: Denmark
Despite these perceptions of the need for a different RTW approach according to the 
cause of the absence, in the Danish cases this distinction was not observed in practice. 
RTW plans were only made in three mental cases; in the other two mental cases these 
plans were only drawn up after the involvement of the union representative or the 
municipality councilor. By contrast, RTW plans were still made in three of the six 
physical cases (all concerning cancer illnesses), although – as we have shown above – 
workplace actors described them as less necessary in these physical situations.
What is more, the analysis revealed the importance of having and holding on 
to an appropriate, phased RTW plan, irrespective of the absence cause. Namely, 
the RTW process appeared to proceed problematically in cases of mental as well 
as physical health conditions when no RTW plan was made (i.e. no phased RTW 
took place), when the plan did not match the sick-listed employee’s needs, or when 
supervisors deviated from established plans. In these situations, conflicts occurred 
between the sick-listed employee and the supervisor over the speed of the RTW; 
in physical cases especially when the RTW took longer than the expected dura-
tion. To illustrate these findings, Table 5.4 gives examples of how both physically 
and mentally sick-listed employees in these problematic Danish cases described the 
importance of a RTW plan.
Table 5.4  Examples of the importance of RTW plans for both physically and mentally 
   sick-listed employees in Denmark
Physical 
cases
I wish I could have started up with some hours or less days […], but if the 
department has to function we have to be there all the time […]. They 
expect you to be here for a 100 percent (DK-7)
No RTW plan
It [the meeting] always ended up with “do you think you can take some 
more hours now?” […] Instead of, when […] we made an agreement of 
“this is how it’s going to be”, then leave it [at that] rather than pushing all 
the time (DK-11)
Deviating from 
RTW plan
Mental
cases
The one thing I was missing was an overview. […] Now, I have a plan on 
paper and I can say, “I’m not ready for this, this is what we planned”. 
[…] [So] the main thing in getting back to work was making a structured 
[RTW] plan (DK-2)
No RTW plan 
I heard that they make a [RTW] plan and you follow it, and I didn’t have 
any. So from day one I was just on my own. […] I have taken the work 
tasks and divided them into red, yellow and green […] and then I wrote 
down how many hours I should work (DK-6)
No RTW plan
I made a [RTW] plan with help from the outside, from the municipality. 
They helped me […] to make plans for about 14 days at a time […] and to 
really hold on to the plans that we were making. […] I didn’t have that the 
first time: […] I built up hours as well, but it was too fast (DK-10)
RTW plan 
not based on 
employee’s 
needs
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Comparing with the Netherlands
In our Dutch cases, RTW plans were made in all of the physical and mental cases 
(with two exceptions where the physical illness was at such an advanced stage that 
RTW was not yet or no longer possible). Although these plans are developed for each 
individual case separately, increasing the amount of working hours appeared to be 
prioritized over building up regular tasks, as one OHP said: “the most important 
is returning to normal work routines (the hours and days you work) and then we 
accept a temporary reduction in the difficulty of tasks” (NL 1-5). This means that 
most sick-listed employees increased their working hours by one hour every two 
to four weeks, job duties were reduced to less complex tasks, and irregular shifts 
were temporarily cancelled. Interestingly, all of the mentally sick-listed employees 
started their RTW by visiting the workplace several times to have a cup of coffee, 
in order to keep in touch with their colleagues and to lower the threshold to RTW.
Despite a perceived need to distinguish actions according to the cause of the 
absence, both physically and mentally sick-listed employees in our Dutch cases 
appreciated the RTW plan as a support and guidance in returning to work. In 
particular, these employees were satisfied with how their needs were considered in 
establishing the RTW plan, as they mentioned, “what has contributed to the RTW 
was the time and space that I was given” (NL-4, mental), “they give me all the room 
that I need to return” (NL-6, physical) and “my manager gives me carte blanche” 
(NL-8, physical). Even in two of the three mental cases where the RTW process was 
at first impaired by conflicting interpretations of work ability, as we saw above, the 
sick-listed employee and the supervisor managed to make a plan that got the process 
back on track in a positive way. As one of the supervisors explained, this meant 
“partly taking on the [OHP’s] advice and partly going our own way” (NL-7). Next to 
having and holding on to a RTW plan, basing these plans on the needs of physically 
and mentally sick-listed employees thus seems important for an unproblematic 
process of returning to work.
5.4 Discussion
The aim of this chapter was to explore if and why the RTW experiences of various 
workplace stakeholders in the Netherlands and Denmark differ between physical and 
mental health conditions, and to understand the consequences of potentially different 
experiences for the RTW process in both health conditions. The data revealed the 
existence of a discrepancy between perceptions of a required distinction between 
physical and mental cases on the one hand, and the reality of having to make this 
distinction on the other. On this ground, this study highlights the importance of 
(1) involving sick-listed employees in a bidirectional dialogue on work ability, (2) 
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establishing an adequate, phased RTW plan, regardless of the absence cause, and (3) 
striking a balance between ‘must rules’ and ‘may rules’ in RTW legislation aimed at 
involving workplaces. We discuss these key findings below.
Bidirectional dialogues on work ability
A first difference in actors’ RTW experiences between physical and mental health 
conditions revealed in the assessment of the sick-listed employees’ remaining work 
ability, which was perceived as more urgent in mental than in physical cases. The 
need to prove a mental illness confirms how doubts regarding the credibility of the 
diagnosis are specific to common mental disorders (Lemieux et al., 2011). However, 
despite this perceived need for evidence, in practice, the assessment of work 
ability appeared counterproductive in the mental cases in our study: conflicting 
interpretations of work ability (initially) impaired the RTW process. With one 
exception, these divergent interpretations did not occur in physical cases. 
In our research, conflicts about an employee’s remaining work ability seemed to 
stem from a lack of (sufficient) two-way communication between the employee and 
the OHP (in the Dutch cases) or between the employee and his or her supervisor (in 
the Danish cases). We found that the mentally sick-listed employees in our study 
were not given an equal voice, although including employees in assessing their 
work ability is described as a best practice to ensure active participation in the 
RTW process (Durand et al., 2014). The lack of voice created resistance in these 
employees towards an early RTW (they felt like ‘the ground was cut from under 
their feet’) and caused them to put their foot down, which delayed the RTW process. 
These findings are in line with earlier research showing that, on a more general 
level, organizational decisions fail more often when employees are not consulted 
(Nutt, 2002). It thus seems that the RTW process could benefit from bidirectional 
communication.
In fact, bidirectional communication among stakeholders has been suggested as 
a potential (yet neglected) facilitator of a successful RTW (Pransky, Shaw, Franche 
& Clarke, 2004). Reflecting on the Danish cases in our study where frictions existed 
between the supervisor and the sick-listed employee, the union representative and/
or the municipality councilor could ensure bidirectional communication between 
both actors. After their involvement, the RTW process got back on track, as 
employees were given a say in determining the RTW approach based on their work 
ability. Indeed, chances of returning to work appear significantly higher when a 
RTW plan is made together with the sick-listed employee, compared to when no 
plan is made or when it is done by the OHP or the employer solely (Oomens, Koppes, 
Van den Bossche & Houtman, 2010). This underscores the importance of effective 
communication between workplace stakeholders.
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Although a greater role for employers in the RTW process is increasingly 
advocated, for instance by the OECD (2010), our study suggests that this should 
not occur without including a support for the sick-listed employee, especially in 
mental but also in some physical cases. This implies that the role of the union or the 
municipality could be further strengthened in Denmark (e.g., active involvement 
from the outset, in all cases), while it is not yet clear who should take this supporting 
role in the Netherlands. Up until now, Dutch municipalities have no statutory 
role in the RTW process of sick-listed employees, while Dutch (confederations 
of) trade unions are centrally organized at the national or sector level, and their 
representatives are not employed by organizations as in the Danish hospitals in our 
study (see Chapter 2; Van Gestel et al., 2013). Therefore, investigating which actor 
could fulfill a supporting role in the Netherlands remains an interesting avenue for 
future research.
The importance of a phased RTW plan
The discrepancy between perceptions and reality of having to make a distinction 
between physical and mental cases furthermore revealed regarding the 
implementation of RTW actions. Whereas workplace actors perceived the need 
to follow official procedures in ‘difficult’ mental cases and not in ‘easy’ physical 
ones, the findings showed that the RTW process could benefit from adequate 
implementation of a phased RTW plan, irrespective of the cause of the absence. The 
most important issue seemed to be that the RTW process (in terms of pace and timing) 
is based on the employee’s needs, echoing Franche et al. (2005) who described that 
“in the optimal self-organized return to work, the worker is typically asked by the 
employer what s/he needs” (p. 533; italics in original). Basing actions on the needs of 
sick-listed employees is also recognized as a best practice in managing the RTW for 
employees with musculoskeletal disorders as well as for those with common mental 
disorders (Durand et al., 2014). This does not necessarily mean moving away from 
an activation approach, since virtually all the (physically and mentally) sick-listed 
employees in our study expressed a desire to RTW early. 
The finding of the importance of a phased RTW plan is in line with quantitative 
evidence in the Netherlands and Denmark showing that sick-listed employees who 
partially RTW have a higher chance of a full RTW compared to those who do not 
RTW partially (Høgelund, Holm & McIntosh, 2010; Oomens et al., 2010). However, 
while a phased RTW appeared only effective for physically sick-listed and not for 
mentally sick-listed employees in Denmark (Høgelund, Holm & Eplov, 2012), our 
study of actors’ experiences revealed how both groups of (Dutch as well as Danish) 
employees valued the structure, guidance and support provided by an adequate, 
phased RTW plan. This contradiction might be explained by the observation that all 
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the mentally sick-listed employees in our research mentioned the desire to RTW early 
(i.e. before having reached full recovery), which has been shown to reduce the time 
to RTW in mental cases when a phased RTW plan is made (Van Oostrom et al., 2010).
In conclusion, while workplace stakeholders perceived the necessity to 
treat physically and mentally sick-listed employees differently, in practice, the 
effectiveness of making this distinction appeared questionable, since both physically 
and mentally sick-listed employees seemed to benefit from having a phased RTW 
plan that is based on their needs. 
‘Must rules’ versus ‘may rules’
This research is one in a few that has explored the RTW process cross-nationally 
(e.g., Van Raak et al., 2005) and included two countries with varying RTW legislation 
for workplaces, ranging from strong ‘must rules’ in the Netherlands (Van Raak et 
al., 2005) to weak ‘may rules’ in Denmark (Chapter 2). While similar perceptions 
of the differences between (the RTW process for) physical and mental cases were 
observed, workplace actors’ behavior differed between the two countries, with 
varying consequences for the RTW process. In our Dutch cases, and according to 
the legislation, RTW plans were made (where possible), but the obligatory problem 
analysis has led to the imposition of an activation approach on (mentally) sick-
listed employees – albeit with a counterproductive effect. In our Danish cases, RTW 
plans were either not drawn up or not followed through in a majority of cases, but 
union representatives and municipality councilors appeared successful in getting 
the process back on track by being the ‘second pair of ears and eyes’ for (especially 
mentally) sick-listed employees. 
Hence, while ‘must rules’ coupled with sanctions (as in the Netherlands) may 
increase the probability that RTW actions are taken, our explorative study revealed 
that these rules can also be used to push sick-listed employees to RTW quickly 
without considering their needs first. Previous research also showed how employers 
in the Netherlands used the legislation to force meetings with the sick-listed employee 
out of distrust regarding the employee’s (in)ability to work (Hoefsmit et al., 2013). 
These observations nuance earlier quantitative findings suggesting that the Dutch 
legislation promotes the RTW of long-term sick-listed employees more than the 
Danish legislation (Høgelund, 2003), since statistics remain rather silent on how 
workplace actors actually experience the RTW process (MacEachen et al., 2007). It 
may be assumed that negative experiences, such as feelings of being pushed, impair 
(the sustainability of) the RTW and damage the employment relationship.
Moreover, similar to an earlier study by Stochkendahl et al. (2015), this research 
found that a reliance on ‘may rules’ does not mean that no actions are taken in 
Denmark. In almost half of the cases, supervisors took the responsibility to draw 
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up a RTW plan, while Danish labor agreements ensured that wages are paid after 
the mandatory wage payment period of 30 days (to four to nine weeks for blue-
collar workers and to one year for white-collar workers; Confederation of Danish 
Employers, 2010). Moreover, while employers in Denmark are allowed to dismiss a 
sick-listed employee, only four of the eleven Danish employees in this study were 
dismissed after an average of eight months of absence, and they were given the 
notice period as a last chance to RTW. Based on a study comparing employers’ 
compliance with ‘must rules’ and ‘may rules’ in Dutch and Belgian RTW legislation 
(Van Raak et al., 2005), a possible explanation for conformity in Denmark may be 
that some actors considered these ‘may rules’ as useful or matching their own goals.
The above suggests that neither an overreliance on ‘must rules’ and sanctions, nor 
the use of ‘may rules’ only should be seen as the holy grail in involving workplaces 
in RTW issues (Høgelund, 2003; Van Raak et al., 2005). To quote Van Raak et al. 
(2005), “[a] combination of ‘must rules’ and ‘may rules’ may be more productive, on 
condition that the latter correspond with internalized rules, with the goals of agents 
and with their ideas about useful and applicable rules” (p. 150). Hence, it seems that 
policymakers need to take different stakeholders and their interests into account, 
when designing policies that aim to involve workplaces but that simultaneously 
should protect and empower (sick-listed) employees.
Limitations and recommendations for future research
The strengths of our study include its comparison of physical and mental cases in 
natural settings involving a diverse set of workplace stakeholders, and its link with 
national legislation in two countries. This has enabled a more in-depth insight into 
the RTW process and the experiences of a multitude of workplace actors therewith. 
Although our research comprised an explorative study with a limited number of 
cases, the use of multiple data sources in terms of interviews with various workplace 
actors (sick-listed employees, supervisors, HR managers, union representatives, 
OHPs, and other work and health professionals) helped to triangulate the findings 
by illuminating the RTW process from different angles. 
Nevertheless, due to the explorative nature of our study, further research is 
needed that compares RTW experiences between physical and mental health 
conditions, in order to verify and extend our findings. For example, while the 
two OHPs in our study had fairly strong opinions about mental illnesses and the 
possibility to RTW, other perspectives may exist among OHPs as well. Moreover, 
it would be worthwhile to include external stakeholders, such as medical doctors 
and psychologists, to investigate how their role might affect the process of, and 
experiences with, returning to work in physical and mental cases. Finally, since our 
research was conducted in four hospitals, its generalizability to other settings has 
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to be further investigated. It is unclear whether workplace stakeholders in sectors 
other than healthcare will experience the RTW process differently, for instance due 
to their lack of medical knowledge. Replicating our study in different sectors would 
therefore be an interesting avenue for future research.
5.5 Conclusion
The legislation aimed at the ‘activation’ of sick-listed employees in the Netherlands 
and Denmark does not distinguish between causes of absence; rather, it provides 
general procedures to manage the RTW process, regardless of the illness. Yet, by 
comparing the experiences of various workplace stakeholders with the RTW process 
in actual settings, this chapter shows how cases of physical and mental health 
conditions are perceived and treated differently. At the same time, the findings 
question the effectiveness of this differential approach, as it appears that the 
‘dis-able bodied’ as well as the ‘dis-able minded’ in the two countries could benefit 
from a treatment (and especially a phased RTW plan) that is achieved through 
bidirectional dialogue, considering the needs of individual employees without 
necessarily moving away from an activation approach.
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In the new activation system the same [security] net would suddenly act as 
a trampoline in which the same citizen on benefit [is] rapidly propelled back 
up into the labour market. In fact, the upward speed of the citizen [...] is so 
powerful in that picture [that it] makes you fear he will soon go into orbit 
around our planet. 
 (Sol et al., 2008, p. 165)
With my dissertation, I aimed to increase the scholarly understanding of the 
microfoundations of the activation paradigm in hospitals in the Netherlands and 
Denmark, by using a Scandinavian institutionalist (translation) perspective. To 
do so, the previous chapters addressed different building blocks of this micro-
foundational understanding: the macro-level arrangement of the activation 
policies in terms of underlying ideas and governance systems (Chapter 2); the 
meso- and micro-level translation of the activation paradigm into sickness absence 
policies and frontline practices (Chapter 3); and the micro-level translation of the 
activation paradigm during dyadic interactions between local managers and sick-
listed employees (Chapter 4), as well as during multi-stakeholder collaborations, 
compared between physical and mental cases (Chapter 5). As outlined in Chapter 2, 
the different governance systems of the Dutch and Danish activation policies led 
me to expect that the greater statutory role of employers in the Netherlands would 
result in employers being more actively involved in sickness absence management 
compared to employers in Denmark.
 Answering my main research question (‘What are the microfoundations of 
the activation paradigm in sickness absence management, within hospitals in the 
Netherlands and Denmark?’), my findings reveal that the activation paradigm has 
become imbricated in local practices within Dutch and Danish hospitals as a focus 
on the speed of the return to work. It seems that returning to work ‘as soon as 
possible’ – rather than ‘as soon as possible’, taking into account the possibilities of 
the employee – has become the main message. This observation revealed in Chapter 
3, where I showed how defining the activation paradigm within the hospitals’ policies 
by decoupling sickness and absence paved the way for local actors to translate this 
paradigm in a way that pushes employees for a quick return to work. Chapter 4 
nuanced these findings by showing how the push for a quick return to work was 
primarily present in cases where the manager perceived the social exchange with 
his or her sick-listed employee negatively (a so-called ‘red score’). Nevertheless, 
employees with a ‘green score’ already appeared to express an active attitude to 
return to work quickly. Finally, Chapter 5 revealed how a push for an early return to 
work occurred in mental cases; in physical cases only when the return to work took 
longer than the expected duration. In contrast to my assumption about the different 
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governance systems of the activation paradigm and the resulting involvement of 
employers in sickness absence management, my findings were remarkably similar 
between the Netherlands and Denmark.
What do these findings mean for theory and practice? This question is central 
to this final chapter. I will start off by elaborating on the contributions of my 
dissertation to (Scandinavian) institutional theory, followed by a discussion of its 
practical contributions to policymakers and businesses. Subsequently, I will reflect 
on the methodology of my study and provide suggestions for future research. The 
chapter will end with a short conclusion.
6.1 Contributions to (Scandinavian) institutional theory
A multi-level perspective on microfoundations
With my dissertation, I respond to recent calls to take a multi-level perspective in 
the study of institutional logics (e.g., Battilana, 2006; Reay et al., 2013; Van Gestel & 
Hillebrand, 2011), which remind us that “[w]ork on institutional logics is inherently 
cross-level, highlighting the interplay between individuals, organizations, and 
institutions” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 120). By means of a translation approach, 
I uncovered the microfoundations of the activation paradigm and showed why this 
paradigm becomes increasingly different from its macro-level meaning, the further 
down the idea of activation travels within the organization.
Based on the insights gained from the previous chapters, the translation of the 
activation paradigm at the various levels is summarized in Table 6.1, which shows 
the relevance of the meso level, but especially the micro level in shaping the meaning 
of the activation paradigm. This finding underscores that logics do not exist by 
themselves, but that “it is only when the logics are enacted that they become part of 
practice” (Lindberg, 2014, p. 496; McPherson & Sauder, 2013). However, by taking a 
translation perspective, I have demonstrated that in becoming part of practice, the 
meaning of a logic changes in a way that diverges from its macro-level formulation. 
As I revealed in Chapter 3, significant changes especially occurred at the micro 
level through actors’ ‘selective coupling’ of the activation paradigm to local sickness 
absence practices (see also Table 6.1). This highlights the importance of including 
frontline actors in studies on institutional logics as well as on translation. What 
is more, institutional logics are not translated by individual actors independently; 
rather, they are “generated and maintained through ongoing interactions” (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997, p. 94). Since (Scandinavian) institutional theory has largely overlooked 
social interactions so far, studying the role of actors and their interactions required 
“a more developed theory of human behavior” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 77). 
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In Chapter 4, I have therefore demonstrated the usefulness of social exchange 
theory to address the micro-level interactions that occur during the translation of 
an institutional logic. 
Contrary to my expectations (see Chapter 2), my findings were remarkably similar 
between the Netherlands and Denmark, despite the different governance systems 
of the activation policies in the two countries. This might again be an indication 
of the great(er) influence of the local context. However, it may also be that the two 
countries are not so different after all; for example, they have been described as 
comparable in terms of being “smaller, highly developed north-western European 
countries with a similar culture of tolerance and flexibility and with a strong 
commitment to social citizenship rights” (Van Oorschot & Abrahamson, 2003, p. 
289). That said, taking the meso level as an example, Chapter 3 showed that both 
the Dutch and the Danish hospitals have adopted the idea and the procedures of the 
activation paradigm, with the Danish hospitals moving even closer to their Dutch 
counterparts (in fact, the organizational sickness absence policies were highly 
comparable, except for the use of sanctions in the Netherlands and the possibility to 
dismiss employees in Denmark). Another explanation for the similarity of findings 
may thus be that regulative pressures (as in the Netherlands) may be substituted 
by normative pressures, especially in areas where regulative pressures do not work 
(as in Denmark, see Chapter 2; Vasudeva, 2013). Different governance systems (in 
terms of responsibilities, routines and regulative instruments) might thus have a 
similar impact.
Table 6.1 A multi-level perspective to arrive at the microfoundations of the activation 
   paradigm
Macro level
component of the 
activation paradigma
Meso level
translation into orga-
nizational policiesb
Micro level
translation into
local practicesc
Change
as a result
of translation
Underlying idea: 
Sickness ≠ inability
to work
Disconnecting sickness 
and absence
Cherry-picking: selective 
coupling of ‘early’ return 
to work to sickness 
absence practices
From an early return 
to work (i.e. before full 
recovery) to returning to 
work as soon as possible
Underlying idea: Rights 
& obligations
Governance system: 
Responsibility of 
employer and employee
Responsibility of both 
employer and employee
Quid pro quo: Scorekeep-
ing and reciprocation of 
employees’ discharge of 
obligations
From shared 
responsibility to 
the employees’ 
responsibility 
Governance system: 
Routines for equal 
treatment
Equal treatment Differentiation according 
to the cause of absence
From equal treatment to 
differential treatment
 Notes: a See Chapters 1 and 2; b See Chapter 3; c From the top down, see Chapters 3, 4 and 5
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Overall, my research reveals the importance of studying micro-level (inter)actions 
to understand how macro-level institutional logics are given shape in practice. Taking 
a multi-level approach enables scholars to build the necessary bridge between the 
macro-level oriented institutional theory and micro-level (inter)actions (Battilana, 
2006; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997), in order to achieve a better understanding of 
the microfoundations of an institutional logic. As became apparent in the previous 
chapters, the translation approach provides a fruitful starting-point for doing so.
Intra-logic complexity
A second contribution of my dissertation relates to the definition of institutional 
complexity, or the situation in which actors face “incompatible prescriptions from 
multiple institutional logics” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 318; see Chapter 1). While 
others have called for a better definition of ‘incompatibility’ (Greenwood et al., 
2011; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013) as well as of ‘institutional’ logics (R. E. Meyer 
& Höllerer, 2014), my findings challenge the general assumption that institutional 
complexity only occurs when two or more logics are at play. More specifically, 
by focusing on individual responses to the activation logic, my study has shown 
that institutional complexity may also occur within a single logic. That is to say, 
because institutional logics are “by their very nature, […] broad and general and 
therefore open to multiple interpretations” (Voronov et al., 2013, p. 1565; see also 
Friedland & Alford, 1991), a logic may itself be ambiguous and contradictory in 
its prescriptions. I will now explain and define this ‘intra-logic complexity’ on the 
basis of my findings.
On the macro level, one of the reasons for the attractiveness of the activation 
logic is its ambiguous and contradictory nature of promoting both the welfare of 
benefit recipients (which requires investments, or ‘spending’) and the financial 
viability of the welfare state (which calls for retrenchment, or ‘saving’): in this way, 
it appeals to all stakeholders (Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011). However, as particularly 
revealed in Chapters 3 and 4, this ambiguous focus on wellbeing and cost reduction 
becomes problematic at the micro level, since local actors perceived these foci as 
prescribing incompatible behaviors: they experienced a need to balance the interests 
of the sick-listed employee and those of the organization. In combination with 
existing demands to “improve access [to care], introduce the latest technologies 
and services [to improve the quality of care], and contain costs” (Arndt & Bigelow, 
2006, p. 384), Chapter 3 showed that local actors within the hospitals translated the 
activation paradigm primarily as a means to reduce costs, by selectively coupling 
the activation paradigm to their sickness absence practices. In nuancing this 
finding, the subsequent chapters revealed that frontline managers interpreted the 
activation logic either as a way to promote the wellbeing of the sick-listed employee 
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or as a tool to reduce costs, depending on their positive or negative perception of 
the social exchange with their employee (Chapter 4) and on the cause of the illness 
and the (expected) absence duration (Chapter 5). Hence, the activation paradigm 
seems translatable in two different and seemingly contradictory ways (i.e. a focus 
on the wellbeing of the employee or on cost reduction), leading to different sickness 
absence practices (i.e. stretching the rules or pressuring employees for a quick 
return to work, respectively).
In sum, my research has revealed the existence of intra-logic complexity: the 
situation in which the prescriptions of a single institutional logic are subject to 
multiple interpretations, and these different interpretations are perceived as 
difficult to reconcile. As a result, different individual responses and practices may 
occur. To the best of my knowledge, this issue has not been addressed to date. 
Voronov and his colleagues (2013) touched upon intra-logic complexity, as they 
demonstrated how the aesthetic logic of the fine wine industry is interpretable as a 
focus on either the winemaking process or the output of that process. The different 
interpretations of this logic were related to different practices, such as farming 
practices in the former interpretation and experimental practices in the latter. R.E. 
Meyer and Höllerer (2014) suggested distinguishing between ‘inter-institutional’ and 
‘intra-institutional’ complexity, where the latter entails a situation of competing 
organizational principles “within one institutional order across different cultural 
contexts” (p. 1227). However, this form of complexity refers to the existence of 
multiple logics within one institutional order (e.g., within one profession, as in 
M. B. Dunn & Jones, 2010), instead of the occurrence of multiple meanings of one 
institutional logic as in the case of intra-logic complexity.
Individual responses to institutional logics
A third contribution of my dissertation relates to understanding individual 
responses to institutional logics, which is an important quest in institutional theory 
(see Chapter 1; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2013a; Thornton et al., 
2012). To date, researchers have paid more attention to organizational responses 
to institutional logics rather than to those of individuals (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010), although it is recognized that “insti-
tutions are reproduced through the everyday activities of individuals” (Powell & 
Colyvas, 2008, p. 277; emphasis added). As a result, there is a need to improve the 
scholarly understanding of individual responses to institutional logics. By taking a 
translation approach, my research adds new insights into how and why individuals 
may respond to an institutional logic. 
First, in Chapter 3, I showed how the activation paradigm was translated into 
frontline practices through ‘selective coupling’ or ‘cherry-picking’, which I defined 
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as the tight coupling of institutional demands and local practices that were once 
loosely coupled, by selecting the best or most desirable elements of these demands. 
My study herewith extends Pache and Santos’ (2013b) response of selective coupling 
from the management level to the frontline, and to situations in which exposure to 
institutional complexity is forced by regulations rather than freely sought. Moreover, 
while the literature on decoupling traditionally assumes the mere symbolic adoption 
of institutional demands in order to continue “business as usual” (Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2008, p. 79; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977), I have shown how selective 
coupling provides a way to implement institutional demands, yet in a way that 
serves business interests more than the interests of sick-listed employees. Selective 
coupling is thus a different, and even a safer solution to managing institutional 
complexity, since it avoids the risk of “being caught faking compliance” (Pache & 
Santos, 2013b, p. 994). In other words, individual actors actually do what they say 
and what they ought to do (thereby appearing legitimate), although they use “the 
official purpose of a policy as a rhetorical device to justify implementing that policy 
in ways that could be considered controversial” after closer inspection (Dick, 2015, 
p. 898), for example by using the activation paradigm to push sick-listed employees 
back to work quickly.  
Second, taking a social exchange perspective on translation in Chapter 4 enabled 
a better understanding of the motivations to respond to an institutional logic. In this 
chapter, I showed how behavior does not just follow a logic of appropriateness as is 
traditionally assumed within (Scandinavian) institutional theory (March & Olsen, 
2006), but rather that the motivation to act appropriately depends on the presence 
of a ‘norm of reciprocity’, which – in its turn – is based on the appropriateness of 
the behavior of the other in the social interaction. Responses to institutional logics 
thus seem motivated by a ‘quid-pro-quo mechanism’, where individual actors are 
involved in a process of scorekeeping and reciprocation. In addition to uncovering 
the motivations underlying individual responses, Chapter 4 underlines how social 
interactions are crucial to understand the actual impact of institutional logics 
on individual behavior. While it has been recognized that “it is through social 
interaction that institutions are interpreted and modified” (Hallett & Ventresca, 
2006, p. 215), so far most institutional studies “have much of the social dynamics 
involved as a closed, black box” (Zilber, 2013, p. 81). My dissertation contributes to 
the existing scholarly literature by showing the relevance of social interactions in 
determining how an institutional logic is given shape on the ground, for instance, 
as a tool to give employees leeway in returning to work (in case of a perceived 
obligation to reciprocate) or as an instrument to push employees back to work 
quickly (no perceived need to reciprocate).
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6.2 Practical contributions
Policies of activation
From an economic perspective, the adoption of the activation paradigm has brought 
about positive developments, when referring to yardsticks such as sickness absence 
and disability rates. Taking the Netherlands as an example, the sickness absence rate 
has decreased from 4.7 percent in 1996 – when the statutory wage payment period 
of one year in case of sickness absence was introduced as the first major activation 
measure –, to a stable average of about 4.2 percent in the period 2004-2011, and to 
3.8 percent in 2014. Within Dutch hospitals, the sickness absence rate has declined 
from 6.3 to 4.4 percent over this time span (Statistics Netherlands, 2015a). At the 
same time, the enormous growth in the amount of disability beneficiaries since the 
1970s – with a peak of almost one million in 2002 – has come to a hold (Van Gestel et 
al., 2013, p. 60; see also De Jong & Velema, 2010). In 2014, 820.000 citizens received 
a disability benefit (Statistics Netherlands, 2015c). Hence, from an economic point of 
view, activation policies may be considered efficient because they result in a decline 
of sickness absence and disability rates, and associated costs (although it must be 
noted that substitution effects have been shown to occur between benefits, and the 
unemployment rate has risen from 5.0 percent in 2011 to 7.4 percent in 2014; OECD, 
2008; Statistics Netherlands, 2015d).
Despite these positive developments in the Netherlands, the inflow into the 
disability benefit has not followed suit, meaning that there is a stable number of 
around 38.000 sick-listed employees who annually leave the labor market via the 
disability pathway (UWV, 2015). This may point to the existence of a ‘healthy 
worker effect’ (see e.g., M. B. Nielsen & Knardahl, 2015), where the (more) healthy 
employees remain at work while the severely ill and disabled, who are unable to 
meet the demand for a quick return to work, leave the labor market. Indeed, it is 
questionable whether activation policies that were originally aimed at activating 
unemployed, able-bodied workers, can be used to determine a capacity for work in 
(temporarily) disable-bodied employees (Hetzler, 2009; MacEachen et al., 2007). After 
all, the activation paradigm stresses individual responsibility, which requires the 
empowerment of individuals in terms of a freedom to choose and the capacity to act 
(Betzelt & Bothfeld, 2011; Bonvin, 2008), of which the latter is problematic in case of 
(long-term) illness. My study included several instances where sick-listed employees 
(in both the Netherlands and Denmark) felt unable to return to work quickly, while 
their employers were convinced that these employees did not put in enough effort to 
return to the workplace. If sick-listed employees become excluded from employment 
because of their inability to meet these pressures to attend, we may ask whether the 
activation paradigm achieves its ultimate goal: an inclusive labor market. 
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Hence, there seems to be a need to rethink the division of individual and 
collective responsibilities within the activation policies that are directed at (long-
term) sick-listed employees (Høgelund, 2003; Van Gestel et al., 2013). Building 
on the findings of my research, the return to work of these employees is likely 
to always be focused on its speed when the financial costs need to be borne by 
employers, who are simultaneously confronted with other (business) interests. 
The similarity of findings in the Netherlands and Denmark highlights that these 
costs do not only concern the statutory financial obligations, but also the indirect 
organizational costs associated with sickness absence (e.g., productivity loss, costs 
of replacement staff and of return-to-work support). At the moment, the activation 
paradigm therefore seems to be used mainly as a tool to deal with the issue of long-
term sickness absence, helping employers to reduce costs, rather than to contribute 
to welfare goals. Based on these findings, it seems that reducing the direct as well 
as the indirect financial pressures, or – as one employee put it – ‘taking finances 
out of the equation’ may improve the return-to-work process. On the other hand, 
financial pressures have also been shown to incentivize employers to take actions 
regarding prevention and return to work (Cuelenaere & Veerman, 2011), which also 
showed in the comparison of return-to-work actions between the Dutch and Danish 
cases in Chapter 5. It thus seems essential to find an optimal balance between the 
responsibilities of employers and the government in sickness absence management, 
which might be located in between the Dutch and the Danish structure. 
Put differently, my research suggests the possibility to reduce the financial 
responsibility of employers in the Netherlands, while maintaining their return-
to-work responsibility, and to especially strengthen these latter responsibilities for 
employers in Denmark. A solution might be found by looking at the activation 
policies of other countries and, more specifically, to those of Germany. Although 
a detailed description of these policies is beyond the scope of this chapter (but see 
Verwer, Groothoff, Van der Velden & Van der Gulden, 2014, 2013), in the German 
policies, employers face a statutory wage payment period of six weeks, which 
is longer than in Denmark and shorter than in the Netherlands. Moreover, they 
are legally required to implement return-to-work actions (e.g., work adjustments, 
a gradual return, and vocational retraining) during 1.5 years, although they do 
not bear the costs of these actions. Instead, expenses are paid by German health 
insurance companies, the so-called ‘Krankenkassen’. In other words, other than 
the statutory six-week wage payment period, most of the finances are ‘taken 
out of the equation’ for German employers (except for, for example, their social 
security contributions). What is more, the return-to-work process is guided by a 
‘Fallmanager’ of the Krankenkasse, who is educated and experienced in this area, in 
contrast to line managers. In addition, the unique concentration of responsibilities 
for medical care, care for the return to work, and finances in one organization (the 
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Krankenkasse) allows for a better alignment between treatment and re-integration 
as well as for more independence towards organizations (Verwer et al., 2013, 2014). 
Although more research needs to be done into actual return-to-work processes in 
Germany, it is worthwhile to consider the design of the German activation policies, 
since both (long-term) sickness absence and disability rates have always been lower 
in Germany than in the Netherlands (Verwer et al., 2014).
The management of sickness absence
Although the hospitals in my study seemed mainly interested in sickness absence 
figures, my research calls into question the efficiency of this approach. It is not 
unlikely that the short-term focus on controlling sickness absence negatively affects 
the sustainability of the return to work and the employment relationship, potentially 
leading to turnover. For instance, Arends, Van der Klink, Van Rhenen, De Boer and 
Bültmann (2014) revealed how conflicts between supervisors and mentally sick-listed 
employees increase the risk of recurrent absence. Moreover, a focus on controlling 
absence figures may lead to ‘presenteeism’ (i.e. going to work while being ill, due 
to pressures to attend; Taylor et al., 2010). Both turnover and presenteeism appear 
to have a negative impact on organizational performance and service provision 
(Johns, 2010; Park & Shaw, 2013), and may thus lead to a lower quantity and quality 
of patient care, thereby impairing the hospitals’ goals. Moreover, such a short-term 
focus does not lead to the prevention of health problems (Taylor et al., 2010; Van 
Gestel et al., 2015), although prevention becomes increasingly important due to 
the aging (working) population and changing lifestyles and working environments. 
Given the expected increase in chronic illnesses (e.g., cardiovascular diseases, 
cancer and diabetes), more and more people will have to combine work with care 
for their health (Van Gestel et al., 2013). Hence, focusing on controlling sickness 
absence, without paying attention to the (work and health) problems that caused the 
illness in the first place, might be more costly in the long term. Based on my study, 
I therefore argue for the relevance of looking beyond statistics and considering 
the process of, and the sick-listed employees’ experiences with, returning to work. 
Below, I will make two recommendations to improve the management of sickness 
absence.
A first recommendation is to address existing perceptions and expectations in 
sickness absence management, in order to prevent the occurrence of disagreements 
between employers and employees that may impair the return-to-work process. 
As has been revealed in Chapter 4, managers’ perceptions appear prompted by the 
behavior of sick-listed employees during past and present interactions (i.e. their 
loyalty to the workplace, sickness absence frequency, tenure, display of an active 
attitude to return to work, and transparency about (in)abilities to work). These 
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perceptions seem to affect how sickness absence is managed, and may hinder the 
return to work when managers’ (negative) perceptions do not match those of sick-
listed employees. Since raising awareness has been shown to be a precondition for 
change (Maon, Lindgreen & Swaen, 2009), workplace stakeholders (and managers 
in particular) first have to become aware of their perceptions and expectations, and 
possible consequences, in order to change how they deal with sickness absence. 
Raising this awareness can be done by conducting ‘focus groups’ (Ivanoff & 
Hultberg, 2006) on sickness absence management and return to work, where the 
perceptions found in my research can be used as a starting-point for discussion. 
Once workplace stakeholders are aware of their perceptions and expectations, their 
behavior may be influenced in a way that either enhances objectivity in managing 
sickness absence (e.g., regarding managers: independent of the employee’s past 
behavior), or encourages them to explicitly communicate and discuss expectations 
towards sick-listed employees (e.g., showing an active attitude and being transparent 
about medical conditions in relation to work) and towards managers (e.g., showing 
respect, taking the employee’s interests into account). Concerning the latter, in 
Chapter 5, I have pointed out the importance of paying attention to communication 
skills, to ensure bidirectional dialogues between employers and employees as well 
as to improve ways of communicating (‘it’s the tone that makes the music’). Raising 
awareness among workplace stakeholders of their perceptions and expectations 
in sickness absence management and adequately acting upon these may thus be 
helpful to prevent disagreements on how to interpret and understand the behavior 
of employees. This may create a ‘win-win situation’ for all stakeholders involved: an 
early and sustainable return to work.
A second recommendation to improve sickness absence management relates to 
the ‘devolution’ of this practice from HR to line managers. The decentralization of 
responsibilities to local managers means that “many of the tensions between competing 
organizational priorities are played out at this level” (Cunningham et al., 2004, p. 274). 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, having to combine business and wellbeing 
interests leads managers to incorporate the activation paradigm in their striving 
for cost reduction (through selective coupling), which is not necessarily in the best 
interests of sick-listed employees when they feel pushed back to work. It may thus 
be questioned whether the advantages of devolving sickness absence management 
to line managers (e.g., their greater familiarity with the work, the workplace and 
the employee, due to their closer proximity) outweigh its disadvantages, at least in 
case of long-term sickness absence (see also Renwick, 2003a, 2003b). According to 
Renwick (2003b), “[l]ine manager involvement in HRM raises the issue of whether 
employees trust the motives of line managers to look after their wellbeing” (p. 276). 
Being caught between competing interests makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
managers to solely act in accordance with the employees’ interests. 
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My study reveals that what seems to be missing is a support for the sick-listed 
employee, or at least a neutral third party. As I have shown in Chapter 5, this may be 
resolved in Denmark by including the union representative or municipality councilor 
to support the employee from the start of each (long-term) sickness absence. In the 
Netherlands, several actors could focus on providing employee support or act as 
a neutral party, provided that the current organization of their roles is somewhat 
altered or extended. For instance, Dutch (confederations of) trade unions and 
municipalities, which nowadays either represent employees at the national and 
sector level or have no statutory role in sickness absence management, could be 
given a (stronger) role in individual return-to-work processes. Likewise, the function 
of works councils may be extended from being employee representatives at the 
organizational level to being a support for individual sick-listed employees as well. 
Another possibility can be found in the role of occupational health physicians, if 
they are enabled to take on a more supporting or independent position, for example, 
by extending their contracts and reducing their workload and financial dependence 
(Plomp & El Markhous, 2015). Finally, strategic HR policies could be installed that 
specifically advance the interests of employees, ensuring that HR managers can act 
as ‘guardians of employee wellbeing’ (Renwick, 2003a) next to being what the HR 
managers in my study called ‘consultants on the rules for line managers’. Hence, 
with some changes, several options seem to exist to include a support for sick-listed 
employees or a neutral third party in return-to-work processes in the Netherlands.
6.3 Methodological reflection and suggestions for future 
  research
As shown above, I believe that my dissertation has provided a better theoretical 
understanding of the ways in which the microfoundations of an institutional logic 
can be understood, as well as a better practical insight into the microfoundations of 
the activation paradigm. However, as with all research, my study also has several 
limitations. In this section, I will reflect on the design of my research and the choice 
for interviews, and I will outline the limitations that constrain the scope of my 
findings. Finally, I will relate these limitations to suggestions for future research. 
Research design and data collection method
In this dissertation, applying a multiple-case study design and conducting interviews 
were considered appropriate to compare how the activation paradigm is translated 
into the actual management of sickness absence in the four hospitals across the 
Netherlands and Denmark. As Zilber (2008) described: “Meanings [as in translation] 
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elude quantification, do not allow for causal inferences and explanations in the 
form of correlations between clear causes and effects. Instead, meanings call for 
‘after the fact’ interpretations, and for case studies with thick accounts rather than 
broad generalizations” (p. 154). Data were gathered via expert interviews on the 
macro level and topic interviews on the micro level, which were preceded by a 
document study on the macro and meso level. The richness of information provided 
by this data collection method was enhanced by interviewing multiple stakeholders 
in each country (macro level) and in each sickness absence case (micro level). This 
approach enabled a unique multi-angled perspective on the same phenomenon, 
including from different hierarchical positions (e.g., employees and managers) and 
from various functional areas (e.g., government, management, occupational health, 
and unions). From a methodological viewpoint, interviewing multiple stakeholders 
decreased the probability of social desirability and memory biases, since “[a] key 
approach [to mitigating these biases] is using numerous and highly knowledgeable 
informants who view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives” (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007, p. 28). Moreover, at the micro level, all employees were (partly) 
absent or had only returned to work up to two weeks before the interview, so that 
the interviewees still had a fresh memory of the return-to-work process.
Of course, the management of sickness absence and return to work could have 
been studied with other data collection methods as well. For instance, (longitudinal) 
questionnaires are helpful to determine causes and effects (e.g., the impact of 
‘problematic’ cases on the sustainability of the return to work and on the future 
employment relationship), while observations enable a more detailed “in situ and 
in vivo” understanding of what actors actually do in practice (Zilber, 2008, p. 164; 
italics in original; Langley & Abdallah, 2011). Although I believe that questionnaires 
or observations can be worthwhile in these respects, they could not have given the 
insights that I obtained by means of interviews. Taking Chapter 4 on the importance 
of social interactions in the translation process as an example, it is precisely through 
the reflections of the managers on (the role of) their sick-listed employees and the 
perspectives of the employees, that a recurring pattern was found in how managers 
evaluated their employees and decided whether or not to reciprocate. It would have 
been impossible to measure or observe that managers evaluated their employees 
as, for instance, (in)active, (non-)transparent or a good/bad employee, since they 
never seemed to communicate these criteria directly with their employees (managers 
themselves might not even be aware of their use of these criteria). I therefore believe 
that the interviews have enabled a good insight into the (perceptions of) social 
interactions between managers and employees, particularly because both managers 
and employees were interviewed, enabling a two-sided view on the social interaction 
(and even a multi-angled perspective; see Chapters 3 and 5). 
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Generalizability of findings
A boundary condition of my dissertation relates to the research setting. As became 
particularly salient in Chapter 3, hospitals present a special case regarding the 
translation of the activation paradigm in sickness absence management, due to 
the medical knowledge available within the healthcare sector. Hospital actors, and 
managers in particular, experienced difficulties with the ‘demedicalization’ of 
sickness absence that is central to the activation paradigm, since it collides with 
daily medical practices that are focused on treating illnesses. Moreover, hospitals 
are large organizations that are more often confronted with sickness absence and 
have more (financial and human) resources to address this issue than small- and 
medium-sized organizations. The peculiarities of the healthcare sector and the 
hospitals’ size may limit the generalizability of my findings to other settings. On 
the other hand, it is unlikely that the ‘balancing act’ between business and social 
interests (see Chapter 3) is specific to hospitals, since all (public as well as private) 
organizations are subject to the same national activation policies. The pressures of 
these national policies to take care of sick-listed employees have to be balanced with 
production or service requirements in these organizations, too. 
To increase the generalizability of my findings, future research could extend my 
study by including non-medical organizations, particularly those in the for-profit 
sector. It would be worthwhile to investigate whether the push for a quick return 
to work is even stronger in these companies, given the need to make profits, or 
maybe less so because people might have more autonomy regarding how, when and 
where to perform their jobs and thus have more options to ‘choose their absence’ 
(e.g., by being able to work from home when not feeling well, or to retreat in one’s 
own office). For instance, in their study of law firms, Van Gestel and Nyberg (2009) 
showed how lawyers could postpone being absent for a longer time than secretaries, 
resulting in suspicion concerning the credibility of the secretaries’ illnesses and 
a focus on controlling their short-term sickness absence rather than the long-
term absence of lawyers. In their examination of call centers, Taylor, Baldry, Bain 
and Ellis (2003) demonstrated how managers’ experiences of strong pressures to 
achieve call volumes led them to prioritize business interests over the wellbeing of 
employees, and employees – in their turn – felt pressured to return to work.
Moreover, after having compared the presence of the activation paradigm in 
the Dutch, Danish and Irish national sickness absence policies in Chapter 2, in the 
subsequent chapters, I focused on the Netherlands and Denmark, being forerunners 
regarding the adoption of this paradigm at the macro level. Including these two 
countries enabled examining the translation of the activation paradigm into the 
management of sickness absence at the micro level. However, to better discern the 
actual impact of the activation paradigm, future research could investigate sickness 
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absence management in countries that have not implemented this paradigm to the 
extent that the Netherlands and Denmark have, and compare their findings to mine. 
This would further improve our understanding of the relationship between national 
legislation and local actions, especially in relation to activation policies (Tiedtke et 
al., 2012; Van Raak et al., 2005).
Microfoundations as a top-down and bottom-up focus
As explained in Chapter 1, in my dissertation, the microfoundations of institutional 
logics were defined as a top-down focus, since I was especially interested in 
knowing how the activation paradigm is translated into local sickness absence 
practices. This enabled studying how “actors interpret institutional logics so they 
fit the local context” (Waldorff, 2013, p. 220), instead of the often-covered ground 
of the diffusion of logics at the field or industry level without offering an insight 
into what happens in practice (Lindberg, 2014; Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013). 
However, in their definition of microfoundations, Powell and Colyvas (2008) also 
distinguished a bottom-up focus, where micro-level (inter)actions “ratchet upwards” 
to change or disrupt macro-orders (p. 278). While I have thus specifically addressed 
the ‘action’ phase of the translation process, future research could apply a micro-
to-macro perspective to obtain an in-depth understanding of the ‘institution’ 
phase (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996), during which institutionalization may or 
may not occur. Such an approach would provide a more complete insight into the 
microfoundations of an institutional logic as well as of the translation process.
By the end of my PhD trajectory, understanding whether micro-level actions 
affect the activation paradigm at the macro level appears particularly interesting 
in the Netherlands, given a recent decision of the Rutte-Asscher cabinet to reduce 
the statutory financial obligations of employers with 10 or less employees from 
two to one year (which at the moment of writing still needs to be approved by 
the Dutch parliament).6 This decision is a response to the problems in small-sized 
enterprises, which are reluctant to hire employees on a permanent basis due to the 
long wage payment period in case of sickness absence, and thereby contribute to the 
increasing amount of people working in precarious jobs (for an elaboration of this 
issue, see Van Gestel et al., 2013). By decreasing the financial obligations of small 
employers to one year, the cabinet assumes that the abovementioned issue will be 
addressed to a large extent, since many businesses in the Netherlands employ up 
to 10 employees (more than 95 percent, Statistics Netherlands, 2015e). Given this 
6 Decision of October 2, 2015. See http://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1121287/loondoorbetalingplicht-bij-ziekte-wordt-beperkt-
voor-kleine-ondernemers, last retrieved December 29, 2015
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cabinet decision, it seems that micro-level actions are bubbling up to change the 
national institutional context; nonetheless, future research should examine whether 
and how they actually do so.
The acceptance of an idea in the translation process
Finally, my research specifically focused on the translation of the activation 
paradigm at the hospitals’ frontline, after its acceptance at the organizational level 
(the latter being studied by means of the sickness absence policies of the hospitals, 
as described in Chapter 3). In doing so, I have been able to study the “less powerful 
members of organizations”, who are often overlooked in both institutional and 
translation studies (Powell & Colyvas, 2008, p. 277; see also Ansari, et al., 2010; 
Helin & Sandström, 2010; Reay et al., 2013; Rocha & Granerud, 2011). Nevertheless, 
this focus on frontline actions has come at the cost of examining how an idea such as 
the activation paradigm arrives at organizations in the first place. It would therefore 
be worthwhile to also study the ‘idea’ and ‘object’ phase of the translation process 
(Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996), during which the idea of the activation paradigm is 
selected and framed as the solution for the problems of sickness absence, and turned 
into an object. In this regard, examining translation practices in combination with 
‘theorization’ practices, which involve specifying a problem and a solution and 
justifying that solution (Greenwood et al., 2002) seems fruitful to better understand 
the translation process as well as actors’ responses to institutional logics (see also J. 
A. Nielsen, Mathiassen & Newell, 2014). 
Studying the ‘idea’ and ‘object’ phases of the translation process is particularly 
intriguing in the Dutch hospitals, where consultants were hired to implement the 
activation paradigm (see Section 1.3 and Chapter 3). As Czarniawska and Joerges 
(1996) wrote, professional consultants are important carriers of ideas: “Like 
travelling salesmen, they arrive at organizations and open their attaché-cases full 
of quasi-objects to be translated into localized ideas. […] They are designers and 
distributors, wholesalers and retailers in ideas-turned-into-things, which then 
locally once more can be turned into ideas-to-be-enacted” (p. 36). In the Dutch 
hospitals, the consultants have objectified the activation paradigm by labeling it as 
a slogan (‘Sickness happens, absence is a choice’), which has also been travelling 
to other parts of the Netherlands (Roeters, 2005). Future research could examine 
how the consultants persuaded the hospitals’ top management of this slogan and of 
the associated approach to combat sickness absence, or how they do so in different 
hospitals or other organizations. From a translation perspective, one would ask to 
which ‘master-idea’ (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) the slogan relates that makes it 
so appealing to translate (e.g., liberalism in the sense of individual responsibilities)? 
And, more importantly, how does it affect the spread of the activation paradigm?
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6.4 Conclusion
Looking back on my journey to the microfoundations of the activation paradigm, a 
picture that sticks to mind is one in which intra-organizational actors need to cope 
with an institutional logic that is open to multiple interpretations (i.e. as a focus 
on the wellbeing of the sick-listed employee or on cost reduction), which are not 
necessarily compatible. In dealing with this ‘intra-logic complexity’, local actors 
selectively couple the activation paradigm to their sickness absence practices, in a 
way that aligns mainly with the focus on cost reduction (by ‘cherry-picking’). That 
is, rather than considering the employees’ possibilities, the activation paradigm 
is translated locally as a focus on the speed of the return to work, ‘propelling’ 
employees back into work. However, underneath this picture we found that 
managers’ translation of the activation paradigm (either as a focus on wellbeing or 
on cost reduction) strongly depends on their positive or negative perception of both 
past and present social exchanges with their employees, as well as on the cause of 
the illness (physical or mental) and the (expected) absence duration. As a result, 
managing sickness absence has become a subjective endeavor, which on the short 
term does not seem to contribute to the aim of the activation paradigm to promote 
the wellbeing of all sick-listed employees, and on the long term potentially conflicts 
with the aims of cost reduction of both the government and organizations.
At the end of my travel to the microfoundations of an institutional logic, I 
believe that my dissertation has also added some luggage for future research. Most 
importantly, my research has shown the relevance of making pit stops at different 
levels of analysis (macro, meso and micro) when traveling to the microfoundations 
of an institutional logic, and especially to take a look at the (inter)actions occurring 
at the frontline or micro level. In this way, institutional complexity may not only 
reveal between different institutional logics, but also within a single logic.
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Appendix A
Interview guide – expert interviews
1 Background information
What is your job? How are you involved in the national policies of sickness absence?
2  Underlying idea of activation in sickness absence policies
How have the national sickness absence policies evolved over the last couple of years? Have there 
been changes to existing laws, or have new laws been introduced?
Has the idea of activation been introduced in the national sickness absence policies? Why (not)? How 
does that show? 
Do you think that employers and employees have adopted the idea of activation in relation to sickness 
absence? Why (not)? 
If so, how does that show in how employers manage sickness absence?
Do you agree with this ‘activation’ view of illness? Why (not)?
3 Responsibilities & routines
The activation paradigm aims to decrease the number of sickness (and disability) beneficiaries. In your 
opinion, who is responsible for decreasing this amount?
At the moment, who is responsible for paying the wages of sick-listed employees?
At the moment, who is responsible for the return to work of sick-listed employees?
Would/do employers accept an increased role in sickness absence management, e.g., in the return-to-
work process? Why (not)?
In your opinion, what effect will an increased role have on how employers manage sickness absence?
4 Regulations
In the literature on policy instruments a distinction is made between regulations, economic means 
and moral persuasion. How would you characterize the national approach towards making employers 
active in sickness absence management, choosing from these three instruments (you can choose more 
than one instrument)?
Why do you think that the government has chosen this approach?
Are you satisfied with the current national sickness absence policies? Why (not)? What would you 
change?
5 International/eu level
To what extent do you think that the national policies of sickness absence are influenced by policies of 
other countries or by the eu?
N.B. Although questions were introduced and framed according to the situation in each of the three countries, 
I ensured that the abovementioned questions were addressed in each interview.
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Appendix B
Topic list and interview guide – hospitals
Background information
Job What is your job within the hospital? What are your primary tasks?
Work history Can you tell me about your work history?
Description of the sickness absence case
Cause(s) What do you think is the cause of the sickness absence in this case?
How long are you/is the employee in this case absent?
Relationship 
with work
Is the sickness absence related to the job and/or the organization? If so, how?
If so, do you think the sickness absence could have been prevented?
Solution(s) Which solutions do you see for this sickness absence case?
Who has to do what according to this solution? (employee, manager, others)
Actors and their role in sickness absence management
Own role What is your own role in sickness absence management?
How do you feel about your role?
What are your reasons for (dis)satisfaction?
Role of others Which other actors are involved in this sickness absence case?
What is the role of these actors?
How do you feel about their role? Do they take their responsibilities? How does that 
show?
Collaboration between actors
Interaction How do the actors collaborate in this sickness absence case?
Are you satisfied about the collaboration? If not, why?
What do you suggest to improve collaboration?
Actions 
Actions What actions are taken in this case? 
How do you feel about these actions? Do these actions actually work? Are they 
sufficient?
Sanctions Are sanctions used in this sickness absence case? 
What are the sanctions that can be used in sickness absence management?
Representativeness Is this case representative for the way in which sickness absence is managed within the 
hospital? 
If not, what is specific? How does sickness absence management work in other cases? 
What are the differences?
Policy What is your opinion about the sickness absence policy of the hospital? 
What are your reasons for (dis)satisfaction?
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English summary
Since the 1990s, a new view on what constitutes appropriate sickness absence behavior 
has emerged in the welfare states of many European countries. While ‘(bed) rest’ has 
traditionally been seen as the best way to recover from an illness (during which one 
receives a sickness benefit), today, the idea is that sickness and work are not mutually 
exclusive, and that continuing work while being ill may even have a positive influ-
ence on a full return to work. A sick-listed employee is thus expected to return to the 
workplace as soon as possible, albeit with adjusted work tasks and/or working hours. 
Consequently, the focus is no longer on the disabilities of sick-listed employees, but 
on their remaining ability to work (Hetzler, 2009). This new view on appropriate sick-
ness absence behavior constitutes the ‘activation paradigm’ and fits with the aim of 
European governments to protect and increase labor market participation, in order to 
secure the economic self-reliance of individuals as well as the long-term viability of 
the welfare state (Bonvin, 2008; Eichhorst et al., 2008; Weishaupt, 2011).
Although by now the activation paradigm is regarded as a politically legit-
imate and appealing discourse (Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011; Eichhorst et al., 2008; 
Weishaupt, 2011), so far, relatively little is known of how this paradigm is imple-
mented in actual sickness absence practices within organizations (OECD, 2010; 
Seing et al., 2014; Tjulin et al., 2010). This is remarkable, since the introduction 
of the activation paradigm has led to an increased role for employers in ensuring 
the early return to work of sick-listed employees, by adjusting work tasks and/or 
working hours (e.g., OECD, 2010, 2015). Given this lack of knowledge, the aim of 
my dissertation is to increase our insights of the processes through which the acti-
vation paradigm is translated into organizational practices, specifically in the area 
of long-term sickness absence (i.e. absence for six weeks or longer). These processes 
are what I call the ‘microfoundations’ of the activation paradigm: the intra- 
organizational processes through which macro-ideas, like the activation paradigm, 
“are ‘pulled down’ and become imbricated in local or particular cases” (Powell & 
Colyvas, 2008, p. 278; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). The main research question of my 
dissertation therefore is as follows: What are the microfoundations of the activation 
paradigm in sickness absence management, within organizations (hospitals) in the 
Netherlands and Denmark?
An answer to this research question is provided by addressing four sub- 
questions, which are addressed in the individual chapters of my dissertation:
1 How is the activation logic understood and given shape in the national sick-
ness absence policies in the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, in terms of 
underlying ideas and governance systems? (Chapter 2)
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2 How are national activation policies re-contextualized, re-labeled and 
defined into actions within organizational policies of sickness absence, and 
in daily sickness absence practices at the frontline? (Chapter 3)
3 What role do social interactions play in the translation of macro-ideas (such 
as the activation paradigm) into micro-level practices (like in sickness 
absence management)? (Chapter 4)
4 How and why do the return-to-work experiences of various workplace stake-
holders differ between physical and mental health conditions, and what are 
the consequences of potentially different experiences for the return-to-work 
process in both health conditions? (Chapter 5)
To address these questions, I apply ‘institutional theory’, which aims to explain how 
institutional demands – or society’s expectations of appropriate behavior – affect the 
actions of organizations and individuals (Dacin, 1997; Scott, 2008). These demands 
consist of “rules and regulations, normative prescriptions and social expectations” 
(Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 457), as well as of cultural templates or ‘institutional 
logics’: explicit and implicit rules of appropriate (inter)action and interpretation 
that are provided by ‘institutional orders’, such as the state, the market, the family, 
religion and professions (Pache & Santos, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). The acti-
vation paradigm can be considered an institutional logic, as argued in Chapter 2.
 In my dissertation, I use a distinctive approach within institutional theory: ‘Scan-
dinavian institutionalism’ (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, 2003) and its concept of 
‘translation’ in particular (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). In 
contrast to the macro-oriented institutional theory, the translation approach “offers 
both a conceptual and methodological way forward” in understanding the process 
through which institutional logics are translated within organizations (Lawrence & 
Sudday, 2006, p. 243). ‘Translation’ here entails “the more or less deliberate transfor-
mation of practices and/or ideas that happens when various actors try to transfer and 
implement them” (Røvik, 2011, p. 642). The goal of my dissertation is to contribute to 
the translation approach by explicitly considering translation processes at the micro 
level, or the actions of and interactions between individuals. One way I aim to do so 
is by combining the translation approach with ‘social exchange theory’ (Blau, 1964), 
which seeks to understand workplace behavior by examining interpersonal interac-
tions within organizations (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Di Domenico et al., 2009).
156
Research context
My research is conducted in the Netherlands, Denmark and (initially) Ireland.7 The 
choice for these countries is based on their comparable sickness absence figures, and 
hence their equal challenge of reducing recourse to sickness (and disability) benefits 
(OECD, 2008). In addition, their reputation as ‘employment miracles’ regarding their 
approach to combat unemployment (Auer, 2002; Schwartz & Becker, 2005; Torfing, 
1999) led to the assumption that the three countries have implemented the activation 
paradigm in the area of sickness absence as well. Another reason for selecting the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland is the difference in the division of responsibilities 
between the government and employers in their national sickness absence policies: 
while the Dutch policies emphasize the (financial) efforts of employers in sickness 
absence management, the Irish policies stress the efforts of the central government. 
Denmark takes a middle position, since local governments are mainly responsible 
but employers are increasingly given a role as well. It is interesting to examine 
whether these differences lead to variation in the management of sickness absence 
within organizations.
Furthermore, my research specifically focuses on the healthcare sector, since 
managing sickness absence is particularly urgent here and, hence, this sector 
provides a relevant research context. For instance, on average, the healthcare 
sector faces higher sickness absence rates than other industries (in 2013, the 
sickness absence rate across the Netherlands and Denmark was 3.9 and 3.8 percent, 
respectively, against 4.8 and 6.1 percent in healthcare in the two countries; Statistics 
Netherlands, 2015a; Statistics Denmark, 2015b). Furthermore, the healthcare sector 
is increasingly confronted with employee shortages, which is amplified by the 
aging of the (working) population (Buchan & Aiken, 2008). These issues reveal the 
importance for healthcare organizations to retain their employees and to prevent 
sickness absence. Within the healthcare sector, I focused on hospitals (two in each 
country), because these organizations are internationally comparable and are large 
enough to select sufficient cases of long-term sickness absence without violating the 
anonymity and privacy of individual participants. 
Data have been collected in two studies. The first study entails a multiple-case 
study of the sickness absence policies of the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland at 
the national level, and includes a literature review and 18 interviews with experts in 
the field of sickness absence, return to work, working conditions or social security 
7 As Chapter 2 shows, the activation paradigm is largely absent in the Irish national sickness absence policies. This meant that 
Ireland no longer presented an appropriate case for studying the microfoundations of the activation paradigm. I therefore 
decided to drop Ireland from further research and to focus on the Netherlands and Denmark. 
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in general (i.e. government officials, representatives of employers’ associations and 
unions, and researchers). This study is central to Chapter 2 of my dissertation. The 
second study concerns a multiple-case study of sickness absence management within 
two Dutch and two Danish hospitals, and includes an examination of the hospi-
tals’ sickness absence policies and interviews with the actors involved in 21 cases 
of long-term sickness absence (61 interviews in total, with sick-listed employees, 
managers and – depending on the country and the hospital – with Human Resource 
(HR) managers, union representatives, occupational health physicians, and other 
work and health professionals. Chapters 3 to 5 are based on this study.
Findings
Chapter 2 demonstrates how the activation paradigm is given shape in the national 
sickness absence policies in the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, as the necessary 
first step in understanding the microfoundations of this paradigm. In this chapter, 
I approach the activation paradigm as an institutional logic that consists of (1) 
underlying ideas about the problem of sickness absence and about how and by 
whom this problem needs to be solved, and (2) a governance system that defines 
responsibilities, routines and regulative instruments for putting these ideas into 
practice. Although the Netherlands and Denmark have adopted the underlying ideas 
of the activation paradigm, Ireland has not (leading me to exclude this latter country 
from further study, see footnote). Despite their similarity in underlying ideas, 
the Dutch and Danish national policies differ in their governance systems: while 
Dutch employers carry the financial and return-to-work responsibilities during the 
first two years (without the possibility to dismiss and with strict legislation and 
sanctions), Danish employers are financially responsible for 30 days and carry part 
of the return-to-work responsibility (with the possibility to dismiss and without 
sanctions), since municipalities are mainly responsible in Denmark. These different 
governance systems could result in different sickness absence practices, which is 
studied in the subsequent chapters and is explicitly addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 zoom in on the meso (organizational) and micro level, and 
show how the activation paradigm can be interpreted as a focus on the wellbeing 
of the employee or on cost reduction, two interpretations that are not necessarily 
compatible. In dealing with this situation of complexity, Chapter 3 demonstrates 
how individual actors translate only those components of the activation paradigm 
that are most desirable or suitable to achieve their interests. I call this ‘cherry-
picking’, or the ‘selective coupling’ of the activation paradigm to local sickness 
absence practices. This reveals in my finding that the emphasis of the activation 
paradigm on an early return to work (i.e. before full recovery) is used in many 
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cases to push sick-listed employees to return to work as soon as possible, even if 
this is not possible according to the employee. This push for a quick return to work 
seems to be caused by disconnecting sickness from the need to be absent in the 
hospitals’ sickness absence policies (e.g., in the slogan ‘sickness happens, absence is 
a choice’). Hence, it seems that returning to work ‘as soon as possible’ is preferred 
over returning to work ‘as soon as possible’, where the possibilities of the employee 
are taken into account first. With the focus on the speed of the return to work, the 
activation paradigm seems mainly translated as a way to reduce costs. 
Chapters 4 and 5 nuance this conclusion: whether the activation paradigm 
is translated as a focus on the wellbeing of the employee or on cost reduction 
appears to depend on the managers’ positive or negative perception of the social 
interaction with their employees in the past and the present (Chapter 4), as well as 
on the cause of the absence (physical or mental) and the expected absence duration 
(Chapter 5). By examining the translation of the activation paradigm from a ‘social 
exchange perspective’, Chapter 4 reveals that the push for a quick return to work 
(and hence, the focus on cost reduction) depends on managers’ perceptions of the 
social interaction with sick-listed employees. These perceptions are based on one 
or more of the following criteria: the value of the employee to the organization 
(loyalty), his or her tenure and sickness absence frequency (all related to the past), 
the employee’s active attitude to return to work and his or her transparency about 
medical (im)possibilities in relation to work (related to the present). The push for a 
quick return to work then appears primarily present in cases where the manager has 
a negative perception of the social exchange with the employee, which results in a 
strict translation of the activation paradigm and its rules and regulations, without 
explicit consideration of the needs of the sick-listed employee. In these cases, the 
return-to-work process proceeds problematically, since disagreements occur between 
managers and employees regarding the timing and pace of the return to work. By 
contrast, employees who are perceived positively by their manager are given more 
time and room to return to the workplace, resulting from a flexible translation of 
the activation paradigm. However, it should be noted that these employees already 
express an active attitude to return to work quickly.
Chapter 5 compares the return-to-work experiences of the various actors between 
physical and mental cases. This chapter shows how the push for an early return to 
work especially occurs in mental cases; in physical cases only when the return to 
work takes longer than the expected duration. In the Dutch hospitals, this push 
especially reveals during the analysis of the employee’s remaining work capacity 
by the occupational health physician, who (in the eyes of the employee) decides too 
quickly that the employee is able to return to work, without acknowledging his or 
her health complaints. In the Danish hospitals, the focus on a quick return to work 
occurs in both mental and physical cases, when no return-to-work plan is made, 
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when the plan does not match the employee’s needs or when the plan is not held on 
to. Again, in these cases, disagreements occur between managers and employees 
regarding the timing and pace of the return to work. From both countries lessons 
can be drawn: the Danish cases reveal that the focus on a quick return to work can 
be prevented by including a union representative or a municipality councilor as a 
support for the sick-listed employee, while the Dutch cases demonstrate that the 
return-to-work plan (regardless of the absence cause) is an important guidance for 
the employee, provided that the needs and possibilities of the employee are taken 
into account. Despite the existence of different perceptions of physical and mental 
health complaints, this chapter shows the relevance of an equal dialogue about an 
employee’s remaining work capacity as well as the importance of a return-to-work 
plan, irrespective of the illness.
In sum, my dissertation reveals the centrality of the speed of the return 
to work in the translation of the activation paradigm within organizations, but 
it also shows that sickness absence management is a subjective endeavor, where 
perceptions of the behavior of others (here: sick-listed employees) and expectations 
of the (duration of) illnesses affect how absence is dealt with. Contrary to my 
expectations that the differences between the Netherlands and Denmark (in terms 
of roles and responsibilities of employers) would lead to variety in sickness absence 
management, my findings were highly similar between both countries. This might 
indicate that the local context has a greater influence than macro-ideas (such as 
the activation paradigm), but also that the Netherlands and Denmark might not be 
so different after all: both countries are “smaller, highly developed north-western 
European countries with a similar culture of tolerance and flexibility and with 
a strong commitment to social citizenship rights” (Van Oorschot & Abrahamson, 
2003, p. 289). However, the similarity of findings may also reveal the equal impact 
of the strict and detailed legislation (with sanctions) in the Netherlands and the 
normative legislation (without sanctions, but with moral persuasion) in Denmark on 
local behavior (see e.g., Vasudeva, 2013).
Theoretical contributions
My dissertation contributes to (Scandinavian) institutional theory and the trans-
lation approach in three ways. First, my research underscores the importance of 
taking a multi-level approach in institutional theory, and particular in the study 
of institutional logics (Battilana, 2006; Reay et al., 2013; Van Gestel & Hillebrand, 
2011). By considering macro, meso and micro levels of analysis, I show that logics 
do not exist by themselves, but that “it is only when the logics are enacted that they 
become part of practice” (Lindberg, 2014, p. 496). However, by taking a translation 
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perspective, I demonstrate that in becoming part of practice, the meaning of a logic 
changes in a way that diverges from its macro-level formulation. This particularly 
appeared to occur during actions and interactions at the micro level (e.g., through 
‘selective coupling’). My study herewith points to the importance of examining 
micro-level (inter)actions to understand the microfoundations of an institutional 
logic, and shows how the translation approach provides a fruitful starting-point for 
doing so.
A second contribution of my dissertation relates to the definition of institutional 
complexity, or the situation in which actors face “incompatible prescriptions from 
multiple institutional logics” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 318). My research shows that 
institutional complexity may not only occur when two or more logics are at play, 
but may also occur within a single logic, when the prescriptions of an institutional 
logic are subject to multiple interpretations, and these different interpretations are 
perceived as difficult to reconcile. The activation paradigm appears interpretable as 
a focus on the wellbeing of the employee and as a focus on cost reduction. These 
foci are not necessarily compatible, since local actors seem to perceive these foci 
as prescribing incompatible behaviors: ‘spending’ time and efforts in promoting 
the wellbeing of the sick-listed employee versus ‘saving’. As my study shows, this 
situation of ‘intra-logic complexity’ may result in different local practices. While 
others have called for a better definition of ‘incompatibility’ (Greenwood et al., 
2011; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013) as well as of ‘institutional’ logics (R. E. Meyer & 
Höllerer, 2014), to the best of my knowledge the issue of complexity within logics 
has not been addressed to date.
Finally, my dissertation adds new insights into how and why individuals (in 
contrast to ‘organizations’) respond to institutional logics (McPherson & Sauder, 
2013; Pache & Santos, 2013a; Thornton et al., 2012). My research shows that 
individuals may respond to an institutional logic through the ‘selective coupling’ 
of this logic to their daily practices, by only selecting its most desirable or suitable 
elements (e.g., by ‘cherry-picking’ the activation paradigm’s focus on returning to 
work before full recovery). In this way, individual actors conform to the prescriptions 
of an institutional logic (unlike in the case of ‘decoupling’, J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 
1977), yet in a way that serves their own interests. Furthermore, my study provides 
a better understanding of the motivations to respond to an institutional logic: while 
(Scandinavian) institutional theory traditionally assumes that behavior follows a 
logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2006), I show that the motivation to act 
appropriately depends on the presence of a ‘norm of reciprocity’, which – in its turn 
– is based on the appropriateness of the behavior of the other (e.g., the manager who 
seems to adjust his or her behavior to the actions of the employee). In other words, 
it seems that an individual only behaves appropriately when the other does (or has 
done) so as well. I call this a ‘quid-pro-quo mechanism’.
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Societal contributions
Policy implications
Despite the decline of national sickness absence rates (e.g., in the Netherlands from 
4.7 percent in 1996, to a stable average of about 4.2 percent in the period 2004-
2011, and to 3.8 percent in 2014), many sick-listed employees still leave the labor 
market via the disability pathway (38.000 people annually in the Netherlands; 
UWV, 2015). This may point to the existence of a ‘healthy worker effect’, where the 
(more) healthy employees remain at work while the severely ill and disabled, who 
are unable to meet the demand for a quick return to work, leave the labor market. In 
this way, the current policy in the Netherlands and Denmark does not seem to lead 
to an inclusive labor market.
Building on the findings of my research, the return to work of sick-listed 
employees is likely to always be focused on its speed when the financial costs need 
to be borne by employers, who are simultaneously confronted with other (business) 
interests. The similarity of findings in the Netherlands and Denmark highlights that 
these costs not only concern the statutory financial obligations, but also the indirect 
organizational costs associated with sickness absence (e.g., productivity loss, costs 
of replacement staff and of return-to-work support). It thus seems recommendable 
to reduce the sickness absence costs for employers, although a certain amount of 
financial incentives is required to motivate employers to take actions regarding 
prevention and return to work (see Chapter 5; Cuelenaere & Veerman, 2011). 
The optimal division of sickness absence responsibilities thus seems to be located 
in between the situation in the Netherlands and Denmark, and implies a reduction 
of the financial responsibility of Dutch employers, while maintaining their return-
to-work responsibility, and an increase of especially the latter responsibility for 
Danish employers. A solution might be found by again considering the activation 
policies of other countries and, more specifically, those of Germany. Although a 
detailed description is beyond the scope of my dissertation, in the German policies, 
employers face a statutory wage payment period of six weeks (i.e. longer than in 
Denmark and shorter than in the Netherlands), while they are legally required to 
implement return-to-work actions during 1.5 years. However, the costs of these 
actions are borne by health insurance companies (the so-called ‘Krankenkassen’) 
and the return-to-work process is guided by an experienced ‘Fallmanager’ (Verwer 
et al., 2013, 2014). Given the lower sickness absence and disability rates in Germany 
as compared to the Netherlands (Verwer et al., 2014), future research could examine 
return-to-work processes within German organizations, to determine whether 
the German policies provide a suitable solution for the division of responsibilities 
between employers and government in the Netherlands and Denmark.
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Implications for organizations
My research calls into question the focus of the hospitals in my study on sickness 
absence figures and a quick return to work. It is not unlikely that the disagreements 
that occurred in some cases negatively affect the sustainability of the return to 
work and the employment relationship, potentially leading to turnover. For instance, 
Arends et al. (2014) revealed how conflicts between supervisors and mentally 
sick-listed employees increase the risk of recurrent absence. Moreover, a focus on 
controlling absence figures may result in employees going to work while being ill, 
due to pressures to attend (‘presenteeism’; Taylor et al., 2010). Both turnover and 
presenteeism appear to have a negative impact on organizational performance and 
service provision (Johns, 2010; Park & Shaw, 2013). Moreover, such a short-term 
focus does not lead to the prevention of health problems (Taylor et al., 2010; Van 
Gestel et al., 2015), although prevention becomes increasingly important due to 
the aging (working) population and changing lifestyles and working environments. 
Given the expected increase in chronic illnesses (e.g., cardiovascular diseases, 
cancer and diabetes), more and more people will have to combine work with care 
for their health (Van Gestel et al., 2013). Hence, focusing on controlling sickness 
absence, without paying attention to the (work and health) problems that caused the 
illness in the first place, might be a more costly strategy in the long term. 
My dissertation provides two recommendations to improve the management of 
sickness absence. First, it shows the importance of addressing existing perceptions 
and expectations in sickness absence management, in order to prevent the 
occurrence of disagreements between employers and employees that may impair the 
return-to-work process. Change starts with raising awareness (Maon et al., 2009) 
among workplace stakeholders (and managers in particular) of their perceptions and 
expectations, and possible consequences. Raising awareness can be achieved by 
conducting ‘focus groups’ (Ivanoff & Hultberg, 2006), where managers’ perceptions 
of sick-listed employees that revealed during my research may be used as a starting-
point for discussion (see Chapter 4: loyalty, sickness absence frequency, tenure, an 
active attitude to return to work, and transparency about (in)abilities in relation 
to work). Once workplace actors are aware of their perceptions and expectations, 
their behavior may be influenced in a way that either enhances their objectivity 
in managing sickness absence (e.g., regarding managers: independent of the 
employee’s past behavior), or encourages them to explicitly communicate and 
discuss expectations towards sick-listed employees (e.g., showing an active attitude 
and being transparent about medical conditions in relation to work) and towards 
managers (e.g., showing respect, taking the employee’s interests into account). To do 
so, good communication skills are utterly important (see Chapter 5). 
A second recommendation relates to the ‘devolution’ of the practice of sickness 
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absence management from HR to line managers. Despite the advantages of 
devolving this task to line managers (e.g., their greater familiarity with the work, 
the workplace and the employee, due to their closer proximity), they are faced 
with seemingly conflicting interests: the care for the sick-listed employee and for 
the organization. My study has shown how these conflicting interests result in a 
focus on returning to work as soon as possible, which mainly seems to benefit the 
organization (on the short term). A solution for this dilemma could be to include 
a support for the sick-listed employee, or to search for a neutral third party. This 
can be readily achieved in Denmark by including the union representative or 
municipality councilor at the start of each (long-term) sickness absence case (see 
Chapter 5). However, in the Netherlands, several actors could focus on providing 
employee support or act as a neutral party, provided that the current organization 
of their roles is somewhat altered or extended. For instance, Dutch trade unions, 
works councils and municipalities, which nowadays either represent employees at 
the national/sector level or at the organizational level, or have no statutory role in 
sickness absence management, could be given a (stronger) role in individual return-
to-work processes. Another possibility can be found in the role of occupational 
health physicians, if they are enabled to take on a more supporting or independent 
position, for example, by extending their contracts and reducing their workload and 
financial dependence (Plomp & El Markhous, 2015). Finally, strategic HR policies 
could be installed that specifically advance the interests of employees, ensuring 
that HR managers can act as ‘guardians of employee wellbeing’ (Renwick, 2003a) 
next to being ‘consultants on the rules for line managers’. Hence, several options 
seem to exist to include a support for employees or a neutral third party in return-
to-work processes in the Netherlands.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Sinds de jaren 1990 is er in de verzorgingsstaten van Europese landen een nieuw idee 
ontstaan van gepast gedrag bij ziekteverzuim. Waar het voorheen vanzelfsprekend 
was om ‘uit te zieken’ alvorens terug aan het werk te gaan (en gedurende deze 
periode een uitkering te ontvangen), is de huidige veronderstelling dat werk en 
ziekte elkaar niet langer uitsluiten, en dat werk zelfs een positief effect kan hebben 
op de re-integratie. Een zieke werknemer dient dus, zodra dat mogelijk is, weer 
(gedeeltelijk) aan het werk te gaan (zij het met aangepaste werktaken of -uren). Het 
gevolg hiervan is dat niet langer wordt gekeken naar de functiebeperkingen van de 
werknemer, maar naar diens resterende werkcapaciteit (Hetzler, 2009). Deze nieuwe 
denkwijze over gepast gedrag bij ziekteverzuim vormt het ‘activeringsparadigma’ 
en past in het streven van overheden om de arbeidsmarktparticipatie te beschermen 
en te verhogen, om zodoende de economische onafhankelijkheid van individuen 
alsmede het voortbestaan van de verzorgingsstaat veilig te stellen (Bonvin, 2008; 
Eichhorst et al., 2008; Weishaupt, 2011).  
Alhoewel het activeringsparadigma tegenwoordig een geaccepteerd discours 
is op het politieke macroniveau (Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011; Eichhorst et al., 2008; 
Weishaupt, 2011), is er in de literatuur nog weinig bekend over hoe organisaties en hun 
medewerkers dit paradigma daadwerkelijk vertalen in ziekteverzuimmanagement 
(OECD, 2010; Seing et al., 2014; Tjulin et al., 2010). Dat is opvallend, omdat 
werkgevers door de invoering van het activeringsparadigma een grotere rol hebben 
gekregen om middels aanpassingen van werktaken of -uren te zorgen dat zieke 
werknemers kunnen terugkeren naar hun werk voordat zij volledig hersteld zijn 
(zie bijvoorbeeld OECD, 2010, 2015). Gezien deze tekortkoming in de literatuur is 
het doel van mijn proefschrift inzicht te verschaffen in de manier waarop het acti-
veringsparadigma op het gebied van langdurig ziekteverzuim (verzuim van minstens 
zes weken) gestalte krijgt binnen organisaties. Ik noem dit de ‘microfundamenten’ 
van het activeringsparadigma: de processen binnen organisaties waardoor macro-
ideeën, zoals het activeringsparadigma, opgepakt worden in lokale praktijken 
(Powell & Colyvas, 2008, p. 278; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). De hoofdvraag van 
mijn proefschrift is: Wat zijn de microfundamenten van het activeringsparadigma 
in het ziekteverzuimmanagement van organisaties (ziekenhuizen) in Nederland en 
Denemarken? 
 Deze vraag wordt beantwoord aan de hand van vier subvragen, die in de af- 
zonderlijke hoofdstukken behandeld worden:
1 Hoe is het activeringsparadigma vormgegeven in het nationale ziektever-
zuimbeleid in Nederland, Denemarken (en Ierland), in termen van onder- 
liggende ideeën en bestuurssystemen? (hoofdstuk 2)
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2 Hoe wordt het activeringsparadigma vertaald in het ziekteverzuimbeleid van 
organisaties en in het dagelijkse management van ziekteverzuim? (hoofdstuk 3)
3 Wat is de rol van sociale interacties in de vertaling van het activeringsparadigma 
in lokale ziekteverzuimpraktijken? (hoofdstuk 4)
4 Verschillen re-integratie-ervaringen van de diverse betrokkenen bij fysieke 
en psychische cases en, zo ja, wat zijn de gevolgen van deze verschillen voor 
het re-integratieproces in beide cases? (hoofdstuk 5)
Om deze vragen te onderzoeken heb ik gebruik gemaakt van de ‘institutionele 
theorie’, die tot doel heeft te verklaren hoe maatschappelijke verwachtingen van 
gepast gedrag het handelen van organisaties en individuen beïnvloeden (Dacin, 
1997; Scott, 2008). Deze verwachtingen bestaan uit regels en wetgeving, normen 
en overtuigingen, en culturele voorschriften of ‘institutionele logica’s’: expliciete 
en impliciete regels van gepaste acties en interacties, die behoren bij een bepaalde 
‘institutionele orde’, zoals de staat, religie, markt, familie en professies (Pache & 
Santos, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Het activeringsparadigma kan gezien 
worden als zo’n institutionele logica, zoals ik in hoofdstuk 2 laat zien. 
In mijn proefschrift heb ik gekozen om een specifieke benadering van de insti-
tutionele theorie toe te passen – het ‘Scandinavisch institutionalisme’ (Czarniawska 
& Sevón, 1996, 2003) en, in het bijzonder, de ‘translatiebenadering’ (Czarniawska 
& Joerges, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Deze invalshoek biedt betere mogelijk-
heden om de vertaalprocessen van institutionele logica’s binnen organisaties te 
onderzoeken dan de macro-georiënteerde institutionele theorie. ‘Vertaling’ wordt 
hierbij gedefinieerd als de “min of meer bewuste verandering van praktijken en/of 
ideeën als verschillende actoren deze praktijken of ideeën proberen te implemen-
teren in hun eigen context” (Røvik, 2011, p. 642; eigen vertaling). Het doel van mijn 
proefschrift is om verder bij te dragen aan deze benadering door expliciet te kijken 
naar vertaalprocessen op het microniveau, dat wil zeggen, naar de acties en inter-
acties van individuen. Dit heb ik bijvoorbeeld gedaan door de translatiebenadering 
te combineren met de ‘sociale uitwisselingstheorie’ (Blau, 1964), die gedrag op het 
werk probeert te verklaren door expliciet te kijken naar interacties in organisaties 
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Di Domenico et al., 2009).
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Onderzoekscontext
 
Mijn onderzoek is uitgevoerd in Nederland, Denemarken en (aanvankelijk) in 
Ierland.8 De keuze voor deze landen is gebaseerd op hun vergelijkbare verzuim-
cijfers, en daarmee de gelijke noodzaak om het beroep op uitkeringen voor ziekte 
(en arbeidsongeschiktheid) te verminderen (OECD, 2008). Daarbij leidde hun 
reputatie als ‘werkgelegenheidswonderen’ in de aanpak van werkloosheid (Auer, 
2002; Schwartz & Becker, 2005; Torfing, 1999) tot de veronderstelling dat deze 
drie landen het activeringsparadigma ook hebben geïmplementeerd op het gebied 
van ziekteverzuim. Een andere reden voor de keuze voor Nederland, Denemarken 
en Ierland is de verschillende verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling tussen de overheid 
en werkgevers in het nationale ziekteverzuimbeleid: waar het Nederlandse beleid 
vooral de (financiële) rol van werkgevers in de aanpak van verzuim benadrukt, ligt 
de nadruk in het Ierse beleid geheel op de rol van de centrale overheid. Denemarken 
neemt een middenpositie in: lokale gemeentes zijn hoofdverantwoordelijk, maar 
werkgevers krijgen een steeds grotere rol. Het is interessant om te bestuderen of 
deze verschillen leiden tot een andere ziekteverzuimaanpak binnen organisaties.
Daarnaast richt mijn onderzoek zich specifiek op de zorgsector, omdat het 
management van ziekteverzuim binnen deze sector urgent is, en daarmee een 
relevante onderzoekscontext biedt. De zorgsector heeft bijvoorbeeld over het 
algemeen te kampen met hogere verzuimcijfers dan andere sectoren (in 2013 was het 
gemiddelde verzuimcijfer 3,9 procent in Nederland en 3,8 procent in Denemarken, 
ten opzichte van respectievelijk 4,8 en 6,1 procent in de gezondheidszorg in beide 
landen; Statistics Netherlands, 2015a; Statistics Denmark, 2015b). Daarbij dreigt er 
een tekort aan personeel in de zorg, wat versterkt wordt door de vergrijzende (beroeps)
bevolking (Buchan & Aiken, 2008). Het is dus zeer belangrijk voor zorgorganisaties 
om hun medewerkers te behouden, en te voorkomen dat zij uitvallen wegens ziekte. 
Binnen de gezondheidszorg richt mijn onderzoek zich op ziekenhuizen (twee in elk 
land), omdat deze organisaties internationaal goed vergelijkbaar en groot genoeg 
zijn om voldoende verzuimcases te bestuderen zonder daarbij de anonimiteit en 
privacy van individuele deelnemers te schenden.
De onderzoeksdata zijn in twee studies verzameld. De eerste studie is een meer-
voudige case studie op nationaal niveau, waarin het ziekteverzuimbeleid van 
Nederland, Denemarken en Ierland onderzocht is door middel van een literatuur-
studie en 18 interviews met experts op het gebied van ziekteverzuim, re-integratie, 
8 Zoals uit hoofdstuk 2 blijkt, is het activeringsparadigma nog niet geïmplementeerd in het Ierse ziekteverzuimbeleid en 
biedt Ierland daarom uiteindelijk geen geschikte context voor het bestuderen van de microfundamenten van dit paradigma. 
Daarom is besloten om dit land uit te sluiten van verder onderzoek naar het ziekteverzuimmanagement binnen organisaties.
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arbeidsomstandigheden of sociale zekerheid in het algemeen (te weten: overheids- 
functionarissen, vertegenwoordigers van werkgeversorganisaties en vakbonden, en 
onderzoekers). Deze studie staat centraal in hoofdstuk 2. De tweede studie is een 
meervoudige case studie naar het ziekteverzuimmanagement binnen twee Neder-
landse en twee Deense ziekenhuizen. Hierbij is het ziekteverzuimbeleid van de 
ziekenhuizen onderzocht, en zijn interviews gehouden met de betrokkenen in 21 
langdurige verzuimcases (61 interviews in totaal, met zieke medewerkers, managers 
en – indien betrokken – Human Resource (HR) managers, vakbondsvertegenwoor-
digers, bedrijfsartsen en andere professionals rondom arbeid en gezondheid). De 
hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 5 zijn gebaseerd op deze studie.
Bevindingen
Hoofdstuk 2 verschaft inzicht in hoe het activeringsparadigma vorm heeft gekregen 
in het nationale ziekteverzuimbeleid in Nederland, Denemarken en Ierland, als de 
noodzakelijke eerste stap om de microfundamenten van dit paradigma te begrijpen. 
Het activeringsparadigma wordt hier bezien als een institutionele logica die bestaat 
uit (1) onderliggende ideeën over het probleem van ziekteverzuim en over hoe en 
door wie dit probleem moet worden opgelost, en (2) een bestuurssysteem bestaande 
uit een verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling, een beschrijving van rollen en taken, en 
een keuze voor regulatieve instrumenten. Alhoewel Nederland en Denemarken de 
onderliggende ideeën van het activeringsparadigma hebben overgenomen in hun 
ziekteverzuimbeleid, heeft Ierland dat (nog) niet gedaan (waardoor besloten is dit 
land uit te sluiten van mijn onderzoek, zie voetnoot). Ondanks hun overeenkomsten 
in onderliggende ideeën, blijken het Nederlandse en Deense beleid te verschillen in 
hun bestuurssystemen: terwijl Nederlandse werkgevers zowel de financiële als de 
re-integratieverantwoordelijkheid dragen gedurende twee jaar (zonder de mogelijk- 
heid tot ontslag en met gedetailleerde wetgeving en sancties), zijn Deense werkgevers 
financieel verantwoordelijk voor 30 dagen en hebben zij een beperkte re-integratie-
verantwoordelijkheid (met de mogelijkheid tot ontslag en zonder sancties), aangezien 
gemeentes in Denemarken hoofdverantwoordelijk zijn. Deze verschillende bestuurs-
systemen zouden kunnen leiden tot verschillende ziekteverzuimpraktijken, wat in 
de rest van de hoofdstukken onderzocht is en vooral in hoofdstuk 5 en 6 expliciet 
behandeld is.      
De hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 zoomen in op het meso (organisatie-) en microniveau 
en laten zien dat het activeringsparadigma vertaald kan worden als een focus op 
het welzijn van de medewerker of op kostenreductie, twee interpretaties die niet 
perse verenigbaar zijn. Om met deze situatie van complexiteit om te gaan, blijkt uit 
hoofdstuk 3 dat individuele actoren (exclusief werknemers) in de twee Nederlandse 
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en Deense ziekenhuizen het activeringsparadigma vertalen door vooral de voor hen 
meest voordelige elementen over te nemen. Ik noem dit het ‘selectief koppelen’ van 
het activeringsparadigma aan lokale ziekteverzuimpraktijken, oftewel: ‘de krenten uit 
de pap halen’. Dit houdt in dat de nadruk van het activeringsparadigma op een vroege 
re-integratie (dat wil zeggen voordat volledig herstel is opgetreden), in veel gevallen 
gebruikt wordt om zieke medewerkers zo snel mogelijk te laten terugkeren, zelfs als 
dat volgens de werknemer niet mogelijk is. Deze focus op een snelle re-integratie 
lijkt te ontstaan doordat ziekte losgekoppeld wordt van de nood tot verzuim in het 
ziekteverzuimbeleid (bijvoorbeeld in de slogan ‘ziekte overkomt je, verzuim is een 
keuze’), hetgeen het voor individuele betrokkenen mogelijk maakt om werknemers 
onder druk te zetten om snel terug te keren. Met andere woorden, ‘zo snel mogelijk’ 
re-integreren blijkt de voorkeur te hebben boven ‘zo snel mogelijk’ terugkeren naar 
werk, waarbij rekening gehouden wordt met de belangen van de werknemer. 
Hierdoor lijkt het activeringsparadigma op zo’n manier vertaald te worden dat het 
voornamelijk overeenkomt met de focus op kostenbesparing. 
Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 nuanceren deze conclusie: of het activeringsparadigma 
vertaald wordt als een focus op het welzijn van de medewerker of op kostenreductie 
blijkt afhankelijk van de managers’ positieve of negatieve perceptie van de sociale 
interactie met hun werknemers in het heden en het verleden (hoofdstuk 4), alsmede 
van de oorzaak van de ziekte (fysiek of psychisch) en de verwachte verzuimduur 
(hoofdstuk 5). Door de vertaling van het activeringsparadigma te bekijken vanuit 
het ‘sociale uitwisselingsperspectief’, laat hoofdstuk 4 zien dat de nadruk op een 
snelle terugkeer afhangt van de beoordeling die managers geven aan hun sociale 
interactie met de zieke werknemer. Deze beoordelingen blijken gebaseerd op één of 
meer van de volgende criteria: de waarde van de zieke medewerker voor de afdeling 
(loyaliteit), de lengte van het dienstverband, de verzuimfrequentie (alle drie 
kenmerken van het verleden), de actieve houding van de zieke werknemer om terug 
te keren naar het werk en diens openheid over medische (on)mogelijkheden in relatie 
tot werk (kenmerken van het heden). De nadruk op een snelle re-integratie bestaat dan 
vooral voor zieke medewerkers met een negatieve beoordeling van hun manager: in 
deze cases worden het activeringsparadigma en de bijbehorende regels strikt vertaald, 
zonder daarbij in eerste instantie naar de belangen van de werknemer te kijken. 
Hier verloopt het re-integratieproces problematisch, omdat er conflicten ontstaan 
tussen managers en werknemers over wanneer en hoe snel de werknemer moet 
terugkeren. Medewerkers met een positieve beoordeling krijgen daarentegen meer 
tijd en ruimte om terug te keren naar het werk, door een flexibele vertaling van het 
activeringsparadigma. Daarbij moet echter opgemerkt worden dat deze werknemers al 
een actieve houding vertonen om snel terug te keren naar het werk.
Hoofdstuk 5 vergelijkt de re-integratie-ervaringen van individuele betrokkenen 
tussen fysieke en psychische cases. Dit hoofdstuk toont aan hoe de focus op een 
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snelle re-integratie vooral optreedt bij werknemers die verzuimen met psychische 
klachten; bij fysiek zieke werknemers is dit alleen het geval als hun re-integratie 
langer duurt dan verwacht. In de Nederlandse ziekenhuizen komt deze druk vooral 
tot uiting tijdens het bepalen van de resterende werkcapaciteit door de bedrijfsarts 
bij psychische cases, die in zijn beoordeling (volgens de werknemer) te snel beslist 
dat een werknemer kan re-integreren, zonder daarbij diens klachten te erkennen. In 
de Deense ziekenhuizen lijkt de focus op een snelle terugkeer bij zowel psychische als 
fysieke klachten te ontstaan bij het ontbreken van een re-integratieplan, het afwijken 
van de gemaakte plannen of als dit plan niet is afgestemd op de behoeften van 
de medewerker. Ook hier ontstaan conflicten tussen de werknemer en de manager 
over wanneer en hoe snel de werknemer moet re-integreren. Van beide landen kan 
geleerd worden: de Deense cases laten zien dat de focus op een snelle terugkeer 
voorkomen kan worden door een vertegenwoordiger van de vakbond of de gemeente 
te betrekken als een steun voor de zieke werknemer, terwijl uit de Nederlandse cases 
geconcludeerd kan worden dat het re-integratieplan – los van de aard van de ziekte 
– belangrijk is als een leidraad voor de werknemer, mits dit plan rekening houdt 
met de behoeften en mogelijkheden van de werknemer. Ondanks het bestaan van 
verschillende percepties over fysieke en psychische klachten, toont dit hoofdstuk de 
relevantie van een gelijkwaardige dialoog over resterende werkcapaciteit alsmede 
het belang van een re-integratieplan, ongeacht de aard van de ziekte. 
Samenvattend laat mijn proefschrift zien dat de snelheid van re-integreren 
centraal staat in de vertaling van het activeringsparadigma binnen organisaties, 
maar ook dat het management van ziekteverzuim een subjectieve praktijk is, 
waarbij percepties van andermans gedrag (in dit geval van de zieke werknemer) 
en verwachtingen over (het verloop van) ziektes beïnvloeden hoe omgegaan wordt 
met verzuim. In tegenstelling tot de assumptie dat de verschillen tussen Nederland 
en Denemarken (in termen van rollen en verantwoordelijkheden van werk- 
gevers) zouden leiden tot een andere manier van ziekteverzuimmanagement, bleken 
mijn bevindingen juist erg vergelijkbaar tussen beide landen. Dit kan betekenen 
dat lokale situaties meer impact hebben dan macro-ideeën (zoals het activerings- 
paradigma), maar ook dat Nederland en Denemarken wellicht niet zo verschillend 
zijn: beide landen zijn “kleinere, hoogontwikkelde Noordwest-Europese landen met 
een vergelijkbare cultuur van tolerantie en flexibiliteit en met een sterke toewijding 
aan de sociale rechten van burgers” (Van Oorschot & Abrahamson, 2003, p. 289, 
eigen vertaling). De overeenkomsten in mijn bevindingen kunnen er echter ook op 
wijzen dat de strenge, gedetailleerde wetgeving in Nederland (inclusief sancties) en 
de normatieve wetgeving in Denemarken (zonder sancties, maar inclusief morele 
overreding door campagnes) hetzelfde effect hebben (zie bijvoorbeeld Vasudeva, 2013).
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Theoretische bijdragen
Mijn proefschrift draagt op drie manieren bij aan de (Scandinavische) institutionele 
theorie en de translatiebenadering. Allereerst bevestigt mijn onderzoek het belang van 
een multi-niveau benadering binnen de institutionele theorie, en in het bijzonder 
in het bestuderen van de microfundamenten van institutionele logica’s (Battilana, 
2006; Reay et al., 2013; Van Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011). Op elk van de niveaus 
(macro, meso, micro) is duidelijk geworden dat logica’s niet op zichzelf bestaan, 
maar “dat ze alleen betekenis krijgen indien zij uitgedragen worden in de praktijk” 
(Lindberg, 2014, p. 496, eigen vertaling). De toepassing van de translatiebenadering 
in mijn studie laat echter zien dat tijdens de vertaling van een bepaalde logica, 
interpretaties en acties op microniveau in strijd kunnen zijn met veronderstellingen 
en intenties op macroniveau (bijvoorbeeld door ‘selectief koppelen’). Mijn onderzoek 
wijst hiermee op het belang van het onderzoeken van (inter)acties op het individuele 
niveau om de microfundamenten van institutionele logica’s te begrijpen, en laat 
zien hoe de translatiebenadering daarvoor een geschikte invalshoek biedt.
Een tweede bijdrage van mijn proefschrift relateert aan de definitie van ‘insti- 
tutionele complexiteit’, als de situatie waarin de voorschriften van meerdere insti-
tutionele ordes en hun logica’s met elkaar botsen (Greenwood et al., 2011). Mijn 
onderzoek laat zien dat institutionele complexiteit niet alleen hoeft te bestaan bij twee 
of meer institutionele logica’s, maar dat dit ook kan voorkomen binnen één logica, 
als die op meerdere manieren geïnterpreteerd kan worden en deze interpretaties 
met elkaar botsen. Zo blijkt het activeringsparadigma interpreteerbaar te zijn als 
een focus op het welzijn van de medewerker en als een focus op kostenbesparing. 
Deze foci bleken niet perse verenigbaar, omdat beide interpretaties ander gedrag 
voorschrijven: investeren (in het welzijn van de medewerker) versus besparen. Deze 
situatie van ‘intra-logica complexiteit’ kan leiden tot verschillende lokale praktijken. 
Alhoewel er wel oproepen zijn geweest om de definitie van ‘onverenigbaarheid’ 
aan te scherpen (Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013) alsook van 
‘institutionele’ logica’s (R.E. Meyer & Höllerer, 2014), is het bestaan van complexiteit 
binnen logica’s nog niet eerder beschreven in de literatuur. 
Ten slotte heeft mijn onderzoek inzicht gegeven in een tot nu toe grijs gebied 
binnen de institutionele theorie: hoe en waarom individuele actoren (in plaats van 
organisaties als geheel) reageren op institutionele logica’s (McPherson & Sauder, 
2013; Pache & Santos, 2013a; Thornton et al., 2012). Mijn proefschrift laat zien dat 
individuele actoren kunnen reageren op institutionele logica’s door het ‘selectief 
koppelen’ van deze logica’s aan hun dagelijkse praktijken, door alleen de meest 
voordelige elementen te gebruiken (‘de krenten uit de pap halen’, zoals de focus van 
het activeringsparadigma op het terugkeren naar werk voordat volledig herstel is 
opgetreden). Op deze manier implementeren individuele actoren de voorschriften van 
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gepast gedrag (in tegenstelling tot de situatie bij ‘ontkoppelen’, J.W. Meyer & Rowan, 
1977), maar zodanig dat zij daarmee ook andere (organisatie)belangen dienen, zoals 
kostenbesparing. Daarnaast heeft mijn onderzoek inzicht verschaft in de motivaties 
van individuele actoren om de voorschriften van een logica te volgen: hoewel de 
veronderstelling binnen de institutionele theorie is dat mensen gemotiveerd worden 
door hun behoefte om zich gepast te gedragen (March & Olsen, 2006), laat ik zien dat 
dit geldt als er een ‘norm van wederkerigheid’ bestaat, die is gebaseerd op het gedrag 
van de ander (zoals managers die met hun gedrag reageren op hun perceptie van het 
gedrag van zieke werknemers). Met andere woorden: alleen als de één zich gepast 
gedraagt, zal de ander dit ook doen. Dit noem ik een ‘quid pro quo’ mechanisme.
Maatschappelijke bijdragen
Implicaties voor beleid
Ondanks de daling van de landelijke verzuimcijfers (in Nederland bijvoorbeeld van 
4,7 procent in 1996, naar een stabiele 4,2 procent in de periode 2004-2011, en naar 
3,8 procent in 2014; Statistics Netherlands, 2015a), zijn er nog steeds veel zieke 
werknemers die de arbeidsmarkt verlaten op een arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkering 
(in Nederland zijn dat 38.000 mensen per jaar; UWV, 2015). Dit kan wijzen op de 
aanwezigheid van het ‘gezonde werknemer effect’, waarbij de gezonde werknemers 
aan het werk blijven terwijl de ernstig zieken, die niet ‘zo snel mogelijk’ terug 
kunnen keren, de arbeidsmarkt verlaten. Zo bezien lijkt het huidige beleid in zowel 
Nederland als Denemarken – dat in mijn organisaties geïnterpreteerd wordt als een 
focus op de snelheid van re-integreren, zonder daarbij altijd rekening te houden met 
de behoeften en mogelijkheden van de werknemer – niet te leiden tot een inclusieve 
arbeidsmarkt voor iedereen. 
Voortbouwend op de bevindingen van mijn onderzoek, lijkt het aannemelijk dat 
de re-integratie van zieke werknemers binnen organisaties altijd gefocust zal zijn 
op ‘snelheid’ als de financiële lasten gedragen dienen te worden door werkgevers, 
die tegelijkertijd geconfronteerd worden met andere (bedrijfs)belangen. De vergelijk-
baarheid van mijn bevindingen tussen Nederland en Denemarken laat zien dat het bij 
deze financiële lasten niet alleen gaat om de wettelijke loondoorbetaling bij ziekte, 
maar ook om de indirecte verzuimkosten (zoals de kosten van productiviteitsverlies, 
vervangend personeel, re-integratieondersteuning). Het lijkt dus aan te raden om 
de kosten van verzuim voor werkgevers te verlagen, alhoewel een zekere mate van 
financiële prikkeling nodig is om werkgevers aan te zetten tot actie op het gebied van 
preventie en re-integratie (zie hoofdstuk 5; Cuelenaere & Veerman, 2011). 
Een geschikte verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling bij ziekte lijkt dus te liggen 
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tussen de Nederlandse en Deense situatie in, en impliceert een verlaging van de 
financiële verantwoordelijkheid voor werkgevers in Nederland, met behoud van hun 
verantwoordelijkheid voor het re-integratieproces, en een vergroting van vooral de 
re-integratieverantwoordelijkheid voor werkgevers in Denemarken. Door wederom 
naar andere landen te kijken, kan een mogelijke verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling 
wellicht ook letterlijk tussen beide landen in gevonden worden. Bij ziekteverzuim 
blijken werkgevers in Duitsland namelijk gedurende zes weken financieel 
verantwoordelijk te zijn (langer dan in Denemarken, maar korter dan in Nederland), 
terwijl ze de verplichting hebben om zieke werknemers te re-integreren gedurende 
anderhalf jaar. De kosten hiervoor worden echter gedragen door zorgverzekeraars (de 
‘Krankenkassen’) en het proces wordt begeleid door een ervaren ‘Fallmanager’ (Verwer 
et al., 2013, 2014). Gezien de lagere ziekteverzuim- en arbeidsongeschiktheidscijfers 
van Duitsland ten opzichte van Nederland (Verwer et al., 2014), is het voor toekomstig 
onderzoek interessant om de re-integratieprocessen binnen Duitse organisaties te 
bestuderen om te bezien of het Duitse beleid daadwerkelijk een goede oplossing 
biedt voor Nederland en Denemarken.
Implicaties voor organisaties
Mijn proefschrift wijst op het belang van een andere kijk op ziekteverzuimmanagement 
dan de focus op ziekteverzuimcijfers en een zo snel mogelijke terugkeer. Het is 
niet ondenkbaar dat de conflicten binnen sommige cases in mijn studie de duur-
zaamheid van de re-integratie of van de arbeidsrelatie aantasten, hetgeen mogelijk 
resulteert in verloop. Zo hebben Arends et al. (2014) laten zien dat conflicten tussen 
leidinggevenden en werknemers die verzuimen vanwege psychische klachten, de 
kans op terugkerend verzuim vergroten. De nadruk op het beheersen van verzuim-
cijfers kan er bovendien toe leiden dat werknemers ziek doorwerken omdat ze 
niet meer durven te verzuimen (‘presenteïsme’; Taylor et al., 2010). Zowel verloop 
als presenteïsme blijken de productiviteit van een organisatie te verlagen en de 
dienstverlening te verslechteren (Johns, 2010; Park & Shaw, 2013). Bovendien leidt 
een dergelijke aanpak niet tot de preventie van gezondheidsproblemen (Taylor et al., 
2010; Van Gestel et al., 2015), ondanks het toenemende belang van preventie door 
de vergrijzende (beroeps)bevolking en een veranderende leefstijl en werkomgeving. 
De verwachte toename in chronische ziekten (zoals hart- en vaatziekten, kanker 
en diabetes), zullen ertoe leiden dat steeds meer mensen de zorg voor hun ziekte 
moeten combineren met hun werk (Van Gestel et al., 2013). Een eenzijdige focus op 
een snelle terugkeer, zonder daarbij de (werk- en gezondheidsgerelateerde) oorzaken 
van verzuim aan te pakken, kan dus op de lange termijn een kostbare strategie zijn. 
Mijn onderzoek biedt twee aanbevelingen om het management van ziekteverzuim 
te verbeteren. Een eerste aanbeveling betreft het onder de aandacht brengen van 
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percepties en verwachtingen in ziekteverzuimmanagement, om zo mogelijke conflicten 
tussen werkgevers en werknemers te voorkomen die het re-integratieproces kunnen 
vertragen. Het is hierbij van belang om de betrokkenen, en vooral managers, bewust 
te maken van hun percepties van werknemers en de gevolgen van deze percepties 
voor hun benadering van verzuim. Deze bewustwording kan gerealiseerd worden 
door middel van ‘focus groepen’ (Ivanoff & Hultberg, 2006), waarbij de in hoofdstuk 
4 gevonden percepties die managers hadden van hun zieke werknemers kunnen 
dienen als uitgangspunt voor discussie (loyaliteit, lengte van het dienstverband, 
ziekteverzuimfrequentie, actieve houding om te re-integreren, openheid over (on)
mogelijkheden in relatie tot werk). Vervolgens kunnen de betrokkenen gestimuleerd 
worden om meer objectief te handelen bij ziekteverzuim (bijvoorbeeld met betrekking 
tot managers: los van het gedrag van werknemers in het verleden) of om beter te 
communiceren over verwachtingen ten aanzien van werknemers (zoals het vertonen 
van een actieve houding en openheid) en van managers (zoals het erkennen van 
de ziekte, rekening houden met de belangen van de werknemer). Hierbij zijn goede 
communicatievaardigheden onontbeerlijk (zie hoofdstuk 5). 
Een tweede aanbeveling betreft de decentralisatie van verantwoordelijkheden bij 
ziekteverzuim van HR naar lijnmanagers. Ondanks de voordelen van lijnmanagers 
als case managers (hun grotere bekendheid met de werknemer, het werk en de 
werkplek), hebben zij te maken met belangen die moeilijk verenigbaar lijken te 
zijn: de zorg voor de werknemer en die voor de organisatie. Mijn studie heeft laten 
zien dat deze tegenstrijdige belangen leiden tot een focus op een zo snel mogelijke 
re-integratie, wat voornamelijk ten gunste komt van organisaties (op korte termijn). 
Een oplossing voor dit dilemma zou kunnen zijn om een support voor de werknemer 
aan te wijzen, of om te zoeken naar een neutrale derde partij. Hierbij kan in 
Denemarken besloten worden om de vakbonds- of gemeentevertegenwoordiger bij 
aanvang van alle (langdurige) ziekteverzuimgevallen in te schakelen (zie hoofdstuk 
5). In Nederland zijn er verschillende actoren die een ondersteunende of neutrale 
rol zouden kunnen spelen, mits de huidige invulling van hun rollen veranderd of 
aangevuld wordt. Zo zouden vakbonden, ondernemingsraden en gemeentes, die op 
dit moment werknemers vertegenwoordigen op het nationale/sectorale niveau of op 
het organisatieniveau, of die nog geen wettelijke rol spelen bij ziekteverzuim, een 
(grotere) rol kunnen krijgen in het re-integratieproces van individuele medewerkers. 
Een andere optie is om de ondersteunende of onafhankelijke positie van bedrijfsartsen 
te bevorderen, door bijvoorbeeld hun contracten uit te breiden, hun werkdruk te 
verlagen en hun financiële afhankelijkheid te verminderen (Plomp & El Markhous, 
2015). Ten slotte kunnen organisaties strategisch HR beleid invoeren dat specifiek 
gericht is op het bevorderen van de belangen van werknemers (Renwick, 2003a), 
zodat HR managers voor zowel werknemers als werkgevers een rol kunnen spelen. 
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